Tactical military deception

Available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va Thesis (M.S. in Systems Engineering) Naval Postgraduate School, 1985 Includes...

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This article is from Frontiers in Psychology, volume 5.AbstractNone

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DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY. CALIFORNIA 93943

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California

THESIS TACTICAL MILITARY DECEPTION by

John Anton Van Vleet

»

Thesis Advisor:

September 1985

K.

Herbig

Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

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GOVT ACCESSION NO

Subtitle)

RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

5.

TYPE OF REPORT

&

PERIOD COVERED

Master's Thesis; September 1985

Tactical Military Deception

7.

3.

AUTHORC*;

6.

PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

B.

CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS.)

John Anton Van Vleet 9.

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS

10.

PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK AREA WORK UNIT NUMBERS ft

Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100 II.

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Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100

REPORT DATE

September 1985 13.

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Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.

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19.

KEY WOROS

(of the abatract entered In

(Continue on reveree elde

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neceeearv and Identity by block number)

It

Deception; Surprise; Decision-Making; Operations Security; Electronic Warfare; Stratagem

20.

ABSTRACT

(Continue on ravaraa alda

11

nacaaaary and Identity by block number)

This is a study of deception in military operations with emphasis on the Army division level. The thesis is developed from empirical data, fundamental processes, and decision-making processes. It is a comprehensive analysis of the battlefield deception process and is a basic guide to deception planning. The thesis formulates a theory for operational military deception as an extension of the pioneering work of Barton Whaley. DD

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Whaley's deception data base is analyzed to show trends in operational deception. These trends are combined with pertinent elements of game, communication, organization, and systems theory as well as decision-making and perceptual and cognitive processes. As a result of this study, the author presents conclusions and recommendations on how deception might be better applied to support U.S. Army division operations.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWh.n

Data Entarad)

Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

Tactical Military Deception by

John Anton Van Vleet Major, United States Ariry 3.S., United States Military Academy,

iy?4

in partial fulfillirent of tne t ted requirements for the degree of

S'jtrri

MASTER CF SCIENCJ. IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (Electronic Warfare) from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 1985

A3STRACT This is a study of deception in military operations errphasis on

the Army division level.

making

processes.

It

is a

decision-

and

comprehensive analysis

deception process and is

battlefield

The thesis is developed

fundarrental processes,

empirical data,

from

with

a

of

the

basic guide to decep-

tion planning. The thesis formulates

deception

as

Whaley.

an

Whaley

a

theory for

extension of the pioneering work 's

deception

military

operational

Barton

of

data base is analyzed to

trends in operational deception.

These trends ere

show

combined

with rertlnent elements of game, communication, organisation, and

systems theory as well as decision-making and

perceptual

and cognitive processes.

As

a

conclusions

result and

of

this

study,

the

author

recommendations on how deception

presents might

better applied to support U.S. Army division operations.

be

TABLE OF CONTENTS I.

INTRODUCTION

12

II.

DECEPTION IN GENERAL

14

III

IV.

V.

.

A.

PROPOSITIONS ON MILITARY DECEPTION

14

3.

STRATEGIC VERSUS TACTICAL IECEPTION

21

BACKGROUND

23

A.

FORCE EFFECTIVENESS AND SURPRISE

24

E.

SURPRISE AND DECEPTION

25

C.

ECONOMICS OF DECEPTION

27

D.

TFE GENERAL STAFF SYSTEM AND DECEPTION

28

E.

TFE 33 AS TKI DECEPTION PLANNER

32

TACTICAL DECEPTION GUIDANCE

34

A.

DECEPTION PLAN EXAMPLE

34

3.

EXECUTION AND RESULTS

37

C.

SUMMARY

43

D.

TEE NEED FOR ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL DECEPTION

44

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

46

A.

COMMUNICATIONS THEORY

45

B„

ORGANIZATION THEORY

56

C.

SYSTEMS THEORY

€2

D.

GAME THEORY AS PART OF DECISION THEORY

66

E.

PERCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES

S0

F.

DECISION MAKING

b3

G.

TRANSITION

101

VI.

103

CAST EISTCRY ANALYSTS A.

DATA

104

3.

CPITERIA

106

C.

ANALYSIS OF DECEPTION EFFECTIVENESS

108

D.

ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL DECEPTION PRACTICES

142

E.

SUMMARY

169

VII. CONCLUSIONS

184

A.

IMPORTANCE OF PAST USE OF DECEPTION

184

E.

FUTUPE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL DECEPTION

185

C.

OPTIMAL DECEPTION PRACTICES

186

D.

INTEGRATION OF TEE OPERATIONS PLAN AND TEE DECEPTION PLAN

200

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

206

E.

:

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

212

A.

ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIVES MODEL FOR OPERATION'S

212

E.

DECEPTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION BY A U.S. ARMY DIVISION

228

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

24^

C.

AFPFNDIX A. A.

E.

C.

LISTS CF RATTLES FROM TEE DATA EASE

242

LIST A: CASES OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE AND/CR DECEPTION

242

LIST E: CASES CF TACTICAL SURPRISE AND/OR DECEPTION

244

LIbT C: TACTICAL CASES NOT INVOLVING SURPRISE OR DECEPTION

246

LIST CF REFERENCES

249

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

258

LIST OF TABLES

1

- SURPRISE ANT RESULTS OF BATTLE

2 3

-

25

SURPRISE AND CASUALTIES

26

DECISION ENVIRONMENTS AN! CRITERIA

71

4 - TWO-PERSON,

ZERO-SUM GAMS MATRIX

72 73

5

-

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE GAME MATRIX

5

-

USE OF DECEPTION AND ACHIEVING SURPRISE

108

7 -

tactical deception and surprise

let

8 -

tactical mission effects on surprise AND EFCEPTICN

109

S

- LIST A

STRATEGIC SURPRISE AND DECEPTION CASES OVER TIME

110

10 - LIST B TACTICAL SURPRISE

11

-

AND DECEPTION CASES OVER TIME

111

SURPRISE ANT PECEFTICN OVER TIME

111

12 - EFFECT OE 13 -

DECEPTION USED BY THE OFFENSE

115

PROBABILITY OF OFFENSIVE OVERWHELMING VICTORY

lie

14 - RESULTS CI DECEPTION FAILURE

117

15 - EFFECT Gi

lib

DECEPTION ON THE DEFENSE

16 - FORCE USED TO GAIN OBJECTIVES AETER WW

127

I

17 - ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS

FCRCFS AKE CASUALTIES

18 - ENVIRONMENT VERSUS

FORCES AND CASUALTIES



123 129

19 - DECEPTION VERSUS FORCES ANT CASUALTIES

131

20 - ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS FORCE EFFECTIVENESS

132

21 - FCRCFS

AND CASUALTY RATIOS (OVERWHELMING VICTOFY)

133

22 - FORCES AN! CASUALTY RATIOS

(CLEAR VICTORY)

134

AND CASUALTY RATIOS (MARGINAL VICTORIES)

23 - FORCES

24 - FORCES AND CASUALTY RATIOS

135

135

(DEFEAT)

25 - PROBABILITY OF DECEPTION GIVEN FORCE RATIOS

135

EXCHANGE VERSUS OUTCOME OF 3ATTLE

13S

26 - TERRITORY

2? - TERRITORY EXCHANGE THRESHOLD

CASE REDUCTION EFFECT

CASES BY CATEGORY

EXCHANGE

28 - TERRITORY

140 140

29 - MODE FREQUENCY OF SURPRISE

144

30 - MODE FREQUENCIES OF DECEPTION

GENERATED SURPRISE 31 - MODE FREQUENCIES

32

-

IN

144

PRECONCEPTION CASES

147

MODE FREQUENCIES GIVEN TECEPTION AND PRECONCEPTION

147 I

33

-

*CDE FREQUENCIES GIVEN PERCEPTION REINFORCEMENT

148

34 - INTENSITY OF SURPRISE

149

35 - FXPECTED VALUE EASED ON SURPRISE INTENSITY

151

36 - INTENSITY OF SURPRISE

151

(DECEPTION CASES)

37 - EXPECTED VALUES OF DECEPTION CASES

152

INTENSITY OF SURPRISE (DECEPTION AND PRECONCEPTION)

lti

38

-

39 - VALUES

(DECEPTION BASED ON PRECONCEPTION

40 - MODF PAIR ANALYSIS AT INTENSITY TWO 41

-

^ODE P/IR ANALYSIS

(TOTAL FREQUENCY)

)

153 154

155

42 - MODE PAIS ANALYSIS

(PRICONCEPTICN BASED DECEPTION) 43 - VALUE OF

A

HIGH DEGREE OF SURPRISE

44 - EEFECT OP WARNING ON TACTICAL SURPRISI

156 158 15 &

45 - OVERALL 5.FFECT OF WARNING

162

46 - EFFECT OF SCHEDULE CHANGES ON EXPECTED VALUE

16?

47 _ EFFECT OF DEFERRED SCHEDULES ON OUTCOME

154

48 - DEMONSTRATION VERSUS FEINT

166

49 - RUSE FREQUENCY OF USE

167

50 - NUMPEB OF RUSES VERSUS OUTCOME

167

51

-

DECEPTION MEASURES TO DISPLAY THE FALSE

163

52 - DECEPTION MEASURES TO CREATE AMBIGUITY

168

53 - DECEPTION MEASURES USFD TO CONCFAL TEE PEAL

16?

54 - COMPARISON OF VICTORY CRITERIA

174

55 - SOMME OFFENSIVE DATA COMPARISON

175

^6 - TACTICAL SURPRISE FACTORS

177

57 - CJMA DATA BASE VALUES

177

FOR SURPRISE

58 - OPTIONAL WEIGHTING SCHEMES

180

59 - COMPARISON OF WEIGHTING SCEEMES

U

€?

-

MODE PAIR RANKING 3Y WEIGHTING OPTION

61 - EFFECT OF WARNING SHOWN BY WEIGHTING

5

181

OPTION



lft2

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ASAS

AIL SOURCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM

CEWI

COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTELLIGENCE

C3CM

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERKEASURES

ETOC

EIVISION TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER

EEFI

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

IW

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

G2

EIVISION INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

G3

TIVISION OPERATIONS OFFICER

G4

DIVISION LOGISTICS OFFICER

HERO

HISTORICAL EVALUATION ANT PISIARCE ORGANIZATION

ICE

IMITATIVE COMMUNICATIONS EECEPTION

IEP

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION 01 THE BATTLEFIELD

fCP

MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

MI

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CIC

OEEICER IN CHARGE

OPSEC

OPERATIONS SECURITY

CPCPD

OPERATIONS ORTEP

PIR

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

PSYCPS

PSYCFOLCGICAI WARFARE OPERATIONS

CJMA

QUANTIFIED JUEGM^NT METFOE OF ANALYSIS

SFAEF

SUPREME HEADCUARTERS ALL IEP EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SIGINT

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

TCAC

TECHNICAL CONTROL AND ANALYSIS CENTFR

10

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT wish to express

I

rry

appreciation to

rry

wife,

Jeryl

Ann,

her patience during the course of my studies and for all

for

of the assistance that

she has provided.

wish to acknowledge

I

Whaley,

for

a

debt

to

the

the use of his 1969 study of

historian, deception.

Barton That

study provided the inspiration for this thesis.

Abundant

thanks dre given to the following professors of

the Naval Postgraduate School.

Eerblg when

needed it the

Warfare Department,

rrost

Johr

thesis advisors, Catherine

provided sup~rt and

and Wayne Hughes, T

My

encouragement

.

The Chdirrrctn of the

-Jou

dry,

Flectrc-ic

recognized the reed

p or

n

study of tactical deception within the tread categories of FW and C3CM.

Thank you.

11

INTRODUCTION

I.

This

thesis

motivated

was

staff deception planner with

military

planning

to

provide

the

bridge

between

the

by a need a

outlined in field

manuals

avA

the

execution of tactical operations supported by deception.

The

forrral

steps

thesis conforms to printed Department of the Army doctrine as

closely as possible. establish

The U.S. Army division level is used

the context for the integration of deception

tc

into

tactical operations.

Deception must be recognized as part of every tactical operation and

acts

rragnifies

tactical

as

a

necessary and desirable

a

because it leads to surprise

'cr e multiplier.

combat power of the deceiver and

the

advantage.

deception

successful

A

produces

synergistic effect which

The

can

a

be

gained through integration of all of the combat

power multi-

pliers

ircrease

adds to

fire ard maneuver tc

produce an

in

force effectiveness. The objective of this thesis is to provide information 01 the in

nature of cpe rational deception in the planning and execution

c P

a

form that may assist

ieception operations at

the

U.S. Army division level.

The

thesis formulates

a

theory for operational

deception based on an empirical analysis of deception

coverage

o^

selected

historical examples,

12

and

a

military cases,

synopsis

e

work done at the strategic level.

previous

of

draw heavily on the results of

will

by

studies

rrul tid

a

at

the

isciplinary research

Pos tgredua

grout).

Naval Postgraduate School

application of game, communication

focused

processes.

applied

to

The

on

the

organization, and systems

,

mul tidiscipl inary

approach

cogniwill

tactical military deception within the

be

framework

the existing division force structure.

of

The thesis includes

followed

by a

will

sions the

a

presentation of rackgrcuod material

theoretical analysis of the deception

process

analysis of deception case studies.

Conclu-

and an empirical

te drawn

from both the theoretical analysis

empirical analysis.

The final

section will

include

recommendation which applies the conclusions to form for tactical deception as it might

layered planning process,

which

be

a

and a

theory

applied at the division

The theory will ^ocus on command and staff ^unctions,

level. a

t

seven

The

as well as decision-making and perceptual and

theory tive

joint investigation of

military deception done at the Naval

strategic School

a

theory

The

is

and

a

detailed execution process

based on the author's personal exuerisnce.

13

DECEPTION JN GENERAL

II.

division

planning

deception

Tactical

typical

the

on hiding the real

based

is

in

displaying

and

the

Every division has standing operations procedures for

false.

Operations

(OPSEC) which are designed to hide

Security

Almost

real.

every

offensive operation has

a

the

supporting

attack which diverts the enemy's attention because it

begins

The supporting attacV displays the

before

the main attack.

false,

reception for the defense

is

does not know if you olan to defend or

Army

U.S.

even easier as the enemy in

place at the ridgeline

fall back to the other side of the river.

section of the thesis provides information

This is known

what

en

about deception in general in an effort to show that

deception requires more th^n

tactical

a

baniaid

application

of simplistic maxims.

A.

PROPOSITIONS ON MILITARY DECEPTION In

Naval

early 1979

Postgraduate

deception.

The

of deception,

one

resorts to

result is

a

mult id isciplinary research grouu at

School began

a

the

investigation

joint

of

group's intent was to illuminate the nature

its processes, and factors rt

n

d

succeeds at

of that investigation

known about deception.

that condition when

deception

[Pef.

1]

.

The

excellent

summary of what

The group's effort

resulted in the

is an

oublication of the book, Strategic Military rer.ert.icn,

14

which

edited

was

by Donald C.

Katherine

Herbig.

I.

one of that book presented concepts and propositions

Chapter

would

that

Daniel and

serve

deception

[Pef.

available

in

as

basis for formulating

a

2].

compressed version of

A

chapter establishes

that

theory

a

or

information

common

level

of

misrepresentation

of

a

understanding of deception. reception

£P.^2§ for

!•

Deception reality

done

Misrepresenting The

side.

certain

gain

to

deliberate

the

is

competitive

a

reality has both

a

advantage

positive bni

[?.ef.

negative

a

portions of the real operation and plans for This

called

is

cover and it is

enforced

cover and learn what you do not want him to learn.

continue

his

attempts until he learns

until he runs out of time. and

his

Friendly

staff

prepare

Information

a

Intelligence

by

In military terms,

of

list

Requirements

Elements

protected.

(PIP)" which is

or

the commander

"Essential

(FEFI)" that rust be

The enemy

everything

FFFI list may be very similar to the enemy's list ty

future

The enemy attempts to break that

security measures [Hef. 4].

will

.

side of deception is the protection of

negative

operations.

3]

of

The

"priori-

of

what

he

is

attempting to learn. The positive side of deception is the presentation of the

leads can

false tale,

the deception story.

The deception

the enery away from the truth by providing clues

answer the enemy's ?IR.

If the enemy accepts

lb

r,tnry

that

the clues

as valid,

he

tray

form the wrong conception of reality.

wrong conception should lead the enemy Deception

disadvantage.

a

should

desired reaction from the enerry.

Daniel

be done

[Kef.

target's

that.

target's actions?

i s

condition to

actions [?ef.

6]

must be kept in mind while planning any

goals

competitive

a

and the ultimate aim is for

benefit from the target's

the

influence the

deceiver

thf*

The three

.

deception

the operation is properly designed toward the

that

be

"to

that there ape three goals

the intermediate aim

beliefs?

a

5]

The immediate dim is to

deception.

any

achieve

to

and Herbig expressed the view

This means, in effect,

advantage.

to

place his forces at

deception an act must be done to gain

labeled

in

to

That

so

ultimate

aim. 2.

Deception Types. Daniel

and

distinguished

Herbig

two

variants

of

deception that produce somewhat different effects and operate in different

ways.

The more simple of the variants,

ambiguity-increasing" that

"A-type," confuses the target

or

the target is unsure as

more

The

termed

what to

to

complicated variant,

believe

[Fef.

termed "misleading"

so 7] "

or

v-

type," reduces ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative

The by

a

[Hef

.

8].

relative values of tne two variants can

simple one-on-one model of

blue and red.

The model

a

battle between two

he

shewn

force?,

requires the capability for blue and

ie-

red

to be visible to each other in order for the killing shot

to

be delivered.

The force that delivers the first killing

Blue attempts an "M-type" deception

shot wins the battle.

dummy that appears more real than blue

displaying

8

Bed

blue

sees

and

the blue dummy and fires at

fires at red and wins the battle.

Blue

degenerates blue

is

"A-type".

dummy

better than

identical

on an

Red has only

fifty

a

chance of picking the correct target while blue

percent one

only

deception

the

dummy.

blue

the point where it no longer looks

if the original deception was based

or

dummy,

to

himself.

the

If the

target.

Bine still has

Red might delay firing until he gets close enough to tell

dummy

from the correct target,

but doing

the opportunity to fire first.

blue

"deceptions

cluded that,

planned

to

so

would

the

if

target resists or

choice the deceiver intends." 3.

[Sef.

the

provide

Daniel and

^erbig con-

mislead

target into

a

choosing one possibility may degenerate and instead ambiguity

has

advantage.

significant

a

by

postpones

increase

making

the

£]

The TeceptiQn Target

Tactical

deception flows from the commander who ini-

tiates the deception to the cormander who receives the deception.

The

deception is channeled

lmplementers

on

through the planners

the deceiver side to the information gather-

ing and proceessing forces on

the receiver side.

Daniel and

Herbig do an excellent job in presenting the conceptual of information

end

?rom the deceiver to

17

the target.

flow

target is the enemy

deception

The

comrrar.d er

deception goal is to predispose the enemy

primary

to rake the desired decision,

hut

it

The deception

is

predictable

in

cf behavior are

possible

because

patterns

acturial

terms.

The patterns of behavior can be

for the enemy commander

only

not

mand decesion.

[Ref.

Common, factors.

Successful Deception Operations,

o.f_

provided

which

addressing written

an

interesting

starting

by

a

deception planner working Allied

point

for

One document

was

with

Expeditionary Forces

Supreme

the

(SEAIF)

and

the

was written by German General of Infantry in World War

other

Fans von Greif f enberg.

deceivers Second

on

either

side

of deception. tc

They

revealed

of

the

experienced

that

during

conflict

the

World War were in agreement on methods for deception.

The two reports were designed

how

recently declassified docu-

found

factors conditioning success.

Peadquarters

II,

entire

the

for

10]

Daniel and Rerbig ments

also

predicted

which provides the information used in the com-

organization

4.

but

commander

impossible to reliab-

is

individual behavior reactions.

ly predict

The

.

The reports revealed similar conclusions

succeed at deception.

useful categories: tion?

(?)

bility

[Ref.

offer advice for future

to

(1)

The documents provided

secrecy, organization, and

plausibility and confirmation; 111.

and

Daniel and Eerbig added

which was applicaDle to operational

18

and

a

(3)

use

about three

coordina-

adapta-

fourth category

tactical deception,

t

the prepositions of

the

target

[Ref.

12].

The author of this

thesis adds a fifth category which is the use of the tive.

All five categories seem

to

be important

initia-

the deter-

in

mination of deception success. Secrecy, Organization, and Coordination

a.

Daniel and Eerbig observed in Strategic Military

Deception

that

both the SBA?F planner ani von

agree

strongly that "knowledge that cover and

(sic)

being

strictest

employed

deception

very

start."

security," 13]

projects are condemned

to

deception

enemy",

be denied the

secrecy is not observed," says

"all

[Ref.

must

Greif f en berg

adds,

"is a normal

Greiffenberg,

von

failure

byproduct

the

"if

from

"receiving one's own troops ^or the

he

is

the

sake

of

deception"

of

.

Eaniel and Ferbig wrote that the two

tfW

that deception must be well organized

argued

plan-

II ar^i

well

coordinated else leaks may occur and deception unravel.

They

ners

well

are

where

organized when there

is

"detailed

"seeming trifles are not overlooked."

even

"

prepa ra

ior

They

well coordinated when directed from one central point

-

.

are that

being the highest headquarters controlling operational forces directly benefiting form the deception b.

number

plausible.

14]

.

Plausibility ard Confirmation of the Lie The

a

[Ref.

SEAEF ani von

C-rei f fen

berg documents present

of principles to the effect tnat tne "

To

achieve this," they recortrend ed

1C

lie ,

must

"the li

te 11

be

woven

into

source."

a

skein of truth and confirmed by more

overall

into harmony with the

It must

16]

[Ref.

Von Greiffenberg wrote that the deception

[Ref. 15]

"must be brought

one

than

be noted that

situation."

plausibility is

a

relative

The lie need be plausible only from an enemy's view.

factor.

Adaptability of reception

c.

There

many

are

The real plan might

deception is initiated.

enemy situation might change.

once

happen

things that can

change.

a

The

More real information might be

obtained by either side. The deception must be able to char.ge as reality changes.

A

deception

net change with

does

that

time becomes more and more divergent from reality.

Target Predispositions

d.

laniel

and

Herbig

note

unaccountably,

that

neither

the

advised

that deceivers should make use of the target's

SEAEF planner's nor von

dispositions.

which

and Eerbig postulated

than

to

assumptions.

run against

the grain of

pre-

is

expectations

his

They also observed that "conventional wis-

dom

is

the

stronger his predispositions,

17].

pre-

take have a higher probability of convincing him

those that

ignore

repcrt

that deceptions

slant the target's mind-set in directions he

disposed

and

Daniel

Greiff enberg's

supported by experimental psychology more

the

this

on a

pcin

is

possible that the World War

did use enemy predispositions, but

2V

II

::

target viil

or twist information inconsistent with tbem." It

1

Pef

deception planner

did not identify them.

Initiative

e.

Retaining

initiative is not

the

function

a

of

"being on

the offense or "being on the defense.

The initiative

can

obtained regardless of the situation

if

be

so confused

becorres

called [Ref.

B.

the enerry on the horns of

enerry

Shernan

General

that he does not act.

"placing

it,

the

dilerrra."

a

18]

STRATEGIC VERSUS TACTICAL DECEPTION The information presented in the book:, Strategic Military

application to the operational and

reception,

has

levels,

well as the strategic level.

tween hut

as

levels is defined

the

reality there is

in

deceptions corps

size

at

The difference

dividing

deceptions

about the

brigade

Strategic

line.

"blend

be-

operation

terms of scope of

Operational deception

of forces.

deception

tactical

sharp

no

operational

and

in

tactical

about

at

the

blends

with

Tactical

level.

deception is composed mostly of tricks played on the enerry

individual

soldiers

Tactical

units.

and srrall

^y

deception

could be considered as part of battle tactics. For the purposes of this thesis,

will

defined

be

smaller

than

tions of

a

normally

has

helow

corps. in

U.S.

battle or

ning

involved

a

as that

The

Arrry a

the

level involving

forces

division level would typically

the execution of corps' deception plan*-.

21

opera-

reception

been associated with the

are

that

corps and participating in

series of battles. net

operational level

plan-

echelons only

he

thesis will concentrate on the division

This

cause

it

has

planning,

and

a

large enough staff to it

corrrrands

forces to accomplish

division's

be-

level

accomplish

sufficient resources

the deception operations.

detailed to

divert

v uch

of the

i

deception planning involves consideration of

the

deception capabilities of tactical units. The deception is in support

of

tactical

operations

even

though

it

rrust

be

considered to be operational level planning. author of this thesis recognizes the difference

The

tween the operational level and the tactical level.

Tactijal

deception is that which is planned at the operational The term,

tactical deception, is slightly rrisleadin^-.

easier

consider that tactical deception is any

that in

to is

not strategic.

be-

level. It

is

deception

That is the convention that is used

this thesis.

2c

III.

U.S.

A

Arrry

smart

"battle

at

afford to wage

of

division commander is to

a

have

a

is

ciently

win

to

of modern

to maintain the

use

resources.

execute

the

modern opponent that

a

three to one advantage in combat power.

requirement

of

every echelon of "battle rust

optimum plan which allows victory over may

tattle

a

management to win without -wasting

requirement

One

division cannot

Commanders

attrition.

BACKGROUND

Another

forces of the division

the battles that will follow.

suffi-

The lethality

weapons is such that the alternative might veil be

an escalation of the war.

There is an increasing recognition

commanders

of

the

on

the critical difference that

part of

integration

combat power multipliers will play in future tattles, for example,

mand,

Control, and Communications Coun termeasures

Electronic

Deception

Warfare (EW).

is

now

of

reten-

included within the concepts of

tion,

is

all

'C3C V

Com'

included in

^r.c

trie

planning for almost all division level training exercises. While deception planning has been revived at the division level in the past years, and interest

is

intensifying,

tacticians must very soon come to grips with two problems at

significant

hindering the full employment or tactical

the division level.

to optimize deception

These are, anc,

iecention

first, understanding

second, how

to

the

how-

achieve integration

of

the deception and

complex

two

will be addressed in light of theory and in light

issues

cdse histories,

past

These

the operation.

first the background for

hut

of

tactical

deception will he presented from the historical perspective. A.

FORCE EIFICTIVINFSS AND SURPRISE General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said,

"Surprise is

the most vital element for success in modern war."

MacArthur

General

risky

1759

to

his U.N.

Landing which he was presenting to

Inchon tion

was referring

from tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

a

19]

plan for

the

delega-

special

M aoArthur

plan through the historical precedent by

[Ref.

argued

the

established

in

General Wolfe in scaling the "unscalable" Heights cf

Abraham to seize French Quebec.

MacArthur

ohserved

"like

f

Montcalm, tbe North Koreans would regard an Inchon landing as impossible. [Ref.

Like

Wolfe,

I

could take them by

Evidently, complete surprise was achieved, as the

20]

North Korean troops garrisoning the drea were not and the landing was virtually unopposed.

complete

military success.

began

a

headlong

That,

however,

achieved

hy

retreat

results

The

at

reinforced

The operation

that,

stopped only

only minimal cost

force effectiveness of the

at

the

a

Yale.

since ^acArthvr in

terms

operation

of

was

surprise such that the North Korean Peoples Army

suffered 12 times the total casualties o^ the United Command.

wa s

Tne enemy's half -enveloped army

was only hair of the story.

those

casualties.

enhanced

surprise."

[Ref.

21J

24

N'aticns

A

of

surrrrary

corrpiled

between

fought

notable

a

deception

rrilitary operation varies directly with the

a

of the initial surprise.

sity

ty

Barton Whaley, indicates that the degree of suc-

researcher, cess in

data

according

to

1914

degree

battles

One data set of 167

and 1973 was divided of

inten-

initial surprise

roughly and

equally

yielded

the

following results: TA2LE 1 SURFRISE ANT RESULTS Ci BATTL.S [Ref. c2j t

FAR EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

X

2 %

p*

rODEFATI INITIAL SURPRISE-

19 %

1 C

INTENSE INITIAL SURPRISE

34 %

INITIAL SURPRISE

NO

surprise

-V

K

2

trend suggested ty the historical evidence

The

/

%

that

is

breaks the normal cause and effect rules which

the basis for

are

Surprise is often the differ-

tattle tactics.

between victory and defeat regardless of the

ence

ENDING IN DEFEAT

quantifi-

able force effectiveness ratios.

The field

force that is out canned and outgunned on the hot tieneeds

minimizing

to

maximize its own forje

that of its opponent.

effectiveness

Achieving surprise

major element in the force effectiveness ratio; is

is

the element that

difficult

to

is

o-^ten

quantify

notion.

2t

is

a

is

however,

the l?ast understood.

because it

while a

it

Surprise

psychological

J

B.

SURPRISE AND DECEPTION There are no rules which guarantee that surprise will Tight security or ineffective enerry

achieved.

be

intelligence

sometimes shield intentions or clues pointing to inten-

does

resulting in the eneuy regaining

tions

unwarned.

However,

absolute security is probably never achieved. There

are

factors which core readily to rind

sorre

which

These factors include attacking over impos-

cause surprise.

sible terrain, operating in in-possible weatner, and acting at the

improbable

exists

time.

It

seems that the

the preconceptions of

in

key

the enemy.

The vietirr

surprise is one who has formed an estimate of his

intentions be

<=»nd

capabilities which is

surprise

to

wrong.

helped in the forming of his preconceptions

of

opponent's

The enemy can

deliber-

t)j

ately misleading him.

Barton tion

is

prise.

tyhaley's theory of stratagem asserts that

not only

Historical

a

decep-

mdin cause tut also an enhancer of

data

SURPRISE ANE

verifies this theory

C

TABLE 2 AS UAL T IIS

[Ref

NO. 01 CASES

.

as

follows:

23

AVE. CASUALTY RATIO

SURPRISE WITH DECEPTION

£9

1:

6.3

SURPRISE WITHOUT DECEPTION

2d

1:

2.0

5

1:

1.3

4e

1:

1.1

NO SURPRISE NO

KITE DECEPTION

SURPRISE WITHOUT DECEPTION

26

sur-

data suggests a clear relationship between surprise

The

deception in

that casualty ratios are substantially

in

greater

cases of surprise with deception than for those

without deception.

prise

deception

deception rot

result in surprise.

to

if deception fails to achieve

that

result

without

it was rare

surprise,

for

significant

It is also it

still

rrey

more favorable casualty ratio then if

in a

sur-

of

While surprise was gained

only one third of the cases,

in

and

deception

was not attempted.

C.

ECONOMICS OF EXCEPTION

Deception

is inexpensive.

The most

elaborate deception

operation in history was for the Allied invasion of Europe in That operation involved only diverting for

1944. the

of several hundred ren,

services

"boats,

few

a

electronic

aircraft,

gear,

aluminum [Ref. 24j

sorre .

a

wood,

dozen or

fair amount of radio

canvas,

paint,

so

s^ali

and

other

and

than plausible threats of attack.

they should

used more sparingly than they have been up to

provides

Deception

a

high return in that

an 80 % chance of yielding surprise.

for

regular

Eowever, as such attacks are generally no more

combat units.

chances

of

Thi^ is the only form

necessarily costs lives and equipment and uses

effective

bits

The most costly single type of deception

operation is the diversionary attack. that

a

fe* weeks


a

it

[Pef.

has

at

25]

.

least

Surprise multiplies the

quick ana decisive military

success,

measured in terms of explicitly sought goals,

2?

nc->i

oe

ground

whether taken,

.

casualty ratios [Ref the

enemy

to

26],

.

Deception itself can also induce resources

make inefficient use of his own

by

causing him to make mistakes in timing or utilization. D.

TEE GENEP.AL STAFF SYSTEM AND DECEPTION

early times, the commanders performed virtually unsup-

In

ported

the advice of specialized

by

staffs.

Staff Systerr tegan to spread throughout the world

century

even

and,

The

General

in

the 19th

the "Great Captains" pretty

then,

rraintained individual control over their battle

much

plans.

The

20th century, however, found the staff performing most of :ne rrilitary planning and even much of

General

Staff

control

of

the decision making.

allowed armies and

System

the

armies to become very complex,

separated the commander

frorr

but

The

command the

and

systerr

planning and execu-

the detailed

tion of functions such dS deception.

The sult

in

tion

for

General

abandoned

diffusion

of

power

the commander can

fror

very effective operations such as the British decepthe

Thirc Battle of Gaza

Sir Idmund /illenby decided on the

on

31

October,

1S17.

a

new

campaign

which

previous pattern of costly

frontal

against the main enemy defenses at tne coast. tegy

called

cavalry

re-

for

an envelopment of

assaults

The new stra-

the Turkish

army

by

sweep through its weakly defended left flank in

desert at Beershefca.

The staff attended

to

the details.

a

the

Tne

tactical plan was engineered by Brigadeer General Guy Dawnay,

while deception was planned

by

Major Fichard

28

v einert

zhagen

Mei nertzhagen used his position as

Major

tary intelligence at Allenby's GEQ to prepare

security,

work of intelligence, he

and.

ground-

firm

a

deception.

Accordingly,

improved the monitoring of enemy radio communications

placing

receiver on the Great Pyramid at Gizah.

a

expanded

with

the Zionist

intelligence service,

group led by Aaron Aaronsshon.

repeating German

technique he

a

agents

which were "allowed" to

be

"\ili" by-

against

He discredited ana compro-

through

agents

the

191b

in

close

a

tightened

was

perfected

had

East Africa.

in

enemy

mised the

Security

by

Fe greatly

the lines espionage by developing

behind

liaison

In

mil i —

chief of

payment

testimonial

and

intercepted by enemy intelligence.

this manner he arranged that the enemy

execute its

own

most effective Arab spy-master in Beersheba.

Simultaneously,

First, he arranged

operation.

communication and

the

to

team,

deception

rapid, and direct

German

This was done by permitting

the

capture messages thdt encded them to solve one radio

British

included

reliable,

a

the

channel for getting his information tc

Turkish intelligence.

Turks

developed

Neinert zhagen

codes.

an efficient

Peinert zhagen

Knowing that the

radio interception

and

German

c?

staff

cryptanalytic

could be confident this rase would give

him the desired channel.

Beginning over

a

month ^e r ore

ihe

battle, Captain Schiller, the shief of German military intel-

ligence

in

Palestine,

that indicated

a

received

a

variety of ingenious clues

cover target of Ga

jo

?a

instead

of

Eeersheba,

and a later attack date. as d target

for

Beersheba was mentioned

Moreover,

mere feint or demonstration attack* and the

a

Turks were told to expect an amphibious landing behind Gaza.

This done, the next task was to lull nny doubts the enemy have by providing plausibly "independent" verification

might in

form of

the

Peinertzhagen

documents.

packet of faked

a

laid

on his famous

To

"haversack ruse".

subordinate officers had twice failed to carry this Pe inertzhagen rode off alone into

10 October,

man's

land

ped

At

feigning

that point,

bis field glass,

a

a

intelligence

life-saving water

letter

20

pounds sterling,

contained

generalship the

and

alsc

offensive.

documents,

disparaging

learned

on

no-

a

recon-

a

Turkish

t

le

rifle

his

,

haversack

's

a

a

letter

flashlight, Gaza

remarks

from

end

front.

about

some clues as to the The haversack also

Turkish

by

Allenoy's place

and

time

contained

a

was passed along to Captain Schiller.

properly fron

Within

skeptical until the following day

promptly decoded

radio

30

a

This

official

orders, maps, and other papers that confirmed

"find"

mained

off,

the haversack.

elaborated on the false tire and place. this

tot

from an officer stationed on the

letter

of

Meinert zhagen

chased by

disclosed such personal items as

wife",

his

of

his

wound, Meinert zhagen drop-

smeared smeared with horseblood, and

Examination

As

the desert

simulated

He

near Girheir until spotted and

naissance patrol.

deliver the mail.

to

this

do

intercepts,

dnd

hours

few Fe

when

re-

he

Turkish

.

freshly captured

patrols,

were feverishly seeking to recover

British

the

two prisoners,

and

orders,

All this circumstantial "confirirdtioa"

course, been

rrost

had,

carefully arranged by Keinertzhagen w a s brought

intelligence

This

to

"lost"

the

haversack.

that

cf

.

the attention

of

the

energetic corrrrander of the Palestine front, General Kress von Eressenst ein find

who issued orders on

,

warning

and

11

October mentioning the

the officers of his command

careful of their own secret documents.

A

tc

nore

Turkish corps order

that the find would allow the reinforcements

stated

be

to

be at

Gaza in time to crush the arrogant English.

Turco-German emphasis accordingly shifted

Ga ?a

to

.

Two

divisions were moved into reserve near the co?.st and defer ses were

strengthened

generally

there.

Allenby launched the operation.

stalemate theater

by

the

throughly surprising the German

of the British

eight-months' Middle

o °

East

off-balance

[Eef

Total casualty ratios were highly in .

is

a

key

tc

addressing the full

tactical deception at the division le/el.

system requires that

favor

27]

General Staff System

employment

1P17,

Victory was capped by the capture o" Jerusalem

November 9th.

The

br^ke

October

commander and routing tne off-guard and

Turkish army. on

It

On 21

be

th functional

reside in one staff office, but

authority

expertise and integration

T he

:'

deception,

and operations is not achieved unless the commander

provides

full

o

central direction tc establish understanding and support

31

from

the

staff.

At

that

the

state

this point

commander

it

is

rray

be

digress

necessary to

deception

tne

proponent

General ^acArthur

General Staff System.

within

the

vetoed

the plans of his staff and implemented

often

deception

in

The Korean War

operations based solely on personal insight.

provide evidence that his staff did not

operations

and

systema-

tically

apply deception in that many deception measures sup-

porting

a

deception story were not integrated and The

effective.

deception

an

point

integrate

deception

the

commander

a

operation,

integral part of the

and execution process must,

planning fully

that even if

is

used

be

and

the

were

a

not

makes

systematic staff

cy the

operations

to

plan.

I

I.

T£E G3 AS TEE DECEPTION PLANNEP

when the commander relinquished total con-

Historically, trol

over deception,

gence

arena

[Pef.

that 28].

function shifted to the Most of the deception

intelli-

experience

gained in war was lost during peacetime vhe^ the intelligence staff? were allowed

to

even established as

a

the mid

1960's.

bilities

when

Military intelligence was not

decay.

permanent branch cf the

The U.S.

.S.

Army until

Army revised deception

responsi-

the concept for command,

tions

countermeasures (C3CM) was formed.

lists

the G3,

not

the 52,

comrander regarding C3CM Security,

,

and deception.

cs to

control,

E'w

communica-

The C3CM

the principal

include

T

L

adviser

jamming,

concept tc

Operations

The Operations Officer serves

the revision's deception coordinator.

32

the

as

Typically,

the

G3 priorities for fighting the

echo the principles of war.

maneuver,

Fire,

rivision

and the ether

elements of combat power receive first priority. Security and surprise come last.

The result

is

The work is assigned accord-

often done as an afterthought. ing

that the deception plan is

the established priorities.

to

The available time end

assets dictate what will be done. The G3 does not do all of this worK himself. a

Operations Section and

small

these

a

small

Plans

The G3 has

Section

and

are augmented with elements from the functional areas.

For example, the Fire Support Element from rivision Artillery and the Air Force Liaison Team plan and coordinate all

fire support for an operation. a

The Air Tefense Artillery Battalion,

The Engineer and

lions all provide personnel and equipment

tronic

the

the to

(FW)

Section

and

(OPSEC) Section.

33

an

Battalion,

Aviation Batteaugment the

Mlitary Intelligence Battalion provides

Warfare

the

The Signal battalion provides

Communications Support Section.

Tven

o f

Operations

an

G3.

Elec-

Security

TACTICAL DECEPTION GUIDANCE

TV.

A.

DECEPTION PLAN EXAMPLE

deception plan

The

can

using the

the operations order (OPORD) FM

annex

to

presented

in

an

as

format

The field manual provides

Tactical reception.

90-2,

written

be

the following guidance:

coordindte the deception jredsures, the planner creates a "notional order of battle" which is the notional for force that will he portrayed "by the task organization true operdtion. The portrayal will he required for a the set time, based on the deception implementation schedule, to enemy feed the enemy collection system and affect the decision-maker [Ref. 29]. To

deception overlay covers the battlefield

The

for the deception ana,

like any overlay,

down the amount of wording required of understanding by the

clarity

requirements.

It

in

in pi

is

deployment

intented

the annex and

to

l^

.ut

gain

various

emen ters of the

helps subordinate elements visualize what

the enemy is to "see"

[Ref. 30],

inception Annex to the OPORD.

*••

The deception annex fellows the five paragrdph format of

the operations order.

mission, [Ref.

execution, service support, dnd

31]. d.

The

and

format is standard for

situation,

are:

command dnd all

signal

orders.

Situation The

forces,

The paragraphs

situation

covers

attachments and

enemy

detachments.

34

forces,

friendly

Usually,

this

.

paragraph

to the intelligence appendix of

refers

the

CPCEE

and to the notional order of battle. b.

Mission The

mission paragraph is

concise statement

a

the task(s) and the purpose of the task(s);

of

i.e., the decep-

tion story. c.

Execution The

subparagraph provides the concept

first

operation and The deception objective.

graph

which outlines unit

in the cover and

tastfs

There

for edcn unit

deception operation.

is

a

of

subpara-

participating

The final subparagraph

contains the coordinating and control measures applicable

to

two or more units. d.

Service Support This paragraph may refer tc

logistic

tive

order

or may

provide

a

current administra-

specific

instructions

concerning combat service support requirements for the and

deception operation. e.

Command

ar\&

Peference

Signal

may be made

to

signal appendix

a

taining communication deception details. tion command posts and deception

provid 2.

con-

location of decep-

command relationships may be

ed

Deception Implementation Schedule The reception Implementation Schedule can

an

cover

appendix

to

the reception Annex.

35

It

is

£

he

aided

* s

chronological

*

presentation of the deception plan, activities

in

order to provide what amounts to

the operation; [Ref.

bringing together all the

effect,

in

a

scenario

a

script for the actors

(units).

32]

schedule lists the implement

The

at ion

pect of the deception story to be supported,

task,

the

and applicable remarks.

An

the

having responsibility,

example

from FM 90-2 supporting the aspect that 2nd

is making the main division

The

electronics

traffic

actions

Brigade

effort has the following level of

task is to portray heavier

scripting.

the as-

tiire,

unit(s)

and

o

level in the

corrtrunicat ions-

3rigade

2nd

zon

:

ne

are to pad traffic on 2nd brigade communication nets

allow only minlmum-essen

to

ti al

brigade, 1st Brigade, and 52nd MI 3n

schedule

initiation

of

the

brigade

1st

The units with responsibilities

communications nets.

The

traffic on

is

(CIWI).

true operation,

and

2nd

33]

[P.ef.

completed all the way

r*re

through

past that

the

tirre

to

include final actions in terminating the deception. Ti Appendix to the Deception Annex



The

tasks

to

EV

appendix lays out the

he accomplished.

(Id)

deception

and

Sines

imitative

used

tc

deception

communications

manipulative electronic deception

usually require snme technical detail, is

electronic

spell out

the appendix

tasking to both tne MI Bn

story

to

the

enemy

signals

intelligence

usually

(CIVI)

maneuver unit? participating in the projection nf the tion

(ME)

and

decep(SISINT)

capability.

In some elaborate deceptions

which

details of scheduling and the content

pive

message traffic, however,

Usually,

would

be

radar spoofing,

typical tasking for

a

[Pef.

enemy

electronic

signal

m

35!

[?ef.

zone

of

countermea srres

There is

tendency

a

follow the guidance provided by FM 90-2 which

to

34]

Battalion

MI

evidence of the division main attack in the

support to 2nd Brigade.

(ECr)

the

false

of

channels at intervals between D-l and D-Day

Brigade and also to provide

2nd

have TABS

etc.

introduce false information into

to

intelligence support

padding,

this vay

emphasizes

the brevity needed in the operations order.

EXECUTION AND RESULTS

B.

deception

believed

Implementation

deception

The

plan into the

by

a

schedule

separates

series of deception measures

target will result in

the

which

acceptance

if

the

cf

i

deception story.

The success of the deception depends

ability to plcn the appropriate deception measures ability to properly execute those measures.

A

<=rd

n

zY.e

o^

[he

r:

proven exists

between planning and execution in that the aeceution annex is only

an

outline and may not provide the

necessary for decent rail on

red

execution

[P.ef.

amount 3C J

o

**

detail

The effect

.

execution can he shown using historical examples of recent

efforts to use deception to aid the operation of 1



JDec en

Frorr

Airborne

t

ftrry

units.

rallied Execution 24 March

Fivision

to

?.8

"zv:*

participated in

5?

1968, a

units

1

c

ccrn c -level

the

leist

deception

plan was designed

The

plan.

convince the enemy that

thrust of an attack would be

main

along Highway The

Division

of the operation

2nd Prigade,

detachment

Communications were

to

be

conducted as

to

Con-

Airfield i r

the

101st Airborne Division, was moving to Dong Foa.

ri^le company was tc conduct operations in the

The

191st

The signal detachment was

radio messages siFulating an Arrival

Group.

west

the

signal

a

of

base.

required

move one rifle company and

vicinity of Dong Hoa.

transrrit

trol

deceive the enemy

to

to relieve the Khe Sanh combat

9

concept to

the

and

Air Cavalry Division which planned to attack

1st

the

the

the Dong Eod area

in

This was to be used

to the north.

to

to

villages

and populated areas to obtain maximum exposure of the Scream-

ing-Eagle

patch and give the impression that

a

much

larger

force was in the area. One

airborne

rifle

company

and

"

15

personnel

(1

I

officer/14 enlisted) moved

501st Signal Battalion,

air from Pue-Phu Dai airfield to Dong Eoa

by

march.

from Company 2,

Two

AN'VPC-49

radios

and

on

AN/ARC-121

one

ra

2r>

i i o

erouo accompanied the signal personnel.

Operational control

task force passed to

General,

of

the

"arine Division, sonnel

were

more

upon its arrival

placed

Kilometers apart.

the

in

two

Commanding at

Dong Poa.

locations

Ire

The 15 oer-

approximately

ten

This enabled radio signals to emanate from

than o^e location.

The signal

radio nets at brigade level,

two

team

simulated

th.-ee

radio nets for each of tr.ree

battalions, radio nets for three companies of each battalion, and

two artillery nets.

division conld not evaluate the overall

The

iveness

the deception operation;

of

tions

recommendations

and

however,

resulted

frcu

effect-

observa-

sorre

reviewing

the

interna] functioning of the operation.

The

scenario accompanying the signal

cluded

approximately seven messages per net

though

ad-lib messages were used

was

concluded

personnel

in-

Al-

day.

per

keep the *ets active,

to

that the scenario should have

it

expanded

been

with more messages. Some

unable used

to

personnel

flexibility

patterns

disguise tneir voices end thereby could

depict

to

with peculiar speech

in

the same call sign

in

the use of personnel.

a

It

net.

was

were

cnly

be

limited

This

recommended

radio operators be thoroughly screened to facilitate

that

maxiniim

personnel utilization. It

personnel officer mended

was had

or

that

disc

found

difficulty

inexperienced

that

playing

a

convincing role

senior non-commissioned officer.

It

rddio messages.

It

recom-

was

should be noted

situation was the result of improper radio ~rocecu

exercise,

an

as

serin- grade personnel conduct such ope ration?

add credence to

At

enlisted

the

termination

the

Marines assured the role

viously simulated.

of the sigrinl of

-es

portion the

Transition massed smoothly,

3b

r

that

to

this

.

of

units

the

pre-

except that

:

one call

with

those

that

the planning must

of tne

new

f

unit

does

tide of battle does not always provide tne

tire

m^Hon

The for

detailed

at

insure that the simulated

the

his

[Ref.

37]

11th Hour

preparations.

planning and

concluded

Fesketh

stated

The recommendat ions

unit.

not unrealistically disappear. 2-

corresponded

sign frorr the deception scenario

only

Fleetwood

Roger

"Fortitude"

eyewitness report on tne

deception that

"There is a tendency on the part of those who are constantly at grips with compelling realities to regard deception e 5 a swift p a n a cea to be invoiced when other rere Although there ray be occasions when its dies have failed. services can usefully be enlisted to give immediate did, it is generally more correct to regard it as nethod which a achieves its results by a slow and gradual process rather than by lightning strokes." [P.ef 38]. .

the

why successful deceptions take

reason

One

enemy needs sufficient

tirre

report thp deception clues.

confirmed

by

to

collect,

tirre

is

that

process,

and

The information usually must

collateral sources

before it

:e

intelli-

becomes

gence which is taken to the decision -maker.

Kesketh alluded to some exceptions to the tiring rule and an

the author of this tmesis was

exception.

The Commanding General

rivisicn during Exercise

deception

was

Tearr

the 25th

In fir

try

Soirit 83 decided on E-l that

officer.

the only possible option was

tions deception.

of

needed to protect the major

The G3 and his deception that

involved in executing such

the E'wC, a

to

crossing.

quickly

maniuulat ive

The tasking was ^iven

4tf

river

a

decided

communica-

tne 125th

Mlitcry

.

Intelligence erate

This battalion was

Battalion (CIWI).

communications traffic over the radio nets of the

2nd

The traffic was to indicate that

the

brigade

Force.

Task

assault river crossing would De conducted in the 2 The deception had to

sector.

main attack "began

aration

scant 18 hours later.

a

tine demanded

that

In

Officer,

at

fact,

Operations

the

the

The lack of prep-

under-

the rTacrc-ievel

Cormander

Officer

be

personnel

the six

involved in the deception were the Battalion

Executive

Erigade

d

experienced personnel who

radio operators.

the

ds

Ti

begin alrrost immed ia tely as

stood the friendly and enemy situation

used

gen-

to

tr.e

,

and

tneir

respective drivers. The

personnel who executed the deception

relied

or/

their knowledge of stereotyping, pattern recognition, traffic

analysis, operation.

soldiers

trdnsmitted

They

signals

er.errv

river crossing

a

mess-ges that they

intelligence operators,

found in ".heir own battalion,

knew

dcceptatls

tecduse

the

ra

wcclc

Other

responses

of the racio

remained on the

transmissions

included

operators

are

terrain

participatory

the

the actual units who

ha;:

dir

The deception attempt was lid not

o:

which

operators

din intercept

of

searching

be

often faced with that situation due to distances and

masking.

the

tne counteroar ts

Pany of the radio transmissions were one-sided,

for.

was

and the specific requirements for

a

failure in that

relocate its armor heavy reserve

41

p

orc£

.

It

the

ney

en. err

y

not

have

been

rritted

in

tij-e

disrupt the actual

to

the enerry commander.

to

intelligence ception

resources

story

A

relocate the

to

the

reserve

the

at

hour Toy have

11th

part of the deception

one

example

indicates that there

unit

to

is

of the deception

when".

and a

The

The

understand

going

at

to

on

believable "how"

The last minute effort

be

in

a

situation.

how deception causes

ception story.

wartime

Tiie

the last minute severely restricts

deception planner must

to

planning

peacetime exercise example shows that adding

the friendly and enerry tactical

tasked

39!.

[Fef.

understanding

lack of

a

task into an executable and

the deception.

o-f

is

process.

deception operation Tay succeed but usually in

is

in

translate the situationally dependant "whet"

deception effort

scope

fcrce

IHPli Gallons

only

h

de-

contributed

The two examples in this section imply that

how

of

The ambiguity of the situation generated

by deception

3.

is

and

significant arrount

the success of The division's river crossing.

to

In

analyzed,

committed to confirm

were

the plans

and

were completed. part

crossing.

river

intercepted,

that the deception activity was

reported

ccr-

not

exercise controller informed the 2bth Eivision S2

one

fact,

failure because the tanks were

total

a

a

the

conduct

to

a

limited way.

position

to

know

The planner must

surprise and now

collect those clues which build up tc

the enery the

de-

Further, the planner rust know whether units

execute the deception

A?

measures

have

si f

^i -lent

assets and appropriate training

Decentralized aspects

entire

properly.

An

tasking may result in an irrproper execution.

irrproper

rrore

the job

do

to

execution

runs the risk that

the deception may go wrong

of

There must be

effort.

one

ruin

and

systeT of checks to

a

cr the

insure

that the deception story has rerrained true to the ulan.

SUMMARY

C.

line

Tactical Pecept icn

90-2,

Fl*

used for deception guidance as long

be

to

understood

that

of flexibility in execution.

situation

ception

a

do not work

but

very hard

reception the

f

is

i

eld.

complete scriot

totally spelled out

Sorre

thi ngs

the next and

that

a

work in one

makes

de-

re

taught as well as it can ce learred

It

be

learned

plans are never

rrust

being

in

peacetime training,

accomplished. y any

asset-lirrited.

and

executed

because

o ^

rut

a-e

Exercises good

deception v

lack of assets.

get one change to learn how to execute

cnly

certain

cannot

scenario-oriented

units

in

the

to

subject to teach.

always

not

a

is

it

deception plan.

Another unit's plan rright include

for ecch player. arrount

a

as

filled in according

what, when, where, and how

with the who,

that

be

unit's plan might require

One

situation.

in

deception outline is not

a

gaps in the outline must

The

provides an excellent cut-

,

^st

a

suc-

cessful deception and that is usually provided once the

unit

has

e

to

war.

is

to

be

ear

if it

re-;ep

used

1-

+

ion

rrust

net

tires of war.

<±o

be

ignored in

peacetime

Barton

Whaley,

in his toofc,

Stratagem!

Decept io n

and

Surprise In War, concluded that: "The deceiver is alrrost always successful regardless of art. On the the sophistication of his victim in the sarre face of it, this seems to be an intolerable conclusion, one offending common sense. Yet^ it is the irrefutable conclusion of historical evidence." [Hef. 40j TFI NI-ZD FOR ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL DECEPTION

D.

examples and written observations can go

Historical

in explaining a complex process

information server

is

on

aware of,

classification Tet,

of

available than the

Far Tore

casual

ob-

this is due in part to the recent

de-

the operations of World

II.

n-any

is

of

difficult to accept the impressive

5,;

a r

conclusions

analysts such as "Barton Whaley have provided.

that it

is

it

deception

such as deception.

far

Further,

difficult to project these conclusions fror the strate-

is

gic level to the tactical level.

Much of what experience. remain

Obviously

there are more recent examples

Many

classifier,'.

transformed

about deception is fror the British

'
is

changes

the battlefield and

it

in

is

technology

tempting

to

ere

would

not

be

the

effective against the

system

battlefield

fielded

on

longer

no

The dummy soldiers and vehicles of that

veillance systems available today. on

have

assume that

the deception practices of 'Vorld War II and earlier

apply to modern war.

that

is

one

the ether.

sophisticated

Nevertheless,

a^ evolutionary

process.

technology Fach

side can be rapidly countered

reception techniques

44

ere

sur-

by

usea

new the in

such as jammers and decoys against hardware such

hardware

radars and electro-optic and infrared sensors. for

coirnmni cat ions

jamming teams

deception,

communications

f«"uch

still

The Fissions

include

irritative

of what can be learned

experience can still be usefully applied

earlier

as

from

today's

to

battlefield. The

optimization of tactical deception must include

not

rvchin.es but ultimately deceiving the

men

dpceiving

merely

who rely on

deception

Therefore, the need in analyzing tactical

Their.

to

is

discover the full role that it can

play

in

future battle.

There ception

several

are

ways

to

gain an understanding of means to

to

integrate

the future practice of

method

tc

is

determine ships.

A

Both can

of

d

co

a

tactical

analyze

de-

optimize

and

deception.

second a

rrethods will be drawn

rethod would

oe

f>

analyze

to

relation-

tactical

multi disciplinary approach to aevelop

er:ept ion's

?ne

comparative analysis of case histories

common factors and the cause and effect

ception 'rcf viev*

systematically

a

de-

ccrrcn

primary elements a"d their relationships. be used

in

this thesis so that conclusions

from each.

4b

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

V.

theoretical approach was employed at the Naval Post-

The

graduate

School in

joint investigation of deception

a

Four studies

began in early 1979. G.

oy

which

William Reese,

Ronald

Sherwin, and Paul H. Moose specifically focused on appli-

cation

of game,

Taniel

Katharine

and

Theodore R. historical derived

L.

Ferbig,

cases and documents

many

Richards

systems

and

Donald

by J.

Eeuer,

arid

concept?

[Ref.

and

The

academic sources.

principles

and

eclectic

three

studies focused on decision-raking and perceptual and tive processes

C.

They were rrore eclectic, drawing from

Sorbin.

fror

organization,

tion,

remaining three studies were

The

theories.

corr.irunica

41]

.

cogni-

This section will summarizize seme

of those rrultidisciplinary concepts as

they can be anolieri

to

tactical military deception.

A,

COMMUNICATIONS TFEORY

Communications

theory focuses on the problems of

mitting

information

^lassie

model

is

a

between

and

both

the

[Ref.

tactical

receiver.

channel, and decoder,

Noise enters the mcdel

destination

a

linear progression of inforration

source through an encoder,

nation.

sender and

a

trans-

42].

to

affect all

but

to

The

frorr a

desti-

the source

This model can be applied

deception

planning

deception execution pro c ess.

46

process

a

and

to

the

Communications Model of the Planning Process

1.

planning process focuses on the deception

The

which

must

tion.

The

ception.

"be

source

destina-

the

is the commander who authorizes

the

de-

The receiver is the opposing commander who is

the

target

prirre

cornrunicdted frorr the source to

story

of the deception.

The source determines

the

overall objectives that he wants the deception to accomplish.

receiver has the ability

The

take place.

information that

is

cause the desired action

transmitted biases the target's decision-

encoder

An

is

the person

or

organization

assists the deceiver by planning the deception. that

the commander might perform this

but usually the planning is

self,

target

fi

It

is

notion

which

possihim-

by

done by the staff.

In

case o^ strategic operations the deception planners are

mally

a

level

is

planning an

the

nor-

separate body of planners who are specifically chosen

their special abilities in this function.

for

to

manner that is advantageous to the deceiver.

in a

ble

to

plan is successful if the false

process at the destination and causes the

making act

deception

The

to

much more restricted

in

personnel and the

function at division level is often

tactical

The

deception

relegated

to

additional duty of the Future Flans Section of the Opera-

tions Staff.

That stcticn coordinates the preparation of the

division operations orders and is in

a

position to call

the

functional expertise of the rest of the division.

The

encoding of the deception plan is done in much the

4?

upon staff.

same

way as the real operations plan is encoded for the commander.

difficulty is that the encoders are normally chosen

The

ability

their

communicated

encode tactics in

to

within

a

Fanner that

will

the organization and that will

ceived by personnel with

sirrilcir

"or

be

be

re-

training in those tactics.

Planning the deception requires that the encoder work the communications problem backwards.

dict the information that must

be

effects

at

the changes that may result after

encoder

must,

into

the signals are

an

He must

the

sent.

convert the

indicator set that is suitable

on

for The

cvailable

mission over the available channels and that will in

have

allowances

recognize the channels that are

information to the enemy.

message

the destination

transmission of the signals will

that

amplitude and their fidelity and make

their

send

received

The encoder must anticipate

to produce the desired results.

the

The encoder must pre-

to

source trans-

for

received

be

desired form at the destination. The

role of the encoder of deception is mad

cult

ir

have

been sent.

that he has no control over the

diffi-

e

signals after

There is no assurrance that they

will

received

or

rranner.

The effects of noise and the effects of chance

that they will be processed

in the

they be

anticipated may

never be known unless there is sorre feedback to the deceiver. The nals

channels that ray be used

to

send

tactical

include all aspects of the environment that

tored ty the enemy.

are

sig-

moni-

Tactical deception channels are visual,

48

sonic, olfactory, or electromagnet ic in nature. is

characterized

with

its physical

by

during

the target

its

fcr a strategic deception.

The

ence.

tactical

information Than

those

produces the biggest differ-

Titre

arena of modern war ^ay oe very

fast-

paced especially if the mechanized forces predominate.

possible

to

forces.

tactical deception are somewhat different

a

the

transmission from the deceiver forces

The channels that can be used to transmit for

associated

the tire

form,

and the random events that modulate

transmission,

signal

lach channel

that

It

is

battle areas might move up to 72 kilometers

a

such an environment,

botn forces would depend heavi-

ddy.

In

ly on

electromagnetic reconnaissance,

frorr

higher headquarters,

intelligence summaries

ard tactical

reports

from

front

line units.

Tactical

where

through

additional channels.

lines

are

Residue

r'ro.T

patrols

recently--vaca cec

territory would be sifted for intelligence data.

soners

war,

of

information. is

,

and

personnel

from

PriThe

would be interrogated for

collateral

The tactical units would report any

information

population

indigenous

of what

line-crossers

rore

information

lach force would use

raids to gai r information.

eneiry

tattle

would present the capability to transmit

static

and

situations

heard,

seen,

or

srrelled

Specialized intelligence units would practice their professions.

49

by oe

individual given

the

soldiers. time

ic

All

be

processed through

of intelligence analysts and officers until the

series rall

the information would

of

picture

the enemy is doing or

of what

Given

recognizable.

becomes

which are so applicaole

to

is

there

oveto

do

networks

even the spy

time,

strategic deception would

filter information through to the intelligence tire

intends

a

begin to

system.

The

usually available even

at

the tactical level because

lull in battle

to

reconstitute and

must

be a

forces.

There

for it.

There must

resupply

must be time to plan the battle and

prepare

time to clarify the situation so that

be

the force with the initiative can avoid the costly ambush. The

analogy

to

is

received

role

at

the decoder in the

of

convert the signal from the form in which it is the chcnnel output

decision-making process. infcrration

planning

deception

the forrr

to

usable

in

the

lecoding involves the processing of

into the intelligence that arrives dt

the desti-

nation.

information

The

battlefield

collected person

it

who

soldier

reports

is

must

te

forwarded in

observes

For

it.

timely

intelligence

importance, it

throughout O'ce manner

it

to

the is

the

example,

the

specific

ene^y

weapon

company

level,

through his chain of command.

dedicated

sufficent

a

an enomcly or

the report is sent to the d

collected

is

many types and qualities.

has requested

who it

of

that

At

infantry

bdttalion intelligence officer over net. is

sent

5F

If the to

information

higher

is

of

headquarters,

.

it mdy be held

if not,

to be combined

eventually becorre part of

and

or periodic

that

is

intelligence summary.

of value only to

higher.

fritted

a

it dies when

If

a

with other inf ormation

periodic intelligence report [Ref.

43j

The in :"ormat ion

.

particular level

the intelligence value is perishaole,

its designated time is up

[Ref.

Intelligence personnel are trained

than

44]

recognize

to

They are also trained in the manner

important.

trans-

not

is

what

in

which

different categories of intelligence should be handled.

Sore

is

information

the

of

There

is

specialized information such as that radio intercept,

received by radars,

intercept devices,

radar

vices,

devices .

j

photographic,

that

Channels

imaging

or

directly

[Ref,

the analysis nodes.

to

decoding must

that

be

by

the different

considered oy

nodes is

the

a

critical

deception

planner.

are unreliable or unsuitable

lead

to

where that information will De neglected or ignored.

being

de-

This direct information flews through parallel communi-

The

ing

tut

which

eiectro-optif

enter the intelligence system

that

cations lines

point

form

lose its content.

may net

45J

different

Other information rapidly loses its

handlings of it.

is

many

remains intact through

paths that are not lost

timely may result in the

or arriving too

late to have

any

nodes

Decod-

information effect.

The

framing of the information at the decoding node pay result in the

wrong meaning being attriDuted

51

to

it.

decoding

Each

i

process

sorre

nf orrrat ion

specialized

only

these nodes necorre more prevalent

was encoded

[Pef.

into

an

the majority of

the

<*s

they near

the

indicators arrive at the

destination

challenge

a

Yet,

the absence of

picture

until

decoded

[!?ef

.

all .

of

information

of

noise which

includes

occurrances that interfere with the signals. the

encoder

for

the

desires channels,

tc

the

has

hi? nee.n

simply Because of source or

the decoders,

or

a

faulty

a

is

communirandom

all

Noise may cause

generate indicators that are not

message of

the

47]

the presence

in

the important

The enemy

have

indicator ^et of the deception story

The cated

the indicator set does not

nay also

corroborating

information at any node may result in inattention.

decoding

to

meny

Too

sent to allow for attrition,

deception.

analyst

story

indicator set that may be meaningful only

duplicate indicators, the

=ind

ultimate

the

enemy analysts or else they will oe suspect.

reveal

or

46]

The indicators must present enough of

intact.

is

intelligence

nodes are important because the deception

illl

if

that

Some nodes process all-source information

.

destination.

which

Some nodes process only collateral informa-

its end product.

and

gate

a

intelligence

the information into the

manipulates

tion

may be viewed as

node

appropriate

mi spercept ion

understanding

of of

the

the

the mindset of the enemy jemmnncer

who is the deception target.

52

The encoder may choose the wrong or the inappropriate channels.

Noise

rray

corrupt the indicators once

they

have

entirely.

ransrritted or it may block a channel

Noise

"been

t

rray

enter the decoding process resulting in critical indicaThe effect of noise is

tors reing ignored or misinterpreted.

unpredictable.

[Pef

.

48]

Communications £odel of the Execution process

?.

The execution process

concerned with the

is

of the signals which support the indicator set

communication

and the elimination of unwanted signals.

events, reverent on the battlefield,

Each

activities. supports

are

signal

must

controlled

oe

actual

to

that

so

mission.

it

with

All of the signals whether

they

inte-

mutually supportive.

te

signals which are transmitted in

deception.

A

The

typical illustration

source

deception message.

is

is

ue

applied

the execution

that of

a

The destination

is

the

o ^

sends

electromagnetic

set.

The

spectrum

channel is

used

in

53

that

tne

the

the

enemy radio inter-

encoder

The

the radio transmitter and the decoder is the rddic

receiver

to

radio trans-

the radio operator who

cept operator who is listening to the message.

cept

ether

or

interfere

The communications theory model may

is

,

hiding the real or displaying the false should he

grated

may

physical

in

cemmunications

the desired indicator and does not

desired indicators.

other

Each indicator

signals which show up

different

many

involve

specific

portion

tne transmission

interof

the

and

the

propagation

physical

transmitter

to

of

the electromagnetic wave

the environment at that

frequency or it could

model

noise inter-

be

does not hdve compatdble

enemy

tre

transmitted signal is blocked by terrain, such

the signal

thdt

iraping

enemy's

designed for

using

trust

detect 3

equipment, or

the range is

if

noise

transmit signals

Similarly,

level.

be

designee according

might

correctly

opposite stands

the

if

effort

is

camouflage against

dgainst

detection

ty

soec-

seerr

[Vet. of

to

the target's capability to

50]

Comrrun icct ions

that

Theory

there would be only

a

small proba-

bility that the deception story intenaed at the source be

the

if

different part of the electromagnetic

IlLP2i caiicms. It

to

will not protect

tho^e signals.



technical

transmission or the protection of deception sig-

The

trurr.

a

know the

photographic reconnaissance

lesse" range.

observation

?

sensors

nals

a

or

49]

communication

the

attenuate! telcw the

deception cannot be used

Visual

vlsu«

is

[Hef.

Electronic deception is useless

parameters of the situation. if

to

The deceiver must

this level.

at

applicable

is more

waves in

el ectrorrcgnet ic

nally generated by the transmitter or receiver.

Technology

the

The noise is the intentional or

the receiver.

interference of other

unintentional

from

is

received at the

true if the deception planner

the process.

sufficiently

destination.

to

In

predict the mindset cf the

54

fact,

correctly

The enerry situation can

would the

under-

be

understood

enemy

commander,

J

hi? decoders,

and his collectors.

working

their

The key personalities and

can be understood in light

models

their

of

training and experience. effect of enemy doctrine and goals on

The

perform-

researched and all available information

ance

can

"be

used

to

predict,

with

fair degree

a

accuracy,

of

decoding function that will be used by the target's

used

deceiver to the decoding process used

by

the

Once that is done the indicators can be transmitted

target.

with

The

the key is to match the encoding process

Thus,

the

be

intelli-

gence systerr. by

car.

calculated

redundency over channels

where

the

r.cise

level can be predicted in terms of accuracy and reliability.

possible that

is

It

a

direct feedback loop

may

be

established so that the effects of the noise can be rreasurdd. This

feedback

sources,

coming

perhaps

but frorr

securing of

k»?y

modern

modify ception

direction or systpp

and

communi natc

wards

communications nets with encryption [Kef.

Feedback

can

tne

devices,

51

deception

indicator set to optimize the effect

story.

feedback

tne

armies ha^e gone far

feedback channel allows the

the

information

of the target's radio

many vulnerabilities still exist. A

different

the rest applicable is

the intercept

Although

tions.

many

could core from

indicate the

planner of

level

the cf

to

de-

mis-

ambigvity that has been generated in the target can

enemy's perception

highlight, changes in o ^

the deception

55

those

story

levels

evolves.

as

tne

The

level

protect the secret of the actual operation.

situation or plan are received

real

the

enough

ambiguity must remain high

of

create contrary evidence.

to

indicators of

If

enemy

by the

they

The existence of contrary evidence

could he used to indicate inadequate deception effectiveness.

Feedback ca^ also indicate the time differential that exists

between

may

a

be

ception in

informatioa collection and

direct

reflection of the effectiveness o?

as it takes longer for the target

the presence of the

Cther

analysis.

deception

syster

of feedback are to determine

functions

and

cators

that

effectiveness information 3.

function

is

in

deceiver intended.

whether the target

on

the

the channel

indi-

measure

The key

acts

52]

whether

whether he attributes The meaning to the the

de-

[Ref.

target believes the information being received at

outputs

the

to

ambiguities.

That

the

ways contrary to his true interest.

of

deceptive [Ref.

5jSJ

ORGANIZATION THIORY Tactical

tattles

or

military deception limited campaigns,

is

restricted to

but even at

the

division level the forces involved ore numerous and

Organization tions are

theory employs the notion that large

involved

as

targets of deception.

individual U.S.

Army

complex.

organiza-

Tnese organiza-

tions can be viewed as intelligence or in formation -proce ssing

organizations transmit

whose function

is

to

attend to,

information to the decision

mate target of the deception.

rra'-^er

process,

who is the

and

ulti-

There are many sensors on the battlefield. range

the individual soldiers in contact with the enemy

frorr

to complex systems of specialized equipment and men

ing

sensors

The

emanating

signals

frorr

all areas of

collect-

battlefield.

the

These signals characterize the operations of the forces

generate

therr.

division

area

sensed

is little activity that

There

of operations

signals generated by the enerry,

is

ing

crnd

subject

it

is

to

to

in

a

bem^

collecting

collect

only

the

signals and to produce the intelligence from them

important that

not

is

The problem is not one of

the enemy.

"by

that

exists

that

The process-

essential for rational decision-making.

reporting of intelligence

organization

that

requires

specialized

a

can be analyzed and understood

fron

the

organization theory perspective.

Analyzing

tlie

tactical deception process may

through viewing the deception target from the

entity

The target

that

but

is

no

is

organizational

longer an unknown or little known

an organization

which has discrete

remain relatively constant regardless of the

who belong tc the organization. the

making are understood, factors to perpetrate '"actors

are of two

types.

of

it a

properties personnel

Once the factors that effect

organization's relationship

intelligence

The

enhanced

since it allows deception to oe more uniformly

perspective, applied.

be

to

decision-

may be possible to manipulate those

deception.

the organization which must

re

understood

The first type involves information of how

b?

parts of the organization function in relation

the

understanding

An

other.

functional

of

the men and machines

is necessary and the command

level

formation

which provides

that

is

or

whole would be of thumb

rules

that

a

the

Obviously, an under-

source of information on the guidelines

being used by the

being targeted for deception.

is

for

in-

of the military doctrine which applies to the enery

standing a

the

control

and

framework

the

setting of group goals and objectives.

as

at

The second type of

typifies the relationship.

process

each

to

specific

organization

The data base of

the

attributes of the organ izat ion is the starting ooint

general

upon which more specific information is built.

physical organization of tactical units

The veil

documented

documentation

for all potential deception

of function

that

targets.

includes line and block cnarts

the command authority.

Fach blocK can

be

fairly

is

which

understood

The

reflect in

terrs

and in terms of equipment and men associated with

function.

communication*

Each line can

De

understood

terrs of the

in

paths ^nd means that will be used

Interface networks.

The general

provide

to

information arplies

to

all

like

units and standardization of units is necessary for all

iai"ge

m:derr armies.

portions

The specific deception target m a y have

of the organization which are not standard

identification of those anomalies would oe gence the

collection task. target

It

is

a

the

regular intelli-

very important

organization within the framework

t>8

and

to o

."

understand the

enemv

system and not simply generate functional attrioutes based on

analogy to the U.S. system.

significant difference between the two systerrs

A

Soviet's ninth principle of war which goes commanders

cised

requiring

be determined and decisive in carrying out

to

assigned mission.

Subordinate commanders

and letter of the plan.

spirit

beyond

the

is

rrust

the

carry out the

Soviet initiative

exer-

is

finding unique ways to execute the plan but does not

in

allow commanders to revise the plan based on changed stances.

plan

The

is

circum-

expected to proceed according

milestones and times dictated.

[Ref.

the

to

54]

There are other features cf military art which typify the organization

which

working

the

and

The

decision

composition

aids

forces.

are designed

can

timetables

be

for

more

and

the

Such an aid might predict

the

of forces

codified. an

cf

speed

that would

success against an objective in

parameters

rptimum

deception

The use

in

decision aids that are becoming more

command and control process.

insure

the

to

the interpretation has resulted

in

and

automated.

size

important

very

are

Soviet command and control requires efficient staff

process.

work

which

a

ether

operation cr

re

to

required

to

situation in

which

might

yield

aids the

movement

of

Planning aids might aiiow the rapid coordination of

staff Inputs and might output the alternatives available the solution of the military problem.

The planning aid might

also rank the alternatives by success probability.

59

for

[Ref.

i:Sj

is

processing

intelligence

of the

structure

interaction

the

analyzed

factor of the organization that can be

One

Knowing the patterns of interaction can help deter-

systerr.

mine to what extent the deception target is structured

hier-

archically and can identify communications bottlenecks. A

second factor of the organization which can be observed

degree of responsiveness to changes in the

the

is

Even though

ment.

Soviet combined arms army, for example,

a

for the collection

resources

vast

has

information,

information

that

and

processing

might not be

decision-making process in certain situations.

dictated

by the

situation,

re

front

or higher

level

a

of the

in

The decisions

commander.

might

be

such

In

the organization which is the combined arms

be operating in

would

used

he the prerogative of the army commander but

may not

environ-

a

army

totally closed fashion and would not

responsive to external signals.

attribute of the organization is how

Another

meaning this

to

factor

processing cf

intelligence information. can he obtained

system

psychology

o f

an

by

An

understanding

researching the

human

of

cognitive

understanding that

biases

and

of what

information will

paradigms

performance

frampwork of the organization allows the general

information will be interpreted,

the decision-making process.

[Ref.

60

~6J

and

.

The

application

perceptual biases which be

of

information

opponent and applying the

which help predict

assigns

it

attended

yield to,

an

how

how it will affect

effect

The

stress

of

decision-making is also analyzed.

he

can

equated

is

involved

not

is

arrbiguous but the analysts feel

evaluation of the situation.

precise

generate

and

the enemy will have

If the situation

degree of stress such as that which is imminent,

The need for decisiois time

to

more

a

mere time

is

is

great,

evaluate

but

a

tc

about the

moderate

generated when battle performs

Information flows faster and is less subject

sufficient

make

involves

org c ni zat ion actually

the

have

large impact on the generation of

a

initial hypothesis set.

is

that they

Preconceptions

evaluate alternatives.

be

The

a.nd

There

can

battle.

in

time to collect more information

sufficient

and

attribute of the organization that

An organization under no stress

an army that

to

situation

an

processing

information

on

there is

the situation

better.

to

being biased.

a

perception of and

make

the

decision based on information that will be sufficient.

High

stress situations such as actual the perception that

introduce

the decisions will

rade before sufficient information is The

compander has

his

cwn

a

tendency

available.

have to [Kef.

preconceptions of the situation rather than on

on

preconceptions

can

be

An

organization's

equated tc

specific

periods related to the start point of the battle. Thus,

conditions

make his decisions based

tc

rerits of the available information. liance

battle

the

negative

impact

on

decision-mrikin^ can De anticipated.

61

oe

E7J

on

the re-

tine

[Pef.

58]

hypothesis-generation

and

f

theory can did in the understanding of

Organization

battlefield application is

The

enemy.

formance

efficient

irost

on the organization's key people and

information

available?

records is

framework fills

in

however,

the

when

their

per-

organization

the

some of the data which may be missing from

the intelligence data base.

C.

SYSTEMS THEORY major weakness of much of the operational planning that

A

is

done is that it is based solely on the quantifiable prinof war without consideration of any

ciples

The enemy

cesses.

usually

disposition,

courses of action and probable

tion

that

is

That

brief.

present at the time of situation

is

used

to

cornrat

power,

intentions.

These

intelligence

similar factors are based on the

and

pro-

taken into account in the planning rut

terms of location,

in

possible

is

cybernetic

the course

generate

informaof

action

different

the

hypotheses

for the projection of the enemy situation to

time

the plan or operation will

when

placed

be

in

the

motion.

Cnce the planners have decided

what they think the enemy will

do,

to change

that decision is very hard

[T>ef

59]

.

.

The enemy situation serves as input to the development the

action

courses of action. are proposed

to

Three to five possible the commander.

At this

limitations of the human mind take over.

..-curses

point,

o

of

the

The human mind can

assimilate only limited amounts of data and can maintain only three

to

five hypotheses at

time

[Ref.

60j

.

The

enemy

situation

simplified by the mind so that only

is

probable and

salient situations are

rrost

courses of action,

61]

that decision is hard to change.

There is

if

the

course

[Ref.

tendency

of action brief

The point

62]

being

a

is

operations

viewed

be

The logic of military the weather,

such that the terrain,

is

faulty.

be

that the enemy should net

passive part of the systerr.

a

during

presented

later proven to

is

logistics,

and the relative forces often dicate the optimal tactics plan.

if the logicol option

Yet,

is

his ccunterpreparati ons.

[Ref.

for

equally obvious to the

the advantages for those tactics

enemy,

to

stick to the decision

to

some of the information that was

even

a

.

fact.

In

hard to determine exactly what data was pertinent

is

the decision.

as

[Ref.

when the commander irakes his decision on the friendly

Again,

It

used.

most

the

ran

by the

'set

b<

63j

reception can he viewed in light of systems theory as the interaction

of

organizations and

two

their

environments.

Each

military force is an organization with properties

will

be

known fairly correctly by its

organizations

are

capable of

intelligence functions. as i

it

passes

nderstood

in

organizations.

ability

which

opponent.

communicating

The

through

The conditioning of that

light of the goals and biases of the

can

be

there is

a

assigned

to

their

can

oe

opposing

certain amount of predictthe system

by

judicious

application of communications and organization theory.

63

two

information

through the respective organizations

Thus,

that

theory takes into account the role

Systerrs

The environment is

and the role of the environment.

part

syste
the

of

capabilities

two

of the

of

feedback

of

stimuli

third

a

sensing

into

organizations.

opposing

The

environment can he changed by the actions of either organization

or

human

factors which are out of

by

control.

The

environment can modulate the stimuli that are inputs and that are outputs of either

responses

dictable behavior of the system may

be

generated by random or

fect knowledge of the predictable events.

behavior

because

Unpre-

organization.

events caused by the environment or by

unaccountable

must be adjusted

imper-

The unpredictable

for in order to optimize deception

requires the ability

deception

the

predict

future

organi zat ion

become

to

I

behavior of the system and influ nee it.

stimuli of

which establish

stimuli

future

or actions of

responses

The

by

a

e a ch

new situation.

the deceiver can establish control

over

stream of events by sending information to an

sary with the purpose of predetermining his

initial

The proper choice

control

additional

is

gained,

the

adver-

decision.

Once

the deceiver can set in

motion

actions which capitalize on the advantage he

has

gained. The

Soviet organization was used as the primary

in the proceeding analysis

examnle similar

will

systems

be

of organization

theory.

example The

same

used to see if the Soviets have adopted view and it seems as I*

64

they

have.

a

The

began research in cybernetics much earlier than

Soviets

Soviet thought developed into

the United States.

reflexive

for

Srrolyan

in

the 1968

theory

a

Le^evre

which was expressed by

control

did

hook, Algebra of Conflict.

and

They wrote:

"Control of an opponent's decision, which in the end forming of strategy on him a certain behavior through reflexive interaction, is not achieved directly, not blatant force, by a but by means of providing him with ground? by which he is able to logically the derive own decision, but one that is his preaet errined by the other side. The process of transferring grounds for making decisions from one opponent to other we call any 'deceitful reflexive control, movements' (provocations and intrigues, disguises and feints, construction of false objects, and deceit in general in any context) are achievements of reflexive control." [Kef. 64] is

a

.

The

.

application

.

of

military

the systems model to

de-

ception was based on the fact that military organizations are

complex systems.

The Soviets already had

a

model for complex

and observed that military organisms corresponded

systems

the objects of the research in the theory of systems. the formal attributes were the same,

military

Since

organizations

were complex systems in the broadest sense of the word.

theory evolved to where

in

tion can be considered

a

system."

|Ref.

the application of military science. as a model

Tn fact,

systems

it

is

to

that

formaliza-

65]

The concept

governed by rules that could

necessary

The

concluded

was determined that the systems view fit very

It

used

1974,

combat operation from the stancpolnt of its

"any

to

Tarakanov,

to

be

closely could be

quantified.

understand the Soviet concept of

and the Soviet concept of cybernetics before one can

understand vbat the Soviets mean by "troop-control."

65

Soviet

.

-s

i

,

"troop-control" is sirrilar to "command and control" but it is slightly

Shavrov and Gdlxin

involved.

rrore

expressed

the

following in 1977: most promising form of model- -the c ybernetic connecti on with the nee essity of in appeare d in which par ticular importsystems on compl ex research the to be given to sys tern's el emen t has come ance out contr ol. carry the function of I n these that th e control proce sses that taice place in models mai nly the reality ore mother atically reprod u c e d wit h regar d to end tran smi tt ing, storing operations o f pro cessing, FroT the point the o f view material of information this cybe met ic modell ing world's dial ecti cal development ail represent s previous the gre atest generally etion of It alio w s one to methods of modell ing. in vest igrr t e systems accord i ng troop-control a complex dyn amlc to great number of att ributes. The pri ncipal peculierf unc tional alities o" cy berne tic modelling a reThe (1) and behavior of the o verdl system its i n d i v i dual ele'?) ments under environ mental conditio ns, The mandatory effectiveness or of riteria the tory ores en ce f system 's c functioning, and 3) The possibil i t y to w dely us e for tne practical re el iza t ion of r a theme tical mod els co nt empo rout a ry electro nie computers that allow one to ca rry quick and d ccurate modeling of c omplex s y stems of c c n trol and to deterrri ne optimal ways of impro v i n g e "fee ti veness." fHef 66] A rrodel

new,

— has

.

(

.

^he same ideas that show up in the Soviet view of coirmand and

control

art

are apparent in their cybernetic rrodel.

which

in

the context of their principles of

have

Soviet

C.

level

to

teen postulated.

however, the applica-

This theory is

part

of

the

organization and shorld be considered for deception.

GAM

TF*CPY AS PART OF EECISION TFIOPY

The

possible

Soviet,

The

they have been able to realize mathematical models and

computer applications is questiona Die? tions

military

use

decislcn-making

of mathematical dt

mocels to

the operational

ee

and

assist

in

tactical levels

leads

decision theory with emphasis on gane theory

into

The application of game theory to the decision

one approach.

process

would

is

values

rodel which is distinct frcrr

a

seem

that games

fit

as

into

war

gaming.

based on probabilities

simple algorithms that might

It

expected

eind

used in the

be

Soviet command and control of operat iondl forces.

objective of decision theory is providing

The makers

a

decision-

basis for making an intelligent choice as to

which

alternative

is

techniques

of mathematics tc deal witn the quantifiable

The nethods are quantitative, usin^ the

best.

pects of the problem.

[Fef.

quantitative basis to

a

approach c

the

onsen ences

decision

The advantage of providing

67]

decision-maker with

a

that he

is

better understanding

of

The book,

the

Knowledge

Naval Operations Analysis., separates

according to the degree of risk that is

predicting

the

state of nature

amount

of

risk involved

action

is

determined by the

in

will

that

involved

occur.

The

picking the single best course of uncertainty.

addresses four possible cases of interest.

Decision [Eef.

theory

68]

The first and simplist case arises when it is fcnown

certainty the stdte of nature which will occur.

action.

tc

the conditions under which an operation or action will

conditions

matrix

a

.

take place.

in

able

is

Decisions must be made with varying degrees of about

as-

is

simply The

one payoff for each

criterion

that snou]d

67

The decision

possible

be used

with

^'or

course

of

comparing

alternatives is

in

the case of decision-making under

the best payoff.

nature

occur

[Ref. 69]

second case arises when it is not known which

The of

certainty

This situation is known as

known.

is

but where the chance

will occur,

state

that each

will

decisi on-rraking

under

risk and the expected payoff for each course of action

would

be the value of the weighted average using

assigned

bilities

to

the different

decision-rraking under risk,

states

corrrr a nder

the

of

proba-

the

nature.

Ir.

would be advised

to

choose the strategy which optimizes the expected value of the rreasure of effectiveness.

third case arises when tne deci

The

does

si on-rraker

the probabilities cf occurrence for the various

know of

70]

[Ref.

uncertainty.

This

be used

rright

action. the

misrr,

states

This situation is called decision-rraking

nature.

in

thesis

not

under

will address four criteria

this situation tc

choose

a

that

course

best

of

These four are the rraximin or pessirrisr,

the opti-

rationality

criteria.

least

regret,

and

tne

?l]

[Pef.

The three cases of decision-rraking under certainty, under and

risk,

state?

under uncertainty apply

of nature occur without

regard

payoff for the decision-raker. end

situations to

the

theory.

A

the the

The techniques of rratheratics

fourth case of

states of nature

where

their effect or

statistics applied in such cases are called

decision when

to

are

68

statistical

deci si cn-ir c king

controlled

by

a

arises rational

-

opponent,

who

frustrates

theory of games.

tion of the book,

[Ref.

a

part

of

T
Theory of Game_s and Economic Behavior, The authors

73j

.

The

payoff matrix can be used tn represent various In planning,

essentially commander

a

conflict

the estimate of the situation

formulation

i

statistical decision theory.

same way that it is used

in

the

effect

The theory uses the payoff matrix

the

situations.

of

by

decislon-nakir.g

ail situations where multiple decision-makers car [Hef.

hematics

established in 1944 by the publica-

von Neumann and Oskar Morgen stern.

an outcome

a

72]

theory hoped that it Tight form the basis of in

decision

A

which is against an active opponent is known as

A theory of games wcs

John

which

rranner

a

decision-maker.

of the

strategy and is subject to

of

called

expected to act in

be

goals

the

situation game

may

of a matrix game

in

rfhich

arrays his own courses of action against

is

the

the capa-

bilities of the enemy [Ref. 74]. is

It

found

in

nature.

It

necessary to consider all four of

the

the military as games of strategy and games against is

necessary becaus*e the commander must ne able

recognize the type of situation that he faces. not

be ir contact with

the enemy and so

direct conflict game situation.

made under uncertainty, is

H^i^ii!

performs

situations

d

risk,

All

of hi

s

.

69

be

in

decisions will

or certainty and

function of hew well his

Fe may or ray

may not

h e

to

the be

the difference

intelligence

service

Certainty,

and uncertainty situations differ in the

risk,

of knowledge available about the state of nature that

degree

The first and rare case is when the state can be

will occur. known

That case would correspond

advance.

in

G2

success

at

knowing

enerry

There is no risk

operations.

intentions

and so

the

that

involved

criterion

comparing alternatives is the best payoff. is

P.

in

used

for

risk situation

which the commander does not Know for

in

ccrrplete

to

sure

what

happen but can predict the probabilities for each state

will

of nature regardless of whether

The commander chooses the

opposing commander.

the expected value after-

optimizes

alternative are

each

uncertainty about

states

action.

tainty

probabilities

of

i^er

Deci si on-Taking

occurrence for any

know

various

the

of

e^ov^.h

of nature to predict their influence on his choice of milit<;ry operations,

In

is

decision-Flaking under uncer-

primarily of interest as an indication that job properly.

2l!-Y.ironrrents

[Sef.

The in

is

an^ Criteria

criteria

making in the military are pessimism,

rationality

G-2

7hJ

main uncertainty

four

The

volved

strifes which

comrrander does not

a

the

the weighted averages for

calculated.

when

arises

net doing its !•

choice is possible 'or

a

decision-

fcr

optimism,

regret,

and

.

criterion making

a

of

pessimism minimizes the

decision.

It

is also

referred

risV to

as tee

rraximin criterion since the minimum payoff for e G ch course

Tl

in-

cf

action is first found and then the alternative is chosen that

yields the maximum guaranteed payoffs. The

gree

criterion of optimism may

75]

implemented by

be

The complete optimist

optimism.

of

[Kef.

uses

de-

maxirndx

a

strategy assuming that the state of nature

will

occur which

is best for

will

choose

optimist.

the

The

optimist

action which provides the test payoffs. The It

applies

identify

.

77j

criterion is based on minimizing

third the

[Pef

pessimism criterion to

a

regret,

matrix

regret

the course of action which yields the least

of regret.

A

commander who would use this crite-io

n

one who looks tack on his decisions after the action to

The

ed

is

is

the

ever the

[Pef. 7SJ

criterion

of rationality accepts

uncertainty acout the probcble state cf nature to

to

amount

see how much better he could iis^e done by predicting

correct state.

the

assuming that each state

is

complete

that

equivalent

is

equally probaole.

The expect-

payoff for each course of action is computed by

v

;

eightin^

each state of nature equally.

TABLE 3 DECISION ENVIRONMENTS ANE CRITERIA

DECISION UNDER

[Pef. 79]

CRITERIA

CERTAINTY

HIGHEST PAYOFF

RISK

LARGEST EXPECTEP PAYOFF

UNCERTAINTY

PESSIMISM, OPTIMISM, LEAST REGRET, ANT RATIONALITY

71

2

Game Theo ry and the Co nf li



theory

Game

making

mathematical theory

a

goals.

general,

safely,

in

the

diametrically

face of

a

to

The decision

80],

military commander Takes conserva-

a

a

is

as

possible,

skillful opponent whose objective is This

opposed.

which

criterion,

[Hef.

desires to gain as much

He

decisions.

with

the degree of speculation allowed by the

on the situation and

tive

opponents

two

The proper criterion depends

depends on the criterion used.

In

decision-

can make a decision as

which alternative should be chosen

corrmander.

of

game theory payoff matrix provides

The

by which each participant

method

Sit uat ion

conflict situations between

in

opposing

is

c_t

essentially

is

the

maxirnin

the reasonable criterion to use

conflict situation involving

a

rational opponent.

The maxirnin criterion is

pessiri sti

a

c

in

[Hef

1 .

strategy

a

81]

con-

ducted urder uncertainty to insure that the greatest expected

value

will be attained against an enemy who makes the wisest

choice.

Once

the

situation

flict

two-person,

^.an

criterion has been established, be placed

in

zero-sum" matrix.

a

An

rratrix

forrr

;

the

con-


the

example o^ this type

matrix is shown in T^ble 4.

TABLE 4 TWO-PERSON. ZIRO-Sl M GAME MATRIX T

RSI OPTIONS

BLUE OPTIONS Bl

32 T-7 i-

w

Hi

R2

SUCCF5I

FAIL DRAW succrir

jccf PRAM

t ;

7L

J

R3

succtit PRA'.v

FA

IT

of

The

which

shown in Table

case

has

all

payoff

A

corrrrander.

payoffs

success for red.

standard

the

the point of view of

frorr

which

blue failure

is a

clue

also

option

or

51

ri sa

Blue

succeeding.

want

rrlght

hut choosing 12 will result

P3.

either

the two-person,

to

intelligence

a

draw every time. the

of

situation

zero-surr garre

[Ref..

is s

i-

predicts the red options and the

staff

The commander

tions staff develops the blue options.

with

the

entire staff to determine which blue

have

the

highest payoff in light of what rer can

situation might be shown as

or

be Cautious and choose B2,

to

estimate

military

The

in

a

blue.

Those options have an equal chance of failing

or 33.

similar

the is

Blue, knowing that red will never choose R2, rust 31

forrr

Red wants to minimize the payoff for

rationally choose either option

will

Red

is in

4

operaworks

option

will

do.

The

game matrix in which the matrix

a

values represent the postulated values of the outcomes of the battle.

An

example would be:

cori^ ITER

'S

TABLE 5 ESTIMATE

n

nor

RED

3LUE OPTIONS LOWEST 1

12

2

33

HIGHEST

R2

Rl

Bl

AME

r.A

!

TV IX

S

Q

P

3

A

6

A 1

(>

2

3

3

2

1

9

u

3

1

2

9

o

o

2=2

73

.

The

blue commander would assure

rational

pick PI to achieve the minimum of the maximum

would

Elue would then decide on option

for blue.

payoff of

least 2.

a

the

payoff matrix is the Same for both

under

dominance

mander's

use of

game is

d

which guaran-

but

least

in

veil

as

This example is

matrix.

a

There are other other examples of ga^es

saddle point game. with

p a yoff

different enerry

a

paycffs

commanders,

the blue commander can do at

situation

this

at

332

red

This discussion has assured that

tees

the

that

and games requiring rrixed strategy,

A

single course of action for all

plays

of

way

of

a

pure strategy.

A

mixed strategy is

a

com-

using two or more courses of action on different plays of the

game

optimal strategy called 'or in the solution

The

game.

the optimal pure strategy in

is

point,

is

and

commander strategy

of

an

the

because

Ilememtary

all.

a

fare game,

inferior force may not

have

are

book,

the two

of

observations on use

The first is

is near certainty with

the game is not

calling

for mixed

n

optimal

an

theory are

in

that military conflict may

game.

a

The

expected

large number p* repeti-

For

ar.y

one play

the commander may realize rrore or less than the

74

at

ex-

games

of

realized for one time plays

strategy.

he

Naval Ojeratiqns Analysis.

series of one time plays of the

pay^f which tions

otherwise.

theory and further example^

a

saddle-

a

optimal mixed strategy

game

conflict situations. be

game with

he may not he able to use game

plained very well in

There

a

to

of

of

a

the

value

of

the game

telligence has

The second observation

83].

[Ref.

great impact on the value of

a

that in-

is

the

garre.

doctrine dictates the selection of

Established

successful

course of action which promises

to

accomplishment of the mission,

regardless of what the

chooses

do in opposition

to

enemy's plan, game

the

in part,

to have perfect

strategies

The

the matrix.

from

commander

to

to

is



<±re

The use of intelligence

the value

eliminated.

than

may be rare

intelli-

i c

iiscarded

equivalent

intelli-

The value of o

p

the game a ''ten

the

[Ref. 35]

it

should oe possible to use deception

influence the game matrix used by the

enemy.

reception

used to eliminate the best enerry course of action deletes from

the matrix.

The best time to use deception is

the enemy's matrix is produced

Fight not

to

Inception Impact on the Same Matrix Theoretically,

to

It

eliminated by intelligence may be

the difference in

options

enerry

rather

eliminate many of the enemy's strategies.

eliminating some enemy capabilities. gence

a

hut it is common for

intelligence,

he able

to

the in

his whole spectrum of capabilities.

against

enemy

can eliminate seme enemy options

This intelligence allows

matrix.

the

in

Knowledge of

84].

[Ref.

against fewer enemy courses cf action

maximize

gence

be most

that

be

able

during

planning.

before

reception

used to convince the enemy that the blue force to

execute

a

certain option.

never be entered into his matrix,

75

That

it

option

is

would

reception mi^ht be used

to

change

the

enemy understanding of the payoffs

combinations

of dlt ernat ives

The matrix

.

changes in his expected value of the game. tion by the inferior force commander,

produce

is

gains,

neces-

reduce

The deception

courses of action which are not otherwise

or not worth 4

The use of decep-

for example,

the situation.

exploit

or

produce

increase

payoffs,

deception to enhance

casualties,

changes

The commander of the superior force might

not use it.

use

several

proper course of action so that he

sary to counter the enemy

does

for

may

possible,

the risk.

Soviet Views on Game Theory



is much of interest

There

Indications

are

in

game theory in

the Soviet commanders

that

will

Russia. use

the

l

cautious criterion o" choosing the

outcomes (mmximin).

oes*' of

the worst possible

There are indications that- the Russians

will attempt to reduce game choices through the use of intelligence,

intimidation,

a:id

creasing the Soviet payoff. Soviet Soviet tion

reflexive control; [Ref.

thereby in-

86]

literature yields sore indications

that

the

hierarchy believes that game theory has sore applicato

the

execution of deception.

In

1971,

Icnov wrote.

'Considering on the whole that tactics of deception should always run one step ahead oi what the opponent knows about these tactics. Control of a n opponent's actions should be viewed as the fine art of applying son-repeating techniques, keeping one step ahead of the same stratagem being en-ployed by the opponent." [Ref. 8?j .

Such by

choices

.

.

thinking proposes that random action

determined

by

the flip of

76

a

coin,

for

generated example,

applicable

rright be

random

for

action

to

Such

military conflict.

could

he

incorporated

techniques

into

antedated

he

discussed

decision aids. The

Soviet view of game theory should

relation to their concept of reflexive control.

in

view,

reflexive

control would

actions of an opponent. in the 1974 book,

K.V.

be used

to

In

such

predetermine

a

the

Tarakanov wrote the following

Mathematics and

Arrred

Conflict:

"The garring theory rrethods in combination with reflex control methods are an effective instrument in selecting implementation the optimal plans for combat operations and in Fere, the course of armed confrontation by sides. displaying military art, the commander knows ahead of time the costs of his risK and its possible results." [Ret, 88]

One

of

the basic rules for the use of deception

the plan must

that

situation.

important

The

based on how the enemy

perceives

same necessity to understand the enemy is

when using game

factor

stated in 1972 by

te

a

theory.

Soviet writer, Sclnyshkov.

This

idea

is

the at

was

He wrote;

"Vhen analyzing a situation it is very important to know the psychological features of one's opponent. If he is cautious, then his selection will evidently be based on the principle of maximum [sic. Kinimar?]. In this situation one can hardly count on success by selecting un action existing arrangement of variant with the manpower and already basing his decision for the enemy is on means, powerful variant. Perhaps it to our most is better the projected area of create a preponderance of forces in action by weakening forces in other sectors, since the cautious opponent will scarcely take advantage of this." [Ref. 89] 5-

Implications of Game Theory The

strategies used ty the two

their choices.

It

is

opponents

determine

the strategies which are important

77

and

Strategy can

which are susceptible to analysis.

defined

be

as a plan for choosing individual moves which is complete

that

possible events

all It

analyze

whether

experience,

past

opponent's game solution

the

on randcrrness or

show if the opponent has

a

dominant choice.

reason for him to deviate

frcrr.

to

involves

a

strategy

Analysis can

the elimination of chance.

on

the

then,

strategy and to analyze whether he bases his

Fixed

no

have been anticipated in

rrust

is possible using

plan.

in

there is

so,

If

that choice whether he

is

deceived or not. Game

theory

provides

model which can be

a

whether an opponent's pest behavior has been

test

and unpredictable, may

rational

to

effective

rules

of war.

The

last would

or ray

seem the

the professional military as it

be

most

incorporates

use of intelligence and applies the The unpredictable pattern may

random

re

rational and predictable,

unpredictable.

but

advantageous

be

to

rational.

This helps establish patterns of behavior that ray

the

used

be

tactical

introduced

through the use cf deception. When deception is available as tion

a

becomes one of high uncertainty where an

never

be sure whether deception

uncertainty effect

is

each situa-

choice,

being used

opponent not.

The

has two main effects on the payoff matrix.

One

opponent must double the

rhe

that

the

is

or

size

payoff matrix to account for each choice involving or

not.

In

t.-i

such

a

case,

the matrix nay

7a

be

too

of

deception

complicated

to

.

the game becomes of little use in simpli-

as a model and

use

fying the decision. gence

placed

is

intelli-

The second effect is that all

doubt

in

when it is

clear

not

The

if

information collected was deception or not. The possible use of deception compensates for

imper

feet security as the opponent must decide whether his

ligence is based on information which is real This the

tends

also

intelligence

commitment

until

but again,

information

to

the attacker

in

fe«r of

the

while

t~ap

a

The defender sometimes will

that advantage.

reduces

ambiguous

situation

The advantage goes to

uncertainty,

of

deceptive.

or

forces collect additional

reduce the ambiguity.

situations

the

keep

to

intel-

the uncertainty is resolved

did

delay

hope

to

i

eliminate

waitirg

th<

long

too

The penalty for

attacker's advantage totally. for

clarification is

svrpri

that

c

e

is

guaranteed theory is one way of looking

Game it

is

applicable

interaction

opposing

can

sides.

to

deception process

a

be viewed as a direct

i

the system

at p

battle may be considered

A

battlefield

the

conflict

and

between

to

be

the

a

two-

the

p^st

person, zero-snm game.

theory is of little use in analyzing

Game use

of deception,

argument

for

but

need

does prDvide

a

strong

theoretical

the occasional or even the continuous

deception at the U.S. will

it

Army operational level.

use

The Soviet's

evidence of the probable use of deception by

?9

of

the

U.S. of

Arrry.

intelligence

operational deception will make their

considerably E.

The Soviet's perception of probable American use

rrore

task

difficult.

PERCEPTUAL ANT COGNITIVE PROCESSES The

target

of

tactical deception is the

a

The corrrrander may he directly targeted with

rrander.

com-

energy

decep-

tive information if his behavior pattern is predictable.

Chinese

intervention in the Korean

situdtion.

General

MacArthur

wa s

tfar

may have beer such

of the possibility.

a

personally and completely

surprised by that action even though there had been tors

'"he

The fact that General

indicar"

a o Arthur

had rarely been incorrect in his past assessment of the enemy

have

coulc)

led hir to disregard

intervene.

that

the Chinese ^ight

the

intelligence collection

have be

many

of

He might

requirements,

been the prime factor which allowed

positions of disadvantage when

in

indications

the

have influenced that

and

forces to

the U.N.

the

rould

attack

surprise

tegan.

The

focuses upon the

commander may be indirectly targeted i" the deceiver on

the organization which provides

the

which the commander bases his decisions. enemy organization dnd the way that

predict

which

means

it

information Knowledge of

functions

of deception would have

the

would

greatest

probability of success. The

correct

chance

of success

for

d

deception

is

enhanced

by

understanding of the thought processes of the target

Bi

the key personnel he has working for

and

Individual

hir.

thought processes are biased by such things as role ments,

environment, culture, and training.

zational

thought processes are biased

setting,

doctrine,

player has

key that

such things as goal

by

The result is that each

experience.

consistent,

judgment

and

predictable.

and

These

cogni-

can be understood in terms of perceptual and

biases

Perceptual biases result

processes.

world

is

they

fron-

the way

perceived and they limit the accuracy

of

biases result from the way the

Cognitive

tions. and

Group or organi-

pattern of biased perception

a

detectable,

is

tive

and

require-

influence the way that

a

person

percep-

trine"

treats

the

works

evidence,

attributes causality, and estimates probabilities. 1

Cognitive Jiases



Perhaps

the

most pertinent factor of how

works is that working memory is very limited.

knowledge

of how the mind works

is

Tne

not yet known,

mind

the

complete but

it

is

recognized that there is an immense capacity for retention of data

in

initial

long term memory. stirruli

histories

Case

It

is also

recognized

presented to the rind can he of

trauma

or hypnotic

induce!

very

that

the

conplex.

recollection

have shown that memory of past events with exceptional detail can exist in long term memory without any recollection at ell by

conscious mind.

the

however,

gence

is

of no use to

analyst.

Memory that

cannot

be

the decision-maker or the

The memory that is of use is

81

recalled,

intelli-

that which

is

placed

working

in

from stimuli that are received

rrerrory

from data which can be recalled

frorr

long

terrr

memory.

or

[Ref.

90]

Working data.

It

can handle only

rremory

tion that is presented by eyes,

stimuli only

closes

or other senses.

The

from those senses are available in great detail

fcr

his

quickly

wants

ears,

to

It

that

working

rrust

retain and chunk

it

simplify the stimuli that

it

The

is

of it.

similar to the way

[P.ef

a

a

those

chunks are discarded

memory

Cne -result to

[Hef.

and the rest must terrr

is

so

that

five hypotheses at

as

data

overload

dees

time.

Once

e

picked up again.

[P.ef.

An

memorized.

the human a

mind can

tire.

Tr

rut

the

ar

there

rest

93]

hypothesis Further,

ut

Some of

92}. be

v

it,

a

a

that none data can

and the mind filters out all

salient hypotheses.

the

in

ambiguous situation where many hypotheses are possible an

by

91]

few chunks at

limit would be around five chunks

They have to be put in long

.

computer

upper

three

be usee!

manipulate chunked

can

memory can only process

handle

can

chunked data is not the sa^e

memory

enter working memory.

a

into data that

it

is only a model

Working [Tanner

The mind

Fernery.

stimuli.

picture before

eyes that one can still see

fades.

working

is

of

short period of time such as the few seconds after one

a

only

amount

small

the amount of informa-

for example,

can not handle,

a

is

drepped it

is

almost

when time stress is present,

82

never the

develops

rrind

cognitive

vision

tunnel

simplifying

using

heuristics such as representativeness and avai lability There

94].

is

a

Mas

Fef.

in estimating the probability of

which is related to ho*

hypotheses

different

r

the

the

easily

hypothesis can he imagined or how easily sirilar cases can be recalled from long term memory very good at aggregating

not

probability

where

a

terrrs

lifce

game

theory

accurate than the word.

[Ref.

Anchoring

is

a

but

number that

it

ques-

is

is

any more

There are seme -cnown tendencies such

regression towards the mean

overestimated.

large

The ability to place numeri-

tionable whether the mind generates

a

prob-

srall difference in probability can result in

ranges on probabilities can be forced,

cal

make

Humans likely,

as

is

The c e terms are not mathema-

96].

differences in expected value.

as

such

enough for applications

precise

tically

[Ref.

humor, mini

The

.

tne information.

judgments in loose

or possibly

ably,

95j

[Ref.

in

which

rare

events

are

97J a

cognitive

bias

analysis being anchored around the initial

which

results

estimate.

in

Addi-

tional information or analysis may not have the impact of the initial

information because the bias will only allow

variance from the initial estimate. The

overconfidence

lias

is

[Ref.

small

a

98].

that people tena

tc

Le

overconfident about what they know and how well they know it. This level

bias is important in that in telliger ~e analysts at

are regarded as experts.

Their private feelings

83

cry ran

effect the intelligence that is produced. large effect on the decision-maker.

evaluated.

is

consistency.

hypothesis are considered to be strong evidence, of

corrrron

indicators that are accompanied

by

of data

number

cant,

the

but

intervals.

transmitted.

If

transmitted,

then

can

be kept

has.

make

gence

is

being

from

the number of deception indicators needed

wotks with the

additional data routinely,

his analysis.

information are

analyst

importance

out

data

he

will -ever

all the information he wants before he has

to get

reasons

information

contrary indicators are kept

intelligence

the

pertinent

the deceiver

if

absence of data is not of vary great

He may request

expect

confidence

small.

The

because

signifi-

be

human mind does not use internal

ever the channels by which the

lot

100"].

[?ef.

should

This bias can help the deception

control

has

points that are used

a

ccntra-

few

a

tc

same

the

while

dictory ones would be considered weaker evidence The

that

One bias is an oversensit ivity

indicators that all support

few

A

a

59]

are cognitive biases that effect the way

There

evidence

[Bef.

That can have

There are too many reasons why ail is

avdlntle

not

many

and

the result of inadequacies in his own

organization.

Too close

a

look at gaps

of

of

tc

the *

h

(-

intelli-

evidence

Right highlight failings in his own operation.

The frorr

cause

human mind is much better et following the to

effect

than it

is

to-t

at

working

backwards

pcth from

effect

to

This bias works in the favor of the

de-

ceiver

because the deceiver begins with the big picture

and

cause-to-effect relationships in breaking

use

can

into the desired indicator

picture

working for the

analysts

with

cause.

indicator

the

target of the deception must they receive and

that

set

harder job in that the effects

that are real or deceptive.

deception 2

rrust

lead

fray

essence,

In

work

trace

indicators back to the events that caused then. rruch

big

intelligence

The

set.

the

those

They have

causes

back to

the target of

do diagnosis rather than analysis.

the 1Z1]

[Hef.

Perceptual Biases



Perception constructs rather than records reality.

Knowledge

as well as awareness.

understanding

irrplies

what is perceived anc the meaning that is attributed

essential biases

a

the planning of

to

a

deception.

The

be considered as one means of

should

of

it

tc

It

is

perceptual

better

under-

standing the enemy. One perceptual an

This

depends

observer

bias

is

the

on

that

information

observer's

bias is applicable throughout

the

obtained

by

own

expectations.

target

organization.

The collector at the channel output has some control over the

signals that are received.

accepted correctly,

misinterpret ed

unexpected he

expects

The

.

signal to

but

The signals that are expected ere

signals that are not expected may be

wrong meaning may

be

attached

to

because it is different from signals

receive.

The first analyst may

8h

re

the

that

sifting

the volumes of intercepted

through only

understanding

and.

those that support the pattern that he is expecting

remaining

develop.

The

worthless

sirrply

that

signals

signals

rray

rejected

he

because they do not fit into

being

as

pattern

the

exists in the analyst's mind.

There contain

are

rrany

signals that are worthless

be

The expectations

of

the analyst

signals

can

important

information

salient to the situation.

[F.ef.

expectations

that

The

expectations

individual

expectation

could

be

or

in

highly

bein^'

102J

the

bias

expectations.

group

generated

Dy

signals

may

group

such things as the

daily

Each

intelligence

summary

quarter's

would

be

that,

officer

situation is expected who

analyst

or

tempted to assume that the

assessment of the situation,

being most correct. a

If

the

group expectation that establishes

the processing of the next

who

accepted.

handles

86

it

is

receives

that

higher

head-

be

the

accepted

summary might proa

day's intelligence.

the information as

change.

tr

should

a

situa-

based on all of

inforraticn available to the organization,

vide

Such

would summarize the perception of the enemy

and project how

be

A

intelligence summary prepared by higher headquarters.

tion

the and

lost

be

iray

may be understood as

information

unimportant

is contained

bias the information that

that

so

document

that

or

information that is so ambiguous that they could

used to support several possibilities.

as

to

common Each

bias-

in

person

processed through

the

organization product

rray

have

rray

a

entering

should.

it

intelligence

an

finished

but the

totally different meaning than

signals

The

biased

distort it only slightly,

syster

the initial hypothesis generated by that

by

are

system.

Those signals that support the hypothesis are welcome because they

prove that the initial hypothesis work

was

good,

everyone wants his work to be perceived as good. that

are

welcomed for the

not

same

a

lot

cf

The implication is that it is e.-sier

to

A

second perceptual

understanding

bias is

that

a

this

bias is to use the

are massing in the typical

units

regimental assembly area.

manipulate

preconception

change that preconception.

is

formation that is

1

different from normal is hard to recognize.

with

them to generate

target by reinforcing an existing

to deceive a

enerry

professional

system should not allow those inconsistent sig-

hypothesis reversal.

it

The

reason.

nals to be ignored but it will taKe

than

The signals

are contradictory to the idea of the initial hypothesis

intelligence

a

forces

A

logical way of

situation pattern

which

in

associated

The actions required

into that stereotyped pattern

intelligence

result

signals

available

analyst

receives the normal indicators and understands

to

the

collectors.

correctly because they indicate activity that fits that

the

and

he

has learned and

overall

norrrally

avd

situation. that

the pattern may

The enemy is

oe

a

tc

in

The them

pattern

consistent

erpertej

to

with

attack

typically would require the second echelon

8?

forces to rrass in preparation for the attack. chose

the stereotype and

break

to

assembly

areas,

it

The signals would not

"be

with

associated

operations

pattern.

should

activity .should

associated

be

story

with

real

opinion of the phenomena being

an

observed.

conditioned by the first perception.

be

the

organization will benefit the

bias of the target

as long as the deception

is designed

the preconceptions of the target.

that ycu are going to continue to delay, to

a

portraying

an

actual preparations

"or

;or

If the enemy

mcich

decep-

expects

for example, ther

him

he

believe

The deceptive

time.

orderly dei^y could a

that

advantage

tai^e

deception which would have

that ycu are willing to trade space

signals

to

The

situa-

The implication fcr deception is

vulnerable

has

"uture

tion in the same way.

is

and

the

observer is biased towards continuing to perceive the

of

be

.

perceptions will

tion

The

third perceptual bias is that once an observer

A

formed

the expected

the indicators of the deception

activity

atypical

fit

for deception is that normal

implication

battalion

from

to

because they would not

clear

attack

enerry

would he much harder for the analyst

what was about to happen.

foresee

If the

be

sent

vhile

different operation ace placed

in motion.

enemy woalc

The

convince

him

indications

to

not require overwhelming signals

of the delay.

He would only

reinforce his existing belief.

88

require

to

enough

The bias would

assist

assure that

the

obtained

if

would attribute missing ddta to

the

deception to cause the enemy

the

conclusive

evidence

necessary.

The

exists

enemy

efforts of friendly camouflage or

the deception

assist

t>y

be

imperfect functioning of

to

The

intelligence collection.

own

his

could

and

to

Mas

further

might

causing indications of activity

not

associated with the delay to be discounted as possible reception.

The implication for deception is that

reduce

the impact of security leaks,

and

uncontrolled

tion for deception

succeed

at

a

one

second

A

will

channels,

poorly executed deception measures as long as

not actually do what the enemy expects.

to

this bias

does

implica-

that this bias mokes it very difficult

is

deception which will require the

enemy

to

change his rind about what he expects. fourth perceptual

A

changes

often

bias is

Transportation

unnoticed.

go

that gradual evolutionary

supplies might be used as an example. he

military

o^

The requirement rright

that the tonnage of supplies being moved by the

support

command

offensive.

The

be

doubled

movement

area

the

number

intelligence

Oi"

hidden

cannot he

rear

of convoys would

analysts.

A

cf

this bias

and any be

gradual

interest to be reported even if is

for

a

key indicator

divisi

increase fnr

was

not

ir

of

be of sufficient

noticed.

The impli-

that if you want the enemy to

89

*r

enemy

increase to the number might

it

sudden

planned

a

large convoys in the

however,

trucks in each convoy,

cation

preparation

in

iivisior

take

of an event you should change patterns

notice

want an event to regain hidden,

you

quickly.

If

the patterns should

re

changed slowly. The last "bias in perception that will is

idea that

the

perceived blurred

a

correctly

subject to erroneous has

and

a

takes longer to

perception. a

but

An

be

picture

that

is

perceive

en'

is

ambiguous picture which

shorter

a

exposure to arrbiguous or blurred stirruli

accurate

information

perception even after

becomes

available.

at

ca*\

longer time will require

same picture presented for

looked

deer

longer perception tire for correct

a

the

initial

with

quickly.

and.

been presented for

focus than

picture that is slurp and

of focus

out

or

be

the

There

sharper

a

recognition The

tire.

interferes

subsequent are

clear obvious

three

implications for deception. First, the start of sis

a

a

very strong and clear indicator set sent

deception can Insure that the desired hypothe-

perceived correctly by the enemy.

is

the deception story

his

clarity enerry

The need

he

considered by the enerry before he cheeses

eration,

front-leaded into the

deception

plan.

once the nypo thesis has been accepted for even

proof that some of the indicators were

may not be sufficient evidence to cause the hypothesis

disregarded

salient The

the indicators may later seer suspicious to

of hut

have

to

initial set of hypotheses may require that very

indicators

at.

.

9/

the

considfalse to

oe

ambiguous The

picture presented

confusing that

at

is

lost

in

bias

be used to hide to

the enemy

that

is

rray

is

an

key signals.

made

be

so

special

a

the noise of other signals that are presented

blurred picture is such

The initial

enemy information system may De Saturated or the

uity

that

ambig-

such that the enemy has not yet determined what

key signals will cal as well.

the

this

key signal such as the movement of

a

the same time.

the

of

initial situation can

initial

unit

implication

second

A

the

The timing of the signals can be criti-

be.

The movement of an artillery unit necessary for

obscured

real operation can he

by

the subsequent decep-

tive movemert of an armored unit which captures the

complete

attention of enemy intelligence. The

third implication of this bias of perception

that an ambiguous picture might

maintained

for

decision-making. clarify

an

be

presented to the enemy and

other reason than just

no

time

The

that

ambiguous situation may

is

it ce

delay

to

er emy

takes for the enemy

to

provide

sufficient to

the necessary tactical advantcge. 3*

lE£li^§tlons of Psychology for reception The

implication

c^

the

perceptual

that if the deception is designed

biases

is

target

will do much of the work for you.

only two choices for

a

and

cognitive

correctly, There are

the

really

deception, although each deception ray

have rrany different attributes.

The two choices h?ve already

been identified as having tc do with enemy preconceptions.

91

.

The first choice is to deceive

reinforce

that

existing

target's

the

target's

preconception.

which

information

in the places

first

evidence as deceptive,

the

contrary

that

In

correct,

it

hypothesis.

fact,

action

is

difficult

has

a

IcoKing

the

favored

the

advantage that

in

signals

hypothesis.

hypcthesis

that his

for nim

charge

to

better change for success

target to action which

the

The

very

the

ctnd

the target may not even perceive

signals or may attach meaning tc

is

for

>e

The deception that capitalizes on the

preconception

take.

if

by'

incorrect, or resulting fror mi stakes

the target has decided

Once

be

-
The target tends to ignore contrary

incorrect but supports his

is

leads

such that it will

that the signals would

you

searching

The target is

is

hypothesis was correct.

in his own system.

is

supports his fdvored hypothesis

profession

intelligence

signals

while

belief's

This deception

really are doing something else. the

target with

a

he

that

target's

because

it

predisposed

is

tc

neiping insure that ne takes

the deceiver can prepare

is

the

that

battlefield

to

maxiri ze his gain

The second choice for to do

something that he

of deception

then least

it

is

should

be

is

a

deception requires the target

not predisposed to

avoided but,

ao

if it mart

.

This type

be

atterpted

necessary to insure that the neception story

one of the initial hypotheses that is considered

target.

The chance

of

total success of this

9*

deception

is by

at

the

tvoe

because it

the other type

is less than for

the

deception

fails.

ambiguities

in

decisions cannot be

tirrely

would be better to

It

attempt

situations where advantages can re

in

introducing

if

this

gained

the target organization so

by

that

rrade.

DECISION MAKING The tactical deception target is the opposing

All

the

ill-advised in situations that will be very dangerous

deception

I.

on

This type of deception would

changing of the target's mind. be

depends

designed

story

the deception story as the

establish

tc

eremy commander sees just prior to hi

the

that

communication of the deception

the

of

decisions

result

that

in

the success or

coirra.ider.

5

must

be

Dig picture

making

failure

of

the th<

decept ion. The

the

deceiver's knowledge of the enemy

^ni.

system interaction is important only for the ability

predict

or predetermine the desired

which

target

battlefield. are

organization

important

his forces at

places

action of the a

deception

disadvantage

on

th<

Knowledge of game theory or other decision aids only

for

understanding the

enemy

identifying vulnerabilities that result ^roT Applying

to

knowledge

of

perceptual and

and

for

predictability.

cognitive

processes

provides ^u^ther understanding and predictability, but again, that

information

against

is of importance only as

i T

can

he

used

Knowing how the target makes

the deception target.

his decisions makes raninulation of his decision?

9'6

uossible.

The

the key not only because he

corrrrander is

decisions

result

that

success of the deception, ance

to

tne action which

in

but

also

the

determines

the

because he provides guid-

intelligence system regarding salience and inter-

the

pretation.

commander

The

organization.

His

sets most of the goals

for

the

policy for deception influences how

trie

organization treats deception.

commander who avoids using

A

deception will probably be less attentive of

makes

deception being used against him.

possibility

the

to

the other hand,

On

commander who uses deception in his own plans may not be better

detecting

at

its use by others.

The

a

any

problems

cf

counterdeception are not solved by attention. The

commander

is

the key

the

to

though the general staff system generated

throughout The

the

staff,

information

commander

so

from

staff sections is

functioning,

responsible.

presented

that he can appprove or disapprove the

entire

system

and

Even

division :f labor

a

tne commander remains

and decisions made in his name

The

organisation.

to

actions

the staff.

by

interaction,

the

organizational

the communications flow for tne

operation end with the commander's decision.

That

cognitive processes and

deception decision

is

biased by perceptual

on

probabilities and expected values that the commander

not

even

be able to

Tep ending

cision,

the

put

acid

is

based

may

into words.

on the payoff for

comranier

the

may

a

correct or

change his

94

incorrect

decision

de-

criteria.

There

is

a

associated

behavior

tendency for risk aversion

with gain situations and for risk seeking behavior associated with loss situations.

Approaches to decision Making

!•

The

Army approach to making decision?

U.S.

the decision belongs to the commander on the spot as it

is

when

i

to do

so

a

decision

will

unpredictability

large amount of

be or what

response might be. in

phrase might

re

that

time than totally

The

"it

ri<-*ht

Soviet

is

the machine,

is

paramount

is

it

to

to

be

too

in

the

A

roughly

on

far

is

The difference that

which automation can or should be included

commanders and their staffs

right

late."

context of this tnesis is the

operational level decision.

descriptive

decision-making

different from the American approach. important

what

friendly

better

approach

rout

the

decision-making.

after

a

the magnitude of not

The man,

approach to

U.S.

the

duthcr-

the lowest

at

The enemy can never have total certainty a

s

for avoiding deception.

good

is

whether they are

decision-making

This

or not.

level possible results in

which

make

Army loves to make 'ecisio n

decisions

many make tactical

zed

as

U.S. Army commanders love to m a :re decisions.

everyone in the U.S.

fact,

and

long

decision is necessary and are trained on how to

that decision. In

that

The commanders are trained to recognize

within reason. a

is

in

degree

tne Soviet

1^ to

A.

<™my

The basic instruction for Soviet or

the

a-

sv.b

;

e>-t

d f

automation

vas

published over twelve years ago

which

Pecjiion,

riihlTj

Library."

That

Force

is

and

velopment

in

a

monograph,

pdrt of the

is

relevant in that

the theory for decision-making

of

U.S.

Air

further

de-

through the

use

the

proposes the

it

"Officer's

Soviet

monograph was translated by

of the concept of automating military operational

management processes

[Pef.

and

and

tion,

a

Justification of the

description of computer systems

a

mathematics,

related

a

and

the display and retrieval of

work study of possible sequences of

carried out by the commanders and tneir staffs

function

use

solve military command and control proolerrs

to

with

ends

control and

103].

The monograph "begins with of cybernetics

Algo-

Idea A

levels using automated systems.

s-wre

informa-

operations the various

at

Included

the

in

material are statistical statements of strategies, forroli. ^7

tion

of categories

the use of algorithmic

through

largrage,

and operational analvsis which applies mathematical models tc

the Soviet decision-making process.

The Soviets

Library the

that monograph in their "Officer's

over ten years ago.

Soviet

to accomplish

is

It

quite ess y to assume that

army did not have anj large amount

assets at that time.

been

placed

The sophi

c

the goals mentioned

of

tiua ted computers ir

computer necessary

the monograph would nave

rare iters in the military system.

Colonel

oartment

J.

Hemsley,

of Tefense Studies,

Research

University

Fellow of

o r

the

Fdinburgh

Te~ .

in

published

1980,

Algorithmic the

paper titled "Voennaya Sis t emotcknika

a

Approach United

"Royal

to

Decision-making"

in the Journal

for Eefense

Institute

Services

An



of

Studies.

Colonel Herrsley rrade the following observation: "The foreword to the Russian edition of the monograph written fcy General of the Arrry S.M. Shtemenko. Fe starts by outlining the inter-relationships between mathematics, social sciences and the humanities en one hand and the irpact of the new sciences and modern technology on the other. The introduction goes o n to explain that automation neither nor supplants rental replaces creativity but rather gives the human mind the opportunity to extend its range of intellect. There is 10 implication substitution for * of of man? rather the a machine that ma- is of certain relieved become complementary in uan formal (technological) functions which be mathematically defined and automatically executed." [Ref 1#4] is

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

t

:

.

man-rraohine decision model

The

level needs to be understood.

tional

exists

standing Soviet

because it

technology

will

is

A

systems

literature.

will

be

The

^rmy

be

well

n

j

to

and

cominte-

aid

applications postulated

question is if and

sufficient

how

ground

of

available to the Soviet Army.

should

and

under-

mobile,

such systems exists at the highes'

^or

ir

cevelop the hardware

be able to

grated are necessary for the tyoes Soviet

opera-

difficult tc project

Reliable systems that are rugged,

bat.

Arrry

problem

necessary for the tactical problems

software

in

the Soviet

at

'els

drive

when

suopert

The i

:i

the

the

such

Soviet

reqruired

technology. The form of the man-machine interface in the Soviet is

a

duced

combination of logic and mathematics. by

the

subordinate commanders and staff

97

Logic

is

Army

intro-

officers

who

codify

which can

symbols

parameters of

essential

the

be

battlefield

the

used in mathemati cal models.

the information requires simple transformation.

would be such things as weather

ation

light,

roads,

parameters vehicles,

time,

of the force such as

determination might be harder on

conjecture

Certainly, matical

require

model

the

that

projecting

that o ^

would

be

must

is

i

to

the

^

-n

on

entered into

of

the

model.

Tee

re-

machine

%hich analyzes

conjecture of possible

One

puts

might include force ratios,

path

mo v em en*

Sophisticated

been

it

Those instructions establish

.

time

irto

computer,

the

^unction does the rapid information processing

tables,

"

s

135]

[F.ef.

tne possible output

synthesizes the data.

know

ode1

taken

be

combined with the instructions that have

ceived by higher head oua rters

and

the mathe-

the computer

by

of those factors could

the environment

be

limits

situation.

future

the situation are rot used

influence

amount

situation a-d probabi-

the

used

account in the final decision. Once

certain

a

the commander *ould need to understand

factors

which

ammunition,

codify.

to

the enemy would

in

terrain,

measurable

weapons,

of guesswork in evaluating the present

listic

This inform-

as well as

men,

of

Other information such as morale or

or supplies.

Information

Much

conditions,

vegetation

or

into

required forces,

milestones,

models should be able

tc

provide

solutions with advantages cui disadvantages.

9H

and

!°ef,

it-

critical legisti

s.

alternative 1/6.!

Logic

required

is

evaluating

in

the

produced alternatives and choosing the optimal

machine

commander

The

the commander

by

approach, yet

still the decision-maker

is a

Soviet

the

in

ore.

scientifically derived Soviet decision c^not

made without calculations and quantitative substantiation.

be

Rechtin,

Sberheirdt

Dr.

3oard

of the National

would

view

the

A

Soviet

past Chdirran cf the cad amies of Science

approach

to

\

!

Studies

cVal

Engineering,

3nd

ieci si on -making

with

certain amount of distrust as indicated in his recent article Naval Van Collgge Review.

the

in

Technology of Command,"

Pr.

In

that

article,

'The

Rechtin wrote:

"A inherent in decision theory difficulty that is decisions all too often are mace under condireal-world rruch tions never before considered, less characterized and Another inherent difficulty in quantised. in a using computers in decision making is that, sense, too precise. computers are too perfect, F^r better or worse, whether computers are operating on simple data cr complex algorithms, they will always produce precisely the are answers inputs same fro* the same inputs. I: the incomplete or if unprogrammed events occur, the computers If the context changes, what was the right answer crash. n ev before may be wrong-precisely wrong-in the ccrtert. .

.

.

1

107 J

[Pef.

approach

The

to

decision-making that

usen

i c

opponent organization is important to the deception An organization which allows decentralized

vulnerable the

deception if certain

battlefield.

selected force

to

communications

oovld

process.

decisions m.i^ht

be

:ommanders are isolated

:>n

Communications jamming cr destruction nodes

;ould

from its command and control

situatiir

the

in

be

presented

to

oc

remove

si.bordir.ate

-1

headquarters. the isolated

cf

A

force

+,

else

which

require decisions to be made without the

would

intelligence

support available to percieve the situation correctly. same isolation could support

makes

which

tion

possible. sion

a

decisions

deception against an organizaoniy

guidance that

afte

The deception

r

is

[right

keep

hirr

would

information The

be

degraded,

probaoly be considered as loss

organization

right

net

be

a

is

.

auto-

more

a

The

significant aVailcble.

world have develooed

arrount

available.

u terra tea

J

i

than if the aid hci never been a

certain

Dacjr-up

manual

A

more

of

systems

Tne loss of information would

-~aie the deci sion-making process.

against

a

or destroyed.

disrupted,

dependence on the machine system and

the

One vulnerability

The commur. i cat ions or the electronics of the

mated aid co^ld

the

organiz-

ar.

which occurs when the use cf the automated

denied.

impact

isola-

from the trap.

that uses automated decision aids.

that

would

force was

the

reception rright attach the vulnerabilities cf ation

level

subordinate contender could not receive

that the

so

highest

the

the last guidance received.

require changing the situation ted

at

the force would continue the mis-

Once isolated,

per

That

elegant

i

e

attdj

1

:

decision aics would require knowledge

of

environment

to

algorithms in use.

Manipulation

of

the

predetermine the input parameters would also predetermine the output

would

variants.

The

target's

use of the

assisting in

benefit the deceiver by

automated the

nenipula-

tion of the targeted commander's optimal course of actio

i

e

aic

".

1

There

always

will

interaction between

"be

The resulting communications flow

sides on the battlefield.

the decisions

establishes an irrpact on matrix

payoff

The

ers.

opposing

the

a nd

made

comna.no-

oy the

available

tne hypotheses

choice ray all be manipulated by the deceiver.

The ceceiver

gains an advantage if the target cheeses tc act in tne

rr

a nner

system,

tne

by the deceiver.

that was desired

The

for

the organization,

communications,

mathematical models,

the

thought processes, and

the

the decision

process can be viewer as sirpie models that can De appliec

to

understand the battlefield. The

is

complex than

rr.ore

models used in this theoretical analysis.

sin-pie

tion

deception process

overall

rec^uires

processes

involved

commander

ene^y

thorough

a

to

understanding

The decep-

all

of

tne

of

trie

the necessary signals reach

the

result in the correct interpretation

aia

so

that

the desired action.

TRANSITION

G.

The

process

theoretical was

comnunications well

as

processes suggest on

the

and that

approach

introduces ,

by

decision

analyzing

application

of

systems,

ga^e theory

as

of

the

malting.

a

and

cognitive The

deception can re understood

tne battlefield to gain

deception

the

overviews of tne

organization,

principles

to

ana

models

theoretical ~

nd

can oe

tactical advantage.

are not perfect in their application to deception,

i. l

perceptual

applied

Tne models out

tnere

information available in literature. Tne

is a great deal more

problem

that while

is

multidisciplinary

the

theoretical

approach provides insight into the deception process,

reception

been used on

has

the

throughout

battlefield

Many of great commanders used deception exceedingly

history.

Whether they used deception because they were great or

well.

whether they were great because tney used deception The

point.

point

is

that deception has often

is

future

The travesty is that

success.

deception

that

work are kept classified after the enc

the

time

that the next

forgotten. is

It

war

comes

cy

root

linked

provide practices

each war. have

they

alon^

The deception art is learned

beyond the scope of this

oz

a

been

success and analyzing how they did it ray help

with

3y

been

trial and errcr.

thesis to

attempt

ever

analyze the total impact of deception in military history,

fortunately

but

historians

lot of work has

a

sunh as Barton

'7

ha ley.

already

Barton Whale;/ has

century and has assembled the cc^e histories into data

base.

that

limited

a

o

by

col*"

this

ieception

The problem with the analysis of case histories

the lata is net perfect and is

The level of quantification that car

-A

done

been

descriptive data from the important battles

lected

is

does

lend itself to an analysis of past use of deception.

not

tc

it

be

act

always

complete.

usee en such data

is

.

analysis of case Histories can provide

comparative

ule^rer understand!

n

f

of the deception pre cess

by

a

indicating

factors

common

relationships.

and general cause and effect

The data analysis can show limited measures of

can support the choice of optimal deception practices to

and

better degree than that provided by

a

effectiveness

theoretical

analysis

alone.

The value to he obtained from the comparative analysis of case histories that

study

da*a

follows will

be

in

the combining the case

with knowledge gained from the

proach.

The two approaches will comDine in

suggests

how tactical deception can

U

.S

.

Army

.

I'l'S

be

theoretical a

manner

au-

which

better appliec. in

the

CASE HISTORY ANALYSIS

VI.

Empirical analysis of case histories from Barton Whaley's data base can be performec in an effort to

deception mine

what the data suggests about tactical

part

of

ueception.

the analysis is to verify that there are

differences changes

the results of deception as

between

from

strategic to tactical.

A

no

major

tne

scope tne

differences

the results of battle that correspond to tne presence

absence of deception.

prise,

(?)

producing victory,

(3)

comrron

producing sur-

(1)

reducing casualties,

(4)

The data analysis will also support the choice of

deception

optimal

in:

and (b) increasing territory

increasing force effectiveness, exchanged.

or

The data analysis is intended to snow

measures of deception effectiveness

A.

One

second part of

analysis is to verify that there are significant in

deter-

practices

indicating

by

general

trends

successful deceptions.

to

1^7 A Tne copyrighted
Whaley's 1S6£ study,

in

this analysis is from 3arton

Stratagem!

Cec.ept.ion and

War,

which included 169 case histories.

were

strategic

and

and/or deception. sidered

a

co'itr^l

47 were tactical

Cf

Sur^Mse

that number,

examples

of

The additional -4 examples could

Odta set in

104

a

part in those

68

surprise ue

tnat tnere is no evedence

either surprise or deception played

in

conthat

battles.

The

cases

dnd

are

are frorr 16 wars luring the period 1914 based on Barton Whaley's survey

sources as weilas his own professional

of the battles included in

lists

the

deception

data

strategic

surprise and/or deception.

List

base.

ples of tactical

A

is an

published

study of history.

reader is referred to Appendix

The

509

of

1966,

to

of this tnesis

A

Whaley's

barton

inventory of List

for

3

surprise and/or deception.

1969

cases

of

contains examList

C

includes

examples of battles involving neither surprise nor deception. The cases are identified by

a

corresponds

location and code

the time,

to

da te-sequencel

list

number that

name

for

tne

battle or operation.

assumption is made tnat the lata from the 169

The

are representative

cover could

only

modern war.

by

Obviously,

small proportion of the total

a

Lists

tne categories.

fit.

selected

o f

tfbaley

3

and

C

cal significance would It

is

not

oe

tc

C

tnat

example

sets

are

ranccm

Tests of statisti-

appropriate

nowever,

proper,

and

i

exanples

from large populations and are not

samples in the normal statistical sense.

data.

lists

cases

for use with such

analyze this aata in

a

quantitative way even thougn the data set is not random;.

The

data can be inventoried to determine characteristics that

c
be

n .

compared by their presence, absence, or relative values in subsets of data.

each

of

cats

characteristics

the

three

compared as long

as

in

each

'ifre

average values

of the three

the lists are typical

1,'b

of

lists tne

can

of oe

populations

.

This can be done as long as the

they represent.

assumption

of representativeness is made.

The data set from the 169 case histories was

categorized

by

Whaley in

information

on

up to 41 characteristics

acteristic.

This allowed

for each case.

enumeration of frequencies of any given

rapid

fairly

simple coded form which provides

a

Summarizing data

ratios does allow

a

char-

frequencies, percentages, or

in

The tactical data

comparison to he made.

set, list 3, can be compared to the control cata set, list and

to the strategic data

list

set,

The

three criteria that Whaley used to

first

front or

stroke of

war;

a

theater of war

J

or

(2)

sive en an existing but dormant

The

open operations on be a

(3]

front

68 cases in list A nave

all-

identify

cases of strategic operations were that they had to: the

new attack or

(1)

in

the

offen-

[Ref. 108j

been augmented with 2b addito

The analysis of the total 93 cases has been published

article

"Understanding Cases,'

De

new

a

tional cases from four more wars lhat extended the survey 1973.

C,

A.

The strategic data set was considered in 1969 to be

inclusive.

a

which

by

Ronald C.

Strategic was

Sherwin

Deception:

included

in

and

£arton

An

Analysis

Section

II

of

tfhaiey,

of

the

93

dpox,

Strategic Military reception. J.

CKITIRIA The

fission.

result that rust be optimized is the outcorre of

the

There are two missions involved in each oat tie, and

106

for

part they can be identified as

most

the

Deception can be

either the attacker or the defender. in

each operation by the attacker,

analysis

The

belonging

the defender,

used Doth.

or

differentiate between the missions of

rrust

to

tne

deceiver.

There of

are many different ways to categorize the

result

the battle which could

of

degrees of each. An

A

overwhelming

might

be

force that achieves only

considered

to

is

a

ha^e suffered

relative defeat.

a

Tne

army

one

effectiveness is

interoperability, having

a

a

criterion

good

and

force advantage that can

force effectiveness result,

claim

for

Training,

experience can result in

Adding one more factor such as deception to the

relative

measure of effectiveness

a

evaluating different units with the same mission. leadership,

Tne

is very important when

for example,

casualty ratio can be used as force

or

victory

modest

a

numerical advantage on one side.

Relative

defeat,

victory,

be

overall

tne

criterion is the relative result.

second

relative casualty ratio, there

One criterion is

mission.

deceiver's

the

outcome

a

quantified.

battle adds

factor should'

that

but

oe

all of the credit for the victory or defeat.

to

net

A

final

so

that

criterion for effectiveness is cost.

These

criteria

probabilities,

must

conditional

expectations can be used. to

be

be understood and must

measurable in sone way pre ba til

i

ties

,

The criteria must be directly related

107

or be

to

mathematical sirple

e

T

iou,-,*n

tne mission.

All

the criteria rrust be used

of

to

determine

overall

the

effectiveness. of effectiveness

criteria

The

deceiver's

mission

but

do

criteria

achievement

data

opti-

be

the choice of optirral decep-

to

different

criteria.

Those

related to the outcome of the

deceiver's

They are

related to the outcome of the

deception.

result that must

The

the

not

are

mission.

of

the

indicate how deception can

not

practices is applicaDle

tion

outcome

use some but not all of

The data which support

mized.

the

Such criteria indicate the effectiveness of

characteristics. deception

will

for

be

optimized for these criteria is

the

That criterion will identify

the

surprise.

of

preferred deception measures and practices.

ANALYSIS OJ DECEPTION EFFECTIVENESS

C.

1



Reception's Barton

If_f_

get £n frodusing Surprise.

Whaley

the following

produced

cross-correlation to show tnat surprise can out employing deception.

tion

effectively

It

also

be

table

as

achieved with-

decep-

reveals tnat using

seems to guarantee that surprise

will

achieved at the strategic level.

TABU

6

USE CT E1CEPTICN ANE ACHIEVING SURPPISE

SURPRISE NO RECEPTION

11

(p=.12)

l^J

LRef.

NO SURPRISE 6

p(S/ND=.65 DECEPTION

76 (p=.«2) p(s/r )-i.0

1V3-B

a

7

be

The

44

cases

tactical

of

deception

surprise

or

yielded the following: TABLE 7 TACTICAL DECEPTION AND SURPRISE

SURPRISE

NO SURPRISE

NO DECEPTION

19

(p=.40)

N/A

DECEPTION

25

(P=.53)

3

p(S/D)=.89

It

is

seen in both cases that surprise anc deception

are commonly associated. tegic operations level.

cal

out

That is particularly true for stra-

still more often than not at tne

tacti-

The correlation between the strategic case

and

tactical case is not really strong enough to support any firm

conclusions.

conditional probability of tactical

given deception does remain high.

prise

deterrined list It

The

E

is

Very little can

the no deception cdtegory as all

frorr

involve surprise if they aid not

possible to separate the data

frorr

sur-

cases

involve the

oe

in

deception.

tactical

cases

by mission.

TAME

8

TACTICAL MISSION EFFECTS ON SURPRISE AND TECEITICN (S/D)

(S/NO D)

(NO

S/ D)

OFFENSE

18

(p=.474)

18

(p=.474)

2

(p*.053)

DEFENSE

7

(p=.77d)

1

(p=.143)

1

(p=.143)'

109

r

significant

The that

has

rruch

a

tactical

environment

greater need for deception

initiative

the recorded examples of deception used by the few in number. by

tion

the

,

The unfortunate situation of nistory is

produce surprise.

that

is

produce

to

The offense can partially rely on the

surprise.

are

tne

indicates that in

it

defense

to

result of the cross-correlation

It

defense

unknown whether the use of decep-

is

the defense was a rare occurraace

whether

or

the

records were lost. The

thesis is that the large majority

on this

irrpact

to the offensive ase of deception.

of data applies

data available to determine the overall

little

There is

benefits

of

using deception when en the defensive. One covers

data years.

It

biased. the

rrore view a

range of w a rs over

is

is necessary

of the data

necessary

to

a

Decause

changing period

war,

of

54

insure that the data set is

Sarton Whaley produced the following taole

frequencies

the

deception

surprise and

rot

show

to

through

tire,

decade by decade:

LIST A STRATEGIC SURPRISE pie io

1914-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 196^-1967 TOTALS

SURPFI

TA3LE 9 DECEPTION OVER TIME

AM

TEC LP I ION r

OX.

dOTE

[Ref.

110]

TOTAL

9

10

1

1

2

3

c

c-

1

<5

5 2

30

40

1

5 3

8

11

?

50

cd

5

110

3

The

author

of

this thesis made the sarre cross-corre-

lation for the tactical, list B, data to produce Taole 10.

TABLE 10 LIST B TACTICAL SURPRISE ANE DECEPTION CASES OVER TIME

SURPRISE

PERIOD

1914-1919 1920-1929 193^-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1967 TOTALS

The

over

TOTAL

DOTE

10

19

9

1

1

2

2

e

3

16

25

19

3

25

47

tactical data shows

rr.uch

wars.

It

in the

tactical sense.

the

takes

conflict

reasons,

bined to

a

world

two

large conflict to field armies that onera

Minor wars

they are

but

rray

mainly

involve fought

a

political

for

The cases fror lists A and

category.

£

are

tne

com-

show the overall dispersion of cases.

TABLE 11 SURPRISE AND DECEPTION OVER TIME

PERIOD 1914-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1967 TOTALS

SURPRISE

DECEPTION

BOTB

TOTAL

11

18

20

2

1

t,

2

3 7

11

8

46

6o

1

2

K

8

30

10

111

te

large mili-

are more appropriate for inclusion in

thus they

strategic

Table 10

tactical data is rrainly from the

that

.

dispersion

of the same

the tire period that the strategic aata did.

shows

tary

DECEPTION

3

<

7b

115

concluded that

Whaley grasp

of the magnitudes involved,

that rright

tions

Second,

involving mained at

there were several trends

the proportion of military opera-

surprise unaided by

involving

declining.

of

shown. First,

be

deception

rather constant low level.

has

re-

Third, the proportion

military operations involving both surprise and deception

Tables clusions.

and

145

Ill J

[Ref.

improved

support

11 roughly

1914.

since

It

is

the

nave

from

Computers can

oe

timely manner.

a

support is still separated

into

strategic intelligence, it is recognized tnat it the commander who neecs it

be passed to

the source.

should oe

becure communications can

pass the resulting intelligence in

intelligence

it

possible to collect data

used in the analysis of that data.

V/nile

con-

aoove

battlefield has vastly

events happening deep in enemy territory.

tactical and

the

support of the first conclusion,

In

noted that intelligence support to

rray

sharply

operations

tnat failed to yield surprise

has sharply increased.

must

is

proportion of military

the

deception a

impressionistic

rough

frorr a

Thus,

near

regardless

the tactical commander at division

real-time access

strategic

to

of

level

intelligence

products that pertain to his area of operations.

Passive camouflage and concealment measures have improved

at

the sa^re rate.

tection devices, or

emphasis.

for example, The

not

Camouflage against infrared dena s

result is tnat

112

received little attention a

headquarters

that

is

concealed

perfectly nave

rray

to

protect against visual

concealment at all

no

surveillance

surveillance

infrared

frorr

which detects hot objects such as the diesel generators the headquarters equipment.

power detect

vehicle

The infrared devices can

picture of the battlefield that in some cases than

a

visual image. 3arton

usually

results

counter-deception

is

The

that

in

deception.

than

While deception may remain peopl e-ori entec, it machine solution to unmask

deception

that

understandable

even less understood

is

a

better

even

is

second conclusion,

surprise,

in

image

112]

[Ref.

Whaley's

can

soldiers and

or even

engines

that

may require

a

deception.

a

thira conclusion,

that operations involving both

i

surprise and decepti

are increasing,

is

a

result of

effective

the direct

that

can still

frontal approach is

be achieved

disasterous.

by overpowering the

pressing the attack until ne runs cut of ammunition, price is excessive for both siaes. and

deception

direct

a

first

or

but

the

evading

alternate approach

the

nust

form of deception.

£&cejplion Ff feet

The

The

The unexpected,

approach.

enemy

The increase in surprise

stems from the effort to win ty

even be considered 2*

tech-

The weapons on the battlefield are so lethal ana so

nology.

Victory

n

on

Producing Victory

category to be IcoKei at is tne

offense.

case studies are categorized by whether the outcome

was

favorable to the initiator. The battles are coaed sucn tnat

115

a

s

victory.

overwhelming

for an

stands

V+

"v"

A

in

is

reference to

for

a

stands

for

defeat.

is the "V-".

A

need

ray

"V-" might result when an attack

The Battle of the Alamo

will be considered an undesirable outcome.

victory only if

a

"l"

a

is

For the purposes of this analysis,

for the Mexicans.

considered

"V-"

A

of victory that did not go according to

example

clear

clear victory.

only one of these that

The

only partly successful.

was

a

successful

victory that is less than expected and

stands

explanation

unexpectedly

,

A

plan a

"v-"

battle will

was coded "V+" or

it

"V".

be

Tni

alleviate the effects of coding errors where the

should

a

two

middle cases meet on the continuous line. The list on

the next

for

list

volved

table. in

£

in

C

cases are included in the comparison shown The

list

cases do not meet the criteria

C

that neither surprise nor deception

the battle.

List

C

can

be

C

torn-

considered

was a

in-

control

data set for list A cases.

Taken together,

again,

can

operations

be

lists E and

The assumption may be valid

because the entire set,

all

battles

primary

assumption, to

had

the

three lists,

however, con not

be

impact

seems to cover tne on

history.

It

is

necessary

cautious in the analysis of the deception data so

the evidence of history

is

not

The

defended sufficiently enough

allow the use of confidence levels.

very

tactical set wni^n,

thougnt of as being representative of tactical

only by assumption.

that

a

to

that

biased by improper methods.

114

be

TABLE 12 EFFECT OF DECEPTION USE! 3Y THE OFFENSE LIST

TYPE

NO.

"v+"

A

DECEPTION

A

NO DECEPTION

8

INCEPTION

21

5

B

NO EEC5PTION

18

C

NC

IECiPTION

54

21

6

71

%

2

1

62.5

£

7

e

3

*7.1 %

2

8

?

1

Z>

1

12

12

2b

8

several interesting

the 52 type A cases

fcr

cases did not

is

o

.

24

least

It

clear

a

is

/"fo

%

trends.

only slightly fetter when deception

is

VICTORIOUS

"e"

9

than it is when deception is absent.

true

"V-"

the probability of achieving at

that

victory

16

12 Indicates

Table shows

52

"v"

present

The reason that this is

that only five of the type A

involve surprise.

all eight of

In fact,

the

strategic cases that dia not involve deception on the part of the initiator resulted

in

surprise anyway.

All type

3

cases

are categorized by the presence of deception and 'or surprise.

The

t;/ue

without deception on

cases

3

by definition,

offense,

and achieved

defense victories

definition,

did

parameters

12

of

the

The relatively high percentage of clear Tne type

C

cases,

involve deception on the part

by

of

the

strongly indicates that one or Doth of

the

not

offense and did not

Table

part

included actions which surprised tne

would be expected.

that

the

result in surprising the defense.

of surprise and deception has

lis

a

strong effect

on

victory

producing surprise

It would

the predominant effect because

has

difference

for the offense.

between

type

C

appear

that

of

the

large

cases and the rest of

tne

cases

shows the

freq-

"

ever-

without deception.

Table

uency

of

is interesting in that

12

it

occurrance of oattles that ended in the

whelming,

unexpectedly

successful victories.

That is

kind of victory that is desired at every level. for

"V +

The

the

trenas

this occurrence warrant special attention in tne form of

conditional probability of the type of victory given that least

a

clear victory,

"v",

result

was

at

obtained.

PROBABILITY OF OFFEN&IVE OVERWHELMING VICTORY "

TYPE

LEVEL

STRATEGIC

INCEPTION

STRATEGIC

NO

STRATEGIC

TCTAL

TACTICAL

riCEPTION

TACTICAL

NC

TACTICAL

TOTAL

16

DECEPTION

DECEPTION

p" (V+/( V+6.V

"(V+ c V)"

"V +

37

43.3 %

5

%

16

42

38

%

£

12

41.7

1

3

23

13

%

8

3b

22.8

%

" )

deception

may

figure prominently in achieving an overwhelming victory.

It

The

also

shows

trend

the probability of

that

whelming victory

shown in Table 13 is that

is

achieving

that

small if deception is not attempted.

11;

over-

Most

of

case histories in the data

the

surprise.

that

Whether

that

involved

deception

surprise

resulted from the deception or resulted from

other

The enemy may have formed the

wrong

factors

is

clear.

not

preconception

also involved

base

without any outside help and in doing

himself up for being surprised.

set

so

On the ether hand,

tne fact

that surprise was not achieved in some cases may not have had

anything

to

do

with the way the deception was

may have intervened on the side of the target.

does

or

The deception may nave been perfect but chance

carried out.

assumption

planned

must

te

rrade

that deception fails

Using that assumption,

not occur.

it

simplifying

A

when is

surprise

possible

to

look at the results of deceptions that failed.

TABLE 14 RESULTS OF DECEPTION FAILURE LEVEL

V+

STRATEGIC

V

V-

D

1

2

2

2

1

TACTICAL

The

Table

v+

20 %

the

results

usee

allows

of confidence in the trends that are shown.

case and

in

The cross-correlations are gener-

large enough so that the averaging effect

degree

p("v")

)

size for the cross-correlation

14 is quite small.

ally

not

sample

p(

for Table 14,

but

the

difference

sore

That is in

the results that *ere shown in Taoie 11

those is

so

large that the obvious indication is that if deception fails,

11?

favorable.

results of battle will not be as

the

attempting

deception

fact,

In

probably counterproductive

is

if

it

fails to surprise the enerry.

Table

14 included one case of failed deception

attempted

was

the defense.

by

attempting

Germans

during the Anzio counterattack battle resulted in

the

and

deception

That was

information.

a

It

.

a

was

a

the

of

Americans

and

tactical deception

defeat for the channel

because of one

failed

British

deceive the

to

case

That was the

tnat

Germans.

The

of

contradictory

a

German traitor

direct channel from

inside Field iVarshall Albert Kesselring's headquarters.

channel was through an OSS agent in Rome to the Allied £rmy Headquarters is

[Hef.

113J

Second,

it

Third,

other Table. cal eye on

is

slightly biases the

it

points out the need to

iceep

a

criti-

Important issues

rr

ay

ce

lost

if

treated without examination in detail.

main reason why deception is usually none by the

The that

is on

the offense

maintains the initiative. the

initiative

The

question is,

the defense? is

it

the data-coding by referring to the actual histor-

the cases are

that

First,

only one case and did not apply tc any

ical records or summaries.

force

Fifth

Tne explanation of that point

.

included for three reasons.

data.

Tne

is

that the

offense

generally

The defense is only aDle to seize

through such actions as

the

counterattack.

can deception be very effective

*?or

The initial impression is that it cannot.

based en the extreme paucity of

113

tne

use by rut

historical

examples.

cross-correlation of those examples

The

The sample sizes are small

below.

prising.

shown

the results are

sur-

particular result that is of interest is

The

percentage

but

is

defensive operations that resulted

of

the

over-

in

Six of the seventeen defensive operations

whelming victory.

resulted in overwhelming victory for the type

A

or 5 battles.

TABLE 15 EFFECT OF DECEPTION ON TEE DEFENSE TYPE

DESCRIPTION

v +

V

V-

r

5

2

3

1

2

3

c

1

5

NO,

A

DECEPTION

A

NO

B

DECEPTION

8

1

8

NO DECEPTION

1

1

C

NO S/NO D

3

DECEPTION

Table

shows

15

1

VICTORIOUS 40

*

100

%

?t

%

100

%

1

f

3

that 70 % of the type A and

fensive operations resulted in at least clear victory. was were The

the operations that

because still of

a

were counterattacks

were

not

dor.e

include

type that gereratea surprise

in

out a

in

£

de-

That

deception the

eremy.

Those three

cases

they were totally predictable.

They

is with the type

contrast

did not

-" 4,

«

S6-

C

cases.

manner that surprised

the

enerry.

The

tactics for the offense

derand

that

result was that they ended in defeat. Cofrpon

once away,

battle

the attackers seize the objective by driving the the

force must prepare for

11^

a

counterattack.

enemy

The

offense

sets

up

counterattack

axis

of

the

regroup

and

established.

A

tactics are to immediately

Defensive

attack.

defense line along the

the

before

perimeter

that

is

counterattack that is done in the predictable manner may fall into the count er-counterattack trap.

done

If the

the unexpected time or executed in an

at

manner,

performs as

it

deceptive maneuver.

a

advantage on one side is

technological

A

duction of the armor piercing longbow as

as

ten

organized.

to

expecting

enerry a

of

better-

while

the

were

tattle other Knights and had no idea tnat

war-

least

5

,£00 men.

introduction of

[Ref. a

114]

new technology must

he

done

at

If

the

tire or else the surprise effect is wasted.

finds out about

Finer preliminary

enemy

were

less thdn 300 men

lost

fare had changed overnignt. The

Battle

The French Knignts

at

to

althou 6 h the Sritisn

one,

British

The

lost

the right

Eritisn technology

The Eritisn were outnumbered by

Agincourt in the year 1415. much

a

over the French armored Knignts in the

advantage

prime

a

Consider the intro-

factor in the production of casualties.

French

unanticipated

Reception Effect on Reducing Casuallies

3.

as

counterattack is

a

new weapon during peacetime or during

battle the effectiveness decreases.

can develop similar technology or tactics tnat

Tne

return

balance to the battlefield.

World

War

II

provides

many examples of the

nology battle of measure and count errr ea sure

12tf

.

tech-

German use

of

J

navigational aid was the first step

"lorenz"

the

to conduct highly directed precision

effort

the British to sue for peace.

happening

instituted

and

system codenamed

ahead

it

draw

"Meaconing" to

to

force

German

the

new tone-Dased

to a

"Headache", but the British found out about

time and countered with

of

bombing

The British realized what was

The Germans switched

bombers off course.

tneir

in

"Aspirin".

system appropriately codenamed

jamming

deception

a

The Germans came

up with another scheme to navigate to selected targets called

"Ruffian"

the British developed a

and

"Bromide",

to

a

target-marking squadron,

The British could not

beat

The

Eritish

became

[Ref.

a

lot of

115J

experts at passive

camouflage during the "Battle of the 3ombs". in

British

the

kept one step ahead of the Germans tney could direct

German bombs onto empty fields.

Kampf

that so they switcnea

As long as

decoy fires called "starfish".

to

repeater,

The frustrated Germans put all of

counter it.

their navigational aids in

Gruppe 100.

deception

and

active

That expertise

fake lighting schemes, dummy installations, and aeccys vas

used on the tactical battlefield.

developed tion

lead

of

uicks

the North Africa campaigns wnere visual observa-

was excellent.

because their

in

The need for sucn

The

British recognizee

opportunity

tne

their recent reliance on sucn tricKs

homeland. and dummy men

Other

nations soon followed

to

protect

tne

British

and equipment were produced and

many of the nations fighting in the

121

w d r.

LRef.

116

usee

by

Once

greatly

a

used,

counter-measure is

decreases

effectiveness

its

the new measure becomes

as

target

a

The Germans relied heavily on their

count er-countermeasures.

"Wurzburg" radar to counter Allied bombing raids. was

effective that the British sent in

so

it allowed

but

commando raid to

a

the

the British to develop primitive chaff,

as an effective

codenamed "Window",

That radar

This did not Keep the radar off

steal the transmitter. air,

for

cour.termeasure

iariy

.

was nothing more than aluminum foil cut by hand to tne

chaff

desired radar frequency, but it was effective.

British did not use their discovery for

The

difficult

years

selves,

and

rritish

wcula

discover tne principle

them-

British

use it against the

finally

effective

Gernans

because they were afraia

pieces of aluminum,

the

find

using

began

jamming.

chaff

dedicated roughly 4,000 engineers, in

category,

that

problerr

plaguing

develop

a

the

in

the

117].

The

combination

with

[Ref.

was so effective that

It

90 percent

solve the anti-jamming

to

the Luftwaffe radars.

countermeasure,

In

This

Gerrans

the

of their

anc

tneir

total

"Window" rush

the Germans were distracted

development of microwave radar which was

exploited by the Allies.

several

to frorr

already

bein^

[?ef. 118]

analysis now returns to Barton ttnaiey's

decep-

tion data base in order to be more specific on tne effects of

deception select

the

on

battlefield casualties. tactical

The criterion used to

battles of interest

122

is

that

the

new

technology was used for the first tine as to support

the battle.

The

Winter

Gerrran

introduction

key

a

new tear gas

Germans

Russian

compared to 210,000

would

certainly

have lost

more

Russians had detected the build up of forces.

1917.

were used by the British

324

tanks

The

10,000 !:1

preceeding

four

casualties

en

have

saved

a

lost

in

months at

but

at

largely

Sidi

due

location, only

quarter of

to

still

in rrcre

tne

trillion

a

have

not been

they were saved

4,000

total

The exact count of German casualties the German

combination

the outcome of

decided

119J

captured

Eritisn suffered only

The

taken prisoner was 8,000.

were

a

the

if

Cambrai

at

naif million casualties as they may

available,

forces

cost of

future battles of attrition.

The

men

Using large tan* forces may

each sice.

that battle.

not

a

few

a

casualties.

LP.ef.

advance in one day

yard

casualties at Cambrai. is

which

Eritlsh divisions nad at 3rd Ypres during

ground than

for

attention

major movement of forces

a

the

in

The battle resulted in only

the tattle.

to

casualties

German The

of

Battle of Masuria in 1915 diverted Russian

while the Germans conducted was

deception measure

a

[Ref. of

loss

due just

soldiers

in

120J

armor and

tne Eritish

Rezegh in 1941.

aircraft

oattle against

advantages tne

The British won the

>*xis

battle

tbe fact that Rommel was deceived as to

direction, ana time of the attack. 17,700 compared to 38,300 Germans

12c"

tne

British losses and

Italians.

One portion of the operation was

a

capture of an entire fort

which 14,000 Axis prisoners were taKen at

during

less than 500 British casualties.

Operation

Bustard

[F.ef.

Kerch in the Crimea

at

For relatively light German casual-

Russians in this battle.

100,000 Russians were taKen prisoner

shculd

prisoners

have

million Russians who died as

Tinian

in

very

been

happy

after tne war was over,

back

a

to

was

defended to

over 8,000 well armed

and

knew

soldiers

die to the last man in order to hole

against the American attacK. that

were

20

island

of

circumstances.

island was only 12 rriles long and four miles

willing

tnese

result of that war.

The

r

The

.

receive

for there

1£44 was conducted under difficult

t>i

122]

(.Ref.

American attack on the Japanese-neld

The

deception,

radio

The Germans soundly defeated the

firming false perceptions.

Russians

1242

in

and false deployments, were effective in con-

"Quaker Guns",

ties,

of

121]

that a wide range of ruses:

demonstrated

oost

a

wide.

were

who tne

island

The Japanese were fully

tne island would

be invaded

that

It

alert Tne

day.

final problem was that the island had only tnree beaches,

one

of

which was not negotiable by existing amphibious equipment.

It

should have been impossible for the Americans to estaMisn

an unopposed beachhead with 5,000 troops on a clear day,

Dut

that was what happened.

The

solution

to

the Tinian invasion problem

was

a

technical modification to smaller landing craft which allowed

124

to negotiate

their

"

was

that

the treacherous coral

end

of

rrost

one of

the

the Japanese reserves to the

far

Americans

The result was that only 16

the island.

of

A simultaneous feint at

irrpossi ble."

proper teaches drew

shallows of the beach

were killed in the first 16 hours of the landing. on

the Americans secured the island

eighth day,

the

cost of only S89 lives.

total

defending Tinian.

fact,

In

[Bef.

at

a

8,000 Japanese soldiers died

123J

The American attack on the island of Iwo Jima in 1945 is

case very similar to Tinian.

a

larger

the real difference is that the deception did not

but

The cost was not oily high in

result in surprise.

numbers cases

casualties,

of

but

the battle was one

which American casualties exceeded

in

were

The relative forces

o

4?

absolute rare

the

those

the

of

The lack of surprise was one of several contribu-

Japanese. tory causes.

[Ref.

124]

Complete tactical and strategic surprise was achieved the

first

August,

1945.

by

use

of

a

nuclear weapon at

ultimate

The

on

6

While the civilian casualties were horrible,

the inescapable conclusion is

lives.

Hiroshima

that

casualty

the act

saved millions

reduction was

due

t c

tne

Japanese surrender without the need for an actual invasion of Japan itself. The atomic tombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not

an

have had

invasion

«

large effect on the tactical

situation cf such

because the Japanese would have realized

12:

that

the

.

bombs

were not available in quantity.

major

innovation in technology may pay large dividends

if

introduced at the right place and

is

it

frontal

assault.

deceiver

advantage become

tire.

main reduction in casualties on

the

the deceived

prisoners

only

the

captured intact or surrender in on

a

avoids

results from not having to fight

side

are

The

thai

the right

at

reduces casualties because it

Deception

that

The point is,

the

mass.

nain

The

casualties

side is thai the

after

of war may be returned

forces

who

war

the

is

over -•

reception Jffect on Force If f ecti veness There

that

general rules for the conduct

are

are used to generate force planning,

oring

of forces,

rules

of

thumb

advantage over the the

that

defense

the

o f fense.

has

these

of

three-to-cne

a

The number three is

That

I.

required

front

a

a

legacy of

large local superiority

zone in order to successfully attack.

The three-to-cne advantage rule a

One

rachine gun and the artillery dominated western Front o^

World War in

battlefield tail-

and operations planning. is

battle

of

generalization.

would need

A

force that

take advantage cf

to

advantage

three-to-cne

in

is

i

c

still accepted

outnumbered

the defense and

as

ten-to-cne

still reed

force effectiveness in

crier

a

to

achieve parity. It

effective.

is

possible to train and equip

The

German

a

:"

armies that attacked

125

A

rce to the-

De

very

Russians

early

in World War II,

for example,

were as truch

tiires

rrore

effective,

men for man,

than their

That was

function of many factors,

a

tut in

four

as

opponents.

situation,

that

the Germans could attack a larger force and still maintain

a

Whaley prepared tne following

three-to-ore 'orce advantage.

Table to corrpare the relationship of surprise

the relative

to

numbers of soldiers:

TABLE 15 JORCE USEE TO GAIN OBJECTIVES AFTER

7'Y

SURPRISE CASES

I

[Ref.

125.1

NO SURPRISE CASES

ACHIEVEMENT

NO.

VICTCPY

18

1

.?

:

1

1

ABOUT AS PIANNir

28

1.1

:

1

4

1

.4

1.4:1

9

1

.4

TROOP RATIO

3EL0W EXPECTATIONS 17 EEFEAT

4

concluded

Whdley any

surprise

although than

there

the

1

a

:

20

1

degree success.

surprise

of

a

.9

for operations not

that

substantial superiority of force

involving

is

-^crec,,

ratio of about two tc one wos suggested

the traditional three to one. was

TROOF PATIC

NO.

Ke also concluded

fairly direct relationship between

success,

the

Barton Vhaley's intervenes

to

Fore the rrore

forue

the

that

force

and

greater

the

surprising conclusion was that

shatter

the

relationship between force and success. alter force effectiveness.

rctner

[Ref.

12'

12cJ

direct Thus,

simle

a id

surprl

c

e

must

Excluding the strategic cases in the data set, possihle

Force

cross-correlate between the results of

battle,

casualty

ratios.

directly

related

force ratios,

input

the

as

to

ratios

and.

and

output

the

casualty ratios should

be

long as the force is applied efficiently.

The

analysis follow

for Table 1? below and the Tables in this section that it

is

it

are all from the point of view of the offense nni include

the type

data set.

C

TABLE 1? ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS FORCES AN! CASUALTIES

ACHIEVEMENT

NO.

OVERWHELMING VICTORY

FORCE RATIO

CASUAI -TY PATIO •

7 c

1

:

2.2S

.6

1

r

1

.71

1



:

:

.71

1

8

1

:

.69

1

CLEAR VICTORY

24

1

:

.82

BELOW EXPECTATIONS

25

1

:

EEFEAT

32

1

TCTALS

89

1

.

+

54

.76



c

.

(?

?

The first observation that can be taken from Table 1?

general, the offense was favored

is

that,

1

force advantage.

in

clusion. at

A

This agrees with

tnree-to-one

the point of attack,

overall.

A

correlation battle.

second

between

but

by

3a r ton

.-'ha

1.4 to

a

lev's

con-

advantage ray aave been e^rinserel the clear advantage did

observation is that there force

only

ratio

and

i

c

exist

not no

achievement

direct in

the

There is no direct correlation between frrue ratios

128

Y

and casualty ratios.

There is

and casualty ratios.

ment

direct link between achieve-

a

That is explained in the cases of

overwhelming victory by mass surrender. ly

more

suffers

The defense typical-

casualties than does

offense

the

sirrly

because of the forces that become cut off And "raptured.

TA£LE 13 ENVIRONMENT VERSUS FORCES AMP CASUALTIES n

FORCE PATIO

A

SUA IT

ENVIRONMENT

NO.

DECEPTION WITE SURPRISE

18

1

:

.83

1

:

4.75

SURPRISE WITHOUT EECEPTICN

18

1

:

.51

1

:

2.08

DECEPTION WITECUT SURPRISE

2

1

:

.

55

1

£1

1

:

.70

1

NO SURPRISE

NO DECEPTION,

RATIO

Table 18 breaks out the tactical cases by the tion

at

the start of the

volved deception,

battle.

only two did rot

Of

the

??j

that

outnumbered 1.8 to 1, they

received.

Tdble

17

w^rse

that

the defenders in

although

they did

This

deception

k

conclusion, It

set J =

;

is

were

inflict Tore casualties

than

is different

at

in-

cases

and may indicate that a no

situa-

case? that

resulted in victory below expectations.

cases

evident

a

8 <6

1.17

:

result in surprise.

of two does not generate much confidence in

both

.

all.

these

from the expectatior

deception Rather

129

fails

than drawing

clusion that is based on insufficient d*ta, check the two cases in more detail.

that

it

is

a

better

is

conto

The first case was the Battle of Sangro, to

Montgomery

was

striking across orate

and

three

rrain

to

open the 15th Army

Group

General

offensive

comprehensive deception plan.

There seem to

factors that resulted in lack of surprise. swollen

Kesselring evidently tooK warning of the

offensive

as he used

rivers.

Second, Kesselring was using

line.

precluded any ma*or shift

terrain

Germans had heater lateral reads. to

induce

Montgomery

Kesselring

to

really

no

had

Field

immediate

time to reinforce that pert of

the

oe

First,

then went in one day early as the weather cleared.

Marshall

by

Montgomery used an elab-

the Sangro Fiver.

attack Wds postponed twice due to rain

the It

The British Eighth Army under

Eecember 1943.

2

28 November

the

a

low risk strategy.

The

in

British forces ana

the

There was no st-ong threat

chcr.^e

his

choice but

to

strategy.

Third,

along

attack

t

;

obvious road.

deception

was to delay the

committing

of

the

German reserves by demonstrating along tne entire Eighth

Amy

This was an inherently implausible alternative.

Tne

The

front.

conclusion

was

that

this deception

^aiied

because it was

plausible enough or serious enough to succeed

anyway.

r c r

[Kef.

127]

The second case was the

American

"Operation Jjetachment

invasion of Ivo Jima.

"

which

long before the

wa

c

actual

operation, the Japanese ^cirrison had amnle and accurate fore-

knowledge

o* the assault,

and had correctly

calculated

an

expected time.

divisions the

extra

an

month

the Americans would

defenses

to

t t



Serine

.

Two postponements

assigned to the Fission.

Japanese

dig

faue

the

in

-eve

formidable

most

Pacific.

the

The

for the Japanese intelligence coup was never identi-

channel

there was

hut

fied,

They even knew the three specific

major security breach

a

involving

the

Hawaiian press that may have made disclosure of the operation certain.

128]

("Ref.

speculation

any event,

In

soldiers

ry

and civilains in Fonolulu provided many rumors.

Returning the

cases

18

Table IB, it is interesting to note th«t

to

deception

of

surprise

produced

that

were

attempted with an average force ratio much worse than that of the

69 battles

that did

not

involve deception,

the

yet

sults of battle ard the casualty ratios were much

K

re-

etter.

overall trend is shown in the next Table:

TA3LE 19 DECEPTION VERSUS FORCES ANT CAS'TAITIfb

ENVIPONNENT

NO.

DECEPTION

20

1

:

.85

1

:

NO DECEPTION

69

1

:

.68

1

:

Table than normal, tion

in

19 suggests

the attacker may feel

at

There

is

a

face value \^

CASUAITY RATIO

that vhen the force a

need

order to obtain the generalized

advantage. ratios

FORCE RATIO

rcit

worse

decep-

three to-one

V-rca

resort,

thev ere direct

131

53

1.3f

is

<~,

.

to

to

difficulty in accepting that

4

a

the

number

foroe

-olios

and dc not reflect the force effectiveness rrerit.

One way to generate

A U.S.

ters.

tanks in The

a

a

hrf

rd

force effectiveness ratio is to

corrputer simulation using all of the

a

is

figure down.

to nail that

do

It

tank,

is

one on many, a

or many on many battle.

function of dead tanks at the end

The result may be that tank

the battle.

of five I tanks,

parame-

for example, could be compared to other

one on one,

effectiveness

realitive

X

is

cf

the equivalent

but it depends on the situation

especidlly

in multiple engagement cases.

Another

casualty

ratios

a

force effectiveness ratio is

casualties at the end of sa actual

to count

the

way to obtain

Just

count as

must

be

they would in

this thesis postulates that

a

related to a

the

simulation.

ratio.

initial

f-?

The author

roe

of

rough force effectiveness ratio

can be obtained by multiplying the force ratic ty

Again,

battle.

Performing this translation.

by

the casual-

Table IS is changed

as shown below:

TABLE 20 ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS FORCE TEFECTIVENESS FOP CI

ACHIEVEMENT OVERWHELMING VICTORY

NO S

TTECTIVENESb 10.9

CLEAR VICTORY

24

VICTORY BELOW EXPECTATIONS

25

2.56

IEEEAT

32

1

13;

.

'/•?

Table 20 is an oversimplification, of course. fray

be defended by the ragic nurroer three.

it

three-tc-one

If

is the force advantage needed to produce victory, in the table clearly support

Yet

the nurrters

the outcorre of the battles.

The

force effectiveness ddvantcge that w a s iruch higher thdn three

overwhelming victory.

produced

The force effectiveness ad-

vantage that WoS close tc three produced cledr vic r cry.

effectiveness

force

advantage

victory below ejpectat ions

Usually

there is

unless

prerrise

casualty

there

is

produced

Force effectiveness parity

.

is

ratio.

a

.Teans

little control over ratio postulate

effectiveness

force

The

three

than

pro-

defeat for the attacking force.

duced

The

lower

The

of controlling

It

is

orce

ratios.

litle

of

is

casualty

the

that surprise can produce

?

rrore

d

ri

fa

Tr

use r

io.

:rd^le

expected that surprise aided or

also

caused by deceDtion will be even rrore favorable.

diverse outcomes that are included

The 18

ard 19 preclude therr from detailed analysis.

needs

tc

be

separated into four different

each "utcor^e ^cr the attacker

so

SURPRISE ANT riCI'FTION SURPRISE VITF.CUT IFC^PTION DECEPTION VITKCUT SURPRISI NO SURPRISE, NO TECEPTICN TOTALS /AVERAGES

NO. c

2

Table

Tables

It-

cover"

ig

-

that the trends are see".

TABLE 21 EORCES ANT CASUALTY PATIOS (OVERWHELMING

ENVIRONMENT

Tables

in

FOPCI PATIO 1

1

:

;

.76 .65

VICTORY)

CASUALTY PATIO 1

N /A

K 1

1

c

1

1

-•

:

1 2

:

4.65

N 'A

:

.4

1

:

:

.69

1

:

1.5 7.5-

1

The five cases in Table 21 that had the worst average

force ratios for the attacker were associated, with deception.

Whether

with deception

surprise

the

produced

Testing the

fixed by other factors is net known.

three environment cases yields ^orce

the

ratios of 13.16,

with

agree

highly-

casualty ratios or whether that casualty ratio was

favorable

for

the

the

and 3.75

7.15,

postulate

effectiveness

respectively.

actual averaged outcomes

of

three

All

different

the

categories of battle. TABLE 22 J0RC1S ANT CASUALTY RATIOS

ENVIRONMENT

'CLEAR VICTORY

ECRCE RATIO

NO.

CASUALTY RATIO

SURPRISE ANT INCEPTION

7

1

:

1.18

1

SURPRISE WITHOUT RECEPTION

S

1

:

.73

1

RECEPTION WITHOUT SURPRISE

K/A

NO SURPRISE, NO DECEPTION

TOTAL/AVERAGE

Table had

three-to-one

a

effectiveness

2.92,

2.56, and 3.09.

deception

and

surprise

...

2

1.67

1

:

.54

1

:

24

1

:

.£2

1

-2.38

multiplying

The figures

ray

have

the force

attacker the

force

ratio

yields figures

ad-

of

support the postulate and

increased

ratios, but the evidence is much weaker.

134

the

Using

advantage.

by the casualty ratio advantage,

vantage

:

3 44

9

force

postulate,

"

N/A

reflect oattles where

22 should

:

the

casualty

TABLE 23 FORCES ANE CASUALTY RATIOS (MARGINAL VICTORIES)

ENVIRONMENT SURPRISE ANE EECEPTICN SURPRISE WITHOUT EECEPTION EXCEPTION WITPCUT SURPRISE NO SURPRISE, NO DECEPTION TOTAL/AVERAGE

The down

force

Table 23.

in

EORCE RATIO

NO. 4 7 2

1

1

12 25



:

1

:

1

:

1

:

.475

1

.4

1

55 .77

1

.€

1

.

While the overall 1,

ible explanation is that there is by

ively. one.

cases.

had

1.4 It

to rray

one

was

be

that

three to ore advantage,

1

.5

1.54

creak

to

two categories

to

one.

poss-

A

limiting factor vnich The

ratios of

hai.

first

one 1..S

the actual

is

two

respectand

the average force ratio for as

.8

:

:

the first

force ratios cf 2.1 and 2.5 to

The other two categories

.97

1 .5

effectiveness

magnitude of the force ratio.

the

categories

a

1

:

:

force

the Table yield ratios of 4.14 and 3.75

set

1

effectiveness postulate begins

ratio for tne data set is 2.56 to of



CASUALTY RATIO

1.3 to oil

force ratio rears

89 the

the possible contribution of surprise

and/or deception weakens. TAB LI 24

FORCES

ANT CASUALTY RATIOS

ENVIRONMENT SURPRISE ANE EECI^TICN SURPRISE WITECUT EECEPTION EECEPTICN WITPOUT SUPPRIS7 NO SURPRISE, NO EECEPTION TOTAL /AVERAGE

i'EEEEAT)

EORCE RATIO

NO 2

1

1

1

X

V

:

.

45

.4 N /A :

CAS r7 ALT v RATIO

^

2y

1

r

.74

1

w •-

1

:

.71

1

135

:

.35

:

.1

i

N/A .83 :

:

.76

Using numbers

.?P,

of

yields

postulate

the

.25,

force

and 1.12 to one.

ef f ect iveness

Ail three categories

would have predicted the result which was defeat. It

is

necessary to increase force effectiveness

adequate force advantage does not exist. it

It

when

would seem that

easy enough to determine the ratio in advance of

is

battle.

the

The commander knows the relative forces pretty hell. be

avail-

able.

The force effectiveness postulate, if correct,

should

easily

show

The casualty ratios for the last few battles should

whether

a

i;

power

or bat

multiplier

such

as

deception is required.

TABLE 25 PR0 3A3ILITY OF rECEPTION GIVEN FORCE RATIOS

PROBABILITY OF ATTEMPTING PECEPTION

EORCE RATIO 10

:

1

TO

2.5

:

1

2

:

1

TO

1.25

:

1

TO

.9

:

1

1.1

:

1

WORSE THAN

.9:1

(9

OF 27)

.156

(5

OF 32)

.07

(1

OF 14;

5

(5

OF 10}

.

OVERALL PROBABILITY

.24

The question of when

d

partially answered by Table 25.

a

superior defensive force

tion

force

than any other force.

may

use deception

a

OF 83

force will resort to deception

is

is

(20

A

force that is attacking

much more prone to use The vastly

thira

o f

the

superior time.

decep-

attacking That

^c

im-

probably has the initiative and can predict the enemy dcticn.

136

The

simply

superior

vastly

force

deception

embrace

The fact that the other

reduce casualties.

to

may

two

are rarely associated with deception nay only

categories

explained

hy

a

general misunderstanding

of

be

deception

the

process.

deception Effect on Increasing Territory Exchanged

5.

victory

is

in

a

overwhelming

force which achieves an

attacking

The

driving

position to exploit that victory by

The exploitation force-

deep into the enemy rear area.

would

have destroyed or bypassed the enemy reserve or counterattack and would he able tc acquire control over vast

forces of

previously

territory

forces

held

ty

the enemy.

either side of the penetration

on

areas

The iefensive

would

either

oe

captured after being cut off cr would have to be withdraw, order tc estatlish

The to

achieve

new line of defense.

a

battles in which the attacking force a

that achieves

typed

as

lines

hut is stopped

short

is

ing

-^orce

able

r>.o 1

in

A

clear victory might

ip.

a

large salient into

the

the exploitation.

A

victory

be one in which the

attack-

of

less than expected rright

that

is

penetration of the defense would result

smaller territory exchange. one

in

stereoenemy

becomes decisively engaged prior to achieving

the

planned objectives. An

ground. he

that

attack

that

ends in defeat right gain

or

lose

The typical situation for that tyoe of battle would the deci^i

T

'e

engagement

begins at

137

the m<-an

line

cf

defense.

attack might not make any progress at all

The

the progress being made might not justify the cost.

costly battle might decimate the

uing

the

such

that

would have to withdraw from

it

or

Contin-

attacking

for-je

battlefield.

the

That would account for territory lost by an attacking force. must be established from the data that

It

exchange

is

battle.

Again,

valid criterion for measuring the outcome

a

The strategic cases are

excluded.

territory

There are &2 cases for which 3arton Whaley assigned

exchange figures,

but

there ere severdl cases which bias the

analysis and which can not oe averaged out. restrict the

ly

bias the cross-correlation.

Ore case,

responsible

attack

and

130]

These

.

[Ref.

of Rumania,

forces

a

129].

resulted

Germany, an?

in

a

defeat

are

not

typical.

Bulgaria

not proper to delete any cases

without compiled of data

first to

considering them.

rile?

They

13S

[Ref.

snould yet

ie

it

from the cross-correlation The following

investigate the bias effect

restriction.

by

the Rumanian

of

territory loss of 54,702 square cases

the

Another case, the World Vac

deleted if the averaged outcomes are to oe analyzed, is

1941.

in

for conquering more territory than all

on the forces of Austria,

the forces

extreme-

;h

the Italian East Africa Campaign

other cases combined I

necessary

is

It

data set to exclude the cases whi

to

was

of

the analysis is done from the point of view

the attacking force.

of

territory

at

IVMe

different

vis

levels

TABU

26

TERRITORY EXCHANGE VERSUS OUTCOME OF 3ATTLE TERRITORY EXCHANGEE (SCUARE MIES

EXCLUDING CASES WITH EXCHANGES

NO.

NC EXCLUSION

7+

V

8?

82 ,680

5 ,580

552

-1 ,955

OVER 50,000

79

6 ,205

2 ,743

340

-

OVER

4,000

71

2S8

463.5

340

OVER

2,000

67

288

246

197

12.4

OVER

1,000

64

288

110

128

12.4

56

80

66

:

OVER 300 SQUARE MILES

Table reduces

the

ddtd

no

is

26 indicates

V-

r

161

104

65.7

12.4

that deleting rrore and Fore

effect o^ extreme cases to the point

longer representative of the

s^rple

data

that

the

sets.

Th-e

range of deletion for the final category was five "v~" oases,

eleven

"v"

There is

cases

results

seven "V-" o-ases,

but an

in in

32 percent

effort to

less

the ddtd is

of

the averaged

ma'-ce

confidence

in

The the

ea^-h

Eliminating settle

data

is

rost representative

There is no obvious point

hold.

The author of this thesis chose to set the

cases

deletion

for

82 cases.

exclude

where territory exchange

139

w:

setting.

requirement is to set the threshold

point where the ddta

d

different

The

entire

to

cases.

r"

lost.

the analysis.

data sets are affected differently at

at

three

and

radical change in the outcome as extrerrf cases ore

a

deleted,

cases,

"or

of

the

the

thres-

threshold

exceeded

1,500

The reasoning for that choice was

square rriles.

First, that area is roughly the area that

cover

ir

two day

a

strongly biasing

the

rerroves

exploitation.

rodem

a

threefold. errry

would

Second,

that

threshold

cases. Third,

that

threshold

retains 82 percent of the data.

TABLE 27 TERRITORY EXCHANGE THRESHOLD CASE REEUCTICN EFFECT

THRESHOLD

NO.

NONE 50,000 4,000 1,500 1,000 300

82 79

8

71

5

67 64 56

K

18 16

5 3

14 12

"v+"

"d"

22 22 21 20

23 22

7

29 28 27

26 26 26

19 15

that is left after considering only

data

The

"V-"

"v"

those

cases with territory exchange less than 1,500 square riles is

assumed the

to

te

"V+" and

representative. "V"

The threshold

sets as it deletes

cases from these categories.

It

higher

a

world

se^rr

irpncts

on

rrore

proportion tn.-it

of

any induced

I

error would

be

on the side of caution.

The data at

the threshold of 1,500 soiare Tiles

is:

TABLE 28 TERRITORY EXCHANGE CASES BY CATEGORY NIT 3 IF 0? CASK ,

ENVIRONMENT SURPRISE ANT IECEPTICN SURPRISE WITHOUT LECEPTION EICEPTICN WITHOUT SUPFRIS? NO SURPRISE, NO RECEPTION TOTAL

TOTAL 14 10

vj

1

-"

V

"v-

4

4 4

pi

140

1

1

1

42 67

2

1

7

11

5

16

20

23 26

Table 27 displays the

sa me

trends as shown previously

far as the relationship between environment and the

dS

come

The cross -correlation

the battle is concerned.

of

territorial

exchange and the outcome was shown in table

The cases of Table 26 for "v+",

21.

average

territorial exchanges of 288,

square miles respectively.

"v",

246,

197,

VI-

12.4

end

The trend was sufficiently strong

measure

a

effectiveness of the attacking force in the battle.

the

of

and "r" displayed

support the idea that territory exchange is

to

out-

would also be reasonable to say tnat it would

be

of I:

measure of

a

effectiveness for the defense as well. The

point

deception

errployed

question

in

is,

be judged

can

as

whether

shown

achieved

less. of

territory exchange of ten square

riles

or

The remaining 52 cases did rot involve deception.

24

a

ended in defeat.

there were 25 that did

ing 28,

meters

of

Those two were the only deception cases

those cases, almost half,

miles

Fifteen of the

Table 28 involved deception and only two

in

them were defeats. that

that

effective

more

heinr

based on the criterion of territory exchanged.

cases

forces

o*

1

territory.

that equates to

Alorg c

a

n

ot gain at

division

Of

the

remain-

least

ten

square

frontage of ZV kilo-

gain cf only 8rh

meters.

That

is

still in direct fire range of where the battle began. The

rd

ses that did rot

involve ce cepti c^ did include

ten cases where surprise wes achieved ar.yvey. one battle ended in defeat.

Of

Even including tnose

141

those, only

cases,

tr.e

attacks that utilized deception produced

clear advantage in

a

territory gained over the attacks that did rot utilize decepThe fifteen deception cases averaged

tion. gain.

a

26c square rile

52 cases not using deception averaged

The

sauare miles,

only

gain that was less than half as much.

a

ANALYSIS OE OPTICAL DECEPTION PRACTICES

T.

desired

One

cases that

deception outcome is surprise because

involved

"both

the deception mission,

duce

surprise.

case

in

The

surprised.

then,

Optimizing

mission.

may require actions which pro-

target is surprised or is

different forms.

The five modes

prise. and

style.

they

death"

are intention,

time, place,

The mode^ will he addressed

in

can

sur-

strength,

this thesis

Style should

what, where, when, and how.

that

reouires

Lefensive style,

Style

The different forrrs that surprise

dS

are slightly rrore descriptive than the traditional

of who,

rode

not

variety

were classified bv Vhaley as the various erodes of

tdke

a

Surprise has several psychological dimensions.

The first dimension of surprise is its extent or of

h<=st

analysis shows that it is not just

deception

which the

the

surprise and deception were the

terms of optimizing the operational

in

an exulanation

in

the

for example, could vary

mere moderate "defend

re

military

use

the only

sense.

Prom "defend to

she

trade space for

tire".

also includes Dattle tactics whether normal or

uncon-

to a

tc

ventional, technical innovations, and new weapons. a

1^9

measure of how the whole operatior is conducted.

142

Style is [Hef.

1

51]

The

dimension

second

Intensity is attack

measure of degree of

a

unexpected

was

that

surprise

of

surprise would generate

a

in

is

intensity.

its

Certainly,

effect.

terms of all five

modes

of

more intense surprise than one that

was predictable in all modes but one.

The number of rode? in

which surprise is attained defines the intensity as being a

an

en

scale cf zero to five.

second measure of intensity of surprise is the

A of

surprise achieved for any one rode.

harder

be limited to

thesis it will

just "surprised". of place would

made at point of

An

being either "very surprised" cr

example of being surprised

the surprise generated when

be

when it was expected at point

P

being very surprised would

generated

degree is rich

Tr.at

For the purposes of this

research or even define.

to

be

the mode

the surprise

that right

when

it

The cross-correlation method will

was

impossible.

oe

i

sed

to

identify the

optimal deception practices used in the historical ddta

analysis

is limited

prise was present 1

De

132]

[Pef.

The

was

An example

k.

that such an attack would have been

preconceived

in

the attack

the attack was made at point

when

degree

.

f^odes of

Overall

surprise

surprise

was in

to

the list


cases

in

which

set.

sur-

.

Surprise there were 44 cases cf tactical

present.

only one mode.

Only nine of these

dates

cases

Tne nine cases included

143

in

which

included one ccse

of

surprise of intent,

Each

resulted not

in

at

least

a

clear victory.

be made for the ether modes.

style

mode is place.

of

due

style.

because

This is of interest

surprise.

i

most

The

The least common mode is

The frequency order of the five modes

style

to

The same statement can

not the predominant mode of

is

common

and three

three cases where surprise was

the

of

two of place,

intention.

as shewn:

s

TABLE 29 MODE FREQUENCIES 0? SURPRISE POPE CF SURFPISE

NUMBER

PLACE TIME STRENGTH STYLE INTENTION

The

were

Surprise

can

70 se 54 27 16

31 25 24 12 8

next

surprise

PERCENTAGE CF CAS

step

is

ce

optimized

%

.8 .5 .3

j/

.2

%

-t

determine whether the modes

to

generated by

a

IS

of

deception

operation

or

not.

by olsn if

deception

is

most

a

efficient in generating surprise in the proper mode.

The 44

cases of tactical surorise are reduced

decep-

tion and

to

25

cases of

surprise for this analysis.

TA3LF 30 MOLE IRECUENCns 0* DECEPTION GENERATE! SURPRISE MOLE OF SURPRISE

PLACE

PERCENTAGE

NUMBER 22 14

88

T IMF

STRENGTF STYLE INTENTION

15 4 4

60

be:

15 ie

144



Table

indicates that deception has not played

30

part in generating surprise in the modes of style

large

intention. tactical

It

difficult to conceal

is

level

and

that

is probably

intention why

that

style of battle is difficult

neglected.

The

weapons mix

Terrains fairly constant.

especially if they have been successful.

only

many technological advantages that are

until they can

strength

includes

of operations.

factors as the

such

mcurtain range?,

friendly areas.

fan either restrict

particular

the reverent Dridge-s,

corrci

most

the

of

poir.t

(IPS).

IFI

Tne

size

precipitaPan-Fade

forces.

of

railroad

e.n
levees, and towns

s,

is

to

identify possible avenues

determine the throughput capability for throughput of

the

avenue

and

in

operations.

or assist

objective of IP2

of approach and

rraximurr

I

Natural obstacles such as

heavy vegetation,

rivers,

features such as roads,

approach.

a n

tire,

Army rses what is known as,

The U.S.

restrict

often

The

secret

account the known factors of the envi ronment

both the enemy and

tion

The

the direction or

"intelligence preparation of the battlefield" into

is

There are

Place,

attack, the area or width of the attack, and

takes

rode

deception plan.

a

Place

axis

the

kept

more readily changed and are the

are

elerrents of

used on the battlefield.

be

at

The tactics are rarely

changed so

and

change.

to

a

capability is

force

that

can

n

maneuver

the speed with wnich

14£

n-eosu^e

the

each

of

alo-y

fo^ce

the a

can

IPB is an analytic

move.

to

predict place,

tire,

reception, however, ray oe based on attacking

and strength.

impassible

over

tool used

durirg impossible weather,

terrain,

or ct

unprecedented speed. Army has

The U.S.

have developed

order to survive. grant

unique

capability

a

to

think and do

Amerithem-

for

trait was needed in the early year:-

This

selves.

long tradition of doing the near

That is not an attribute of every arry.

impossible. cans

a

simply

in

The problems of forcing the wilderness

to

passage to the West developed engineering

skills

An Army of soldiers who grew up

solutions.

end flat

or.

land might never think to move across broken terrain.

matches enemy doctrine and organization

IPS

types to the physical environment. a

on

perception.

It

is

a

The end result of I? F is

strong perception because

use IPB

support forces. raxirrized

covered

in

The result could be that

the force 'available elsewhere. the defensive

by aircraft

efficient

if

ccmtat power is

combat

tne

approach

block the expected main avenue of

to

minimizing areas

position combat forces and allocate

to

based

1?

it

The defense

detailed analysis and current intelligence.

would

stereo-

large

fact,

In

line may oe loosely defended or

uatrois.

This style of dpfer.se

i

c

by

only

highly

the enemy attacks according to the preconception

of his attack. IPB

intelligence

is

a

task.

formal method of performing

Similar

effort existed

1

?

a

in

historical many of

tne

Barton Whaiey recorded, that in 20 of the 44

data set cases.

tactical surprise cases, the defender had forced tion

regarding where the attack was likely

rrode

frequencies

a

preconcep-

occur.

to

The

for this data set which includes cases

surprise without

of

deception are shown in Table 31.

TABLE 31 MOLE FREQUENCIES OF PRECONCEPTION CASES MCEE OF SURPRISE

PLACE TIME STRENGTF STYLE INTENTION

data

The

PERCENTAGE CF CASES

NUMBER

"set

can

ie

S
13 12

65 % 60 %

%

3

X

6

30 %

w

b

further restricted

be

the

tc

cases where deception was -jonducted against an enemy who f

erred

d

deceiver

preconception. rray

The assumption is made

If

had

tnat

the

have had knowledge of the preconception and may

have teen able to incorporate that Knowledge in the deception plan. as

a

There is

a

requirement for

a

feedback channel as well

requirement for sufficient intelligence on

forces if the deception is to

fdl

be

based

on

the

preconcert ions

eremy .

TABLE 32 FREQUENCIES GIVEN DECEPTION AMP PRECONCEPTION

MODE CF SURPRISE

PLACE TIME STPFNGTE STYLE INTENTION

PERCENTAGE OF CAz

NUMBER 14 10

e^.5

^

so u^

*

«=>

• *-

63.7 12.5

11 4

147

% a

Corrparing Table? 29 and 32, is

a

seen that

there

general increase in the percentage of successful

sur-

it

can

be

prise rrodes when deception is attempted against an enemy has

preconception.

forrred d

style.

This

planning

a

frorr

rray

mode

result from the inattention tc style

deception,

the fact

The exception is the

who

frorr Q n

when

inability to change style,

the defender did

that

cf

not form

a

or

preconception

as to style.

The

deceiver

was

aole

preconception. on

to

successfully reinforce

The data is split

of

preconceptions or whether

successful.

The

difference

victim's

the

depending

two groups

this thesis

was coded was

that

it

just appeared

to

oe

between the two groups is

net

An assumption was made by the author

obvious from the data.

the

into

the

whether fthaley was able to determine successful rei~fort;e~

Trent

of

which

next step is to look at the cases in

the difference in

the way that

the

deia

based on an lack: cf direct evidence in sore

The difference Goes not

historical files.

very important and no conclusions will

oe

seer

tc

of ce

based on it.

TJ.ELE 32

MOPE FREQUENCIES GIVEN PERCEPTION REINFORCEMENT

SUCCESSFUL POPE CE SURPRISE

PLACE TIME STRENGTH STYLE INTENTION

NUM3FP

PERCENTAGE

APPEAREE SUCCESSFUL

NW3EB

PFPC5NTAG

8

88. y

tit

b

bo.b

71 .4 %

p ^

Rf 5

85.?

2 ^

22.2 33.3

.

148

.V

7

%

K/A

14.3

*

tentative

A

conclusion

from Table 33 is

style and intention irodes of surprise should not

Tnese rrodes can

in deception planning.

to reinforce 2-

a

be

used successfully

Surprise 3ased 03 Numbers of Modes

Analysis of the intensity of surprise number

the

be neglected

target's preconception.

IlLterijity of

indicate

the

that

of modes

is

required

to

combined

that should be

and

These indications are necessary at

which modes are optimum.

the tactical level because tirre and assets are lirrited.

tactical level requires deception rrost

The

optimize surprise in the

to

efficient and cost effective manner. has already been shown that surprise is

It

related

to

the outcome of battle.

iirectly

The results of

cdses of tdctical surorise can be correlated with the sity

surpri c

of

reflection surorised

of

The intensity used

e.

INTENSITY

TOTAL

that whicb

is

e

was

.

TAELE 34 NT7NSITY OF S UP PP. IS I OUT COM

2 3 4

inten-

the number of moles in which the defender

T

1

is

44

the

01 3ATTLZ

I

V+ c ^

TOT. 2 3

4

10 C

1

ir

20 10

1



^

4

1

1

2

V

d

1

'A

1

C

12

',

140

1


expected,

As

modes.

This

surprise usually appears with multiple

because surprise as to the

is

coincides with surprise as to tire, prise

of intensity

clear reason why.

would

It

seem that it

planning and execution resources

more

designed

was

induce surprise

to

in

deceptions

conduct

to

multiple modes.

The

higher

intensity

deceptions would have to increase

same rate in order to

Equating reauires

which

values

the

to the outcomes

payoffs "V + ",

values of 5,

3,

2,

and

creak-even point of 2.b, *>or

would be at least The

a

"V", 1

and

category.

The

be corrpared

to

at

T

he

payoff

The method used to

assign

the

to

is

weighted

a

"V-",

and

respectively.

in

assigned

"e" are

This is based on

achievement

tne standard

but

system

a

hcped

3.0.

outcomes of ea^h battle are sorted by

categories

the

rattle

intensity

surprise

would

effective.

cost

be

quantitative method.

a

numerical

linedr

.The payoffs for

make sense in all five modes.

to

costs

lach item on the deception indicator set

nature.

have

rare.

require

would

would become very expensive because the effort is not in

Sur-

half of the cases were of intensity two but there vds

Almost no

strength, or roth.

five did exist but it

^our or

usually

place

then divided

by the number of

intensity

battles

in

the

normalized values of the battle outcomes .en tne achievement nun hers as

of the expected value for that

1

level

a

direct reflection

of intensity.

Table was designed to include the probability

1£0

o^

The

next

achieving an

5

overwhelming

victory as that value may be xore irrporta.it

in

situations.

sorre

T A3L E

3

EXPECTED VALUE BASED ON SURPRISE

3.0 3.15 2.8 3.0 2.0

1

2

3 4

Intensity

level

Applying

payoff.

would

MENS

this

2

IT

r

PROBABILITY OF

EXPECTED VALUE

INTENSITY

I

22 OK

0/

10

T

'

V*

1

25 % i

exhibits

the

historical trend

average

highest

future

to

battle

suggest that only two mcdts cf surprise are needed

optimize

intensity.

the

additional

modes of surprise

The is

a

penalty

tor

to

etteroting

more complex planning

and

execution requirement. Cases not involving deception are removed

to

produce:

TABLE 35 INTENSITY CF SURPRISE (DECEPTICN CASES

OUTCOME CF BATTLE INTENSITY

V+

V.

V



TOTAL 1

3

1

13

1

1

i

2 3 4

4

? 3

1

2

t-

1

2

3

12

e;

1

c

,'

TCTAI

e

It

is

2

2b

seen that two thirds of the intensity one cases

were not the result of

a

forral deception operation.

151

It

i s

clear

that

intensity two cases predominate with over

percent of the total set.

which

produced

It

is

interesting that the

overwhelming,

an

unexpected

limited to tbe first three intensity levels.

three

appears

be good

to

defeat but the number of cases is small.

difficulty

deception.

properly

of

were

Intensity leveL coses

cf

The low number

of

deceptions of intensity three or higher may al increased

cases

victory

that it contains no

in

fifty

c

indicate the

o

executing

elaborate

an

The normalized value of the outcome? are:

TABLE 3? F7PFCTEL VALUES CF DECEPTION CASES promf.il it:

EXPECTED VALUE

NTINS ITY 1

3.0

2

3.3b

3

3.0

4

2.33

Again,

the

31 %

surprise seems optimized at

p i r>st

level.

Vhile the

result

of clear victory,

three intensities have

intensity three has

r.he

a

second

the

historical

l^ver

prob-

ability of achieving overwhelming victory. The

probability

willing

commander

to

of

accept

"v+" would be a

higher

risk:

important to have

protability of achieving an overwiielmi ig victor/. from point

Tables 35 and 37 could also o

*"

a

oe

looked at frcm

commander who can not afford

U- 2

a

decisive

to

a

higher

~

TV trie

Tri

view-

defeat.

'

aversion

Risk

behavior would lead such

for achieving intensity level three. of intensity three would produce a

Following individual

the sere trend

modes,

the

a

corrrcinder

On an

average, battles

clear victory. that was used

data set is reduced to

evaluate

to

sixteen

the

cases of deception based on preconceptions naze by the

INTENSITY

,f __

INTFNS ITY

TABLE 38 SURPRISE (DECEPTION

01'

plan

10

AM

PRECONCEPTION

e Gerry.

)

»•

V+

V

V-

rr

r

-

m

t

1

1

1

2

3

4

7

3

1

3

t

4

1

c

TOTAL

based

on

ie

e

As soon as The data was restricted

tion

«

the preconceptions of the

to

cases

of decep-

all of

enerry,

tin

cases wnicn ended in defeat dropped out.

VALUIS INTENS ITT

TABLE 39 fTECEpTlON 3ASZL ON PR FCONCFPTICN

EXPFCTEI VALUE

PPCIAEILITY OE 100

I

3.S6

a3

%

3.0

17

1

'

V

+

Sufficient knowledge about the enemy produces

victory

overwhelming

expected

average

The probability

of intensity.

levels

all

increased or

value for

a

same.

the

deception based on

preconcep-

Inlenjity of Surprise EdSjd on Mode Grouping

-

Knowledge, of enemy preconceptions will provide key

be used

to

in the

determination of which modes

prise, should be attempted.

enemy

The

clear victory value, 3.0.

a

3

stayed

achieving

of

That seems significantly higher

tions cf the enemy is 3.^-4. than

large

value increased or stayed the same for

Expected

advantage.

a

analysis

of

surprise

and

The necessity to understand

trying to deceive

before

Mode

pairing

of the historical deception

design

remains

him

rode pdirs looks «t the results

deception.

of

may also indicate which rodes snould

rray

valid.

be

surthe

This

historical

of

have

r.lainers.

the

Mode

been

by

pairing

combined.

This analysis is to investigate the effectiveness

different two

has

outccrre of

pairs of surprise rodes. a

mode pa the

i

r

battle.

intensity

Each case cf

which was issigne?

the

value

of

PI.ACE-STYI

I

TIME-INTENTION STRENGTH-STYLE

the

The 21 intensity two cases produce:

TA3LE 4tf MOPE PAIR ANALYSIS AT INTENSITY TWO liQ.II PAIE PLACE-STFINSTE TIME-PLACE TIME-STRENGTH

of

NUM3ER 8

EXPECTE! VALUE 3.375 2.4 3.0

t

3 2

-'

1

5.e

1

2.'/

154

.?

:

The most common pairings were as expected

with

associated Table

40

resulted

are in

a

either strength or time. not

large enough

to

pair

adding

included in

was

outcome.

More numbers are

obtained

battle values for each case in which

the

a

The

larger mode set.

in

averaging

that

representative number for the battle

Averaging requires more numbers. by

numbers

The

insure

Place was

.

a

results

noie

are

shown in Ta ble 41

^1

TAbI E

V CTE

PAIP ANALYSIS "(TOTAL FREQUENCY)

MODE PA 13

EXPEC TE: D VALU

NUr"£ER

PLACE- STY LI

FLACI-STBENGTE TIKI-STYLE

TIKE-STRENGTH

TIM-INTENTION

7

3 .14

19

.£5

4

3

13

£

2 .83

6

TIM-PIACE

If

2

STPENGTF-STYLE 2

INTENTION-PLACE

b

INTINTION-STPINGTE

surprise

are

ten

c

pairings fcr the

in Table 41.

terms of expected value is surprising. that

rust

be rrade

c

3

possible

induced

.72

2 .71

INTENTION-STYLE

/ 1 1

.92

Trie

moaes

of

ordering

in

five

rai£

There are refinements

before opt imur mode pairs can be selectee

1

i

u

i-.

.

a

The key di scrirri set

r.a

tor used

to

select the desired data

the existence of preconceptions.

is

intensity

There

ore

seven

level two cases involving deception based on

conceptions

Place-strength is the

the enerry.

of

ore-

dominant

pair with four of the seven cases having that rroce pair.

rrode

Corrpdring the place-strength rrode pair using Tables 41

shows

that

different

pair's

the

was

41

suds tantially

the data set

to

the cases

deception

of

the preconceptions of the enemy will provide the set

based or

which the

sults

value

nc

.

Pestricting

from

expected

a

of

the

optirr'un-

rode pair can be selected.

analysis of that set are shown

The

next

the

in

Table:

PQTT PAIR ANALYSIS

r-OTl

PAIR

TAILI 42 (PRECONCEPTION 3ASIT INCEPTIONS

PLACE-STBINGTH

5

3 .4

TINE-INTENTICN

4

3.25

PLACE-STYLE

7

3.14

TIM-STYLE

1

3.

STPEMGTF-STYLE

1

3 .0

TIME-PLACE

S

Z.875

TIME-STRENGTH

7

?

P1ACE-INTENTICN

3

STBENGTE-INTENTION

.857 /- r~

«-,

C '?

1

1

)

EXPPCTEL VALUE

NUMEER

1-

.

E

'/

<

re-

42 lists the mode pairs in order of decreasing

Table expected value. in

The table indicates that deception planning

past may have been based en what measures

the

could

optimize

done rather than on what should De done in order to

The expected values and the frequencies of pairing

surprise.

are not associated correctly.

Still, the analysis shows that

the cases,

where deception was

associated

with battle outcomes that were better then

shewn

deception

choice,

is

of

the one that is the

preconceptions, were

on

If those preconceptions

enemy.

the mode pairs should

be chosen

those

optimized

the

precon-

based primarily on the

the order shown in Table 41. by

based,

The conclusion is that

Table 40.

in

ceptions

be

alio*

a

expected value in

oy

The pairs should not

chosen

be

their ease of execution because an easy deception is

not

necessarily an effective one.

Inteniiiy Surprise

4-

The

surprise to

the

very

second

Surprise

$f

i.e.s

ed

Tggree

on

measure cf intensity is

achieved for any one mode.

It

degree

the

would

expect that the rore the deception target

be

data,

however,

of

reasonable surprised,

is

greater would be the effects of the 5urprise.

little

^ode

of

There

which differentiates

is

between

"very surprised" and "surprised". The

first

task

in

addressing

this

intensity of surprise was to see if tnere was

advantage associated with intensity levels. this

was to equate the

a

of

quantifiable

The net hod

battle outcomes using the

II:?

measure

to

do

previously

established was

number scheire

found

battles

The average

25 battles.

in

was

The rating of

.

Those

3.16.

surprised"

"very

outcome

those

o ?

25 battles were ta^en

from

the

larger tactical data set which had ar average outcome of 3.0.

The difference is not large enough

indicate an advantage.

set was restricted to

data

the cases which

in-

tactical deception based on enemy preconceptions.

The

The

volved

to

number

of cases from that set

rating

was ten.

surprised"

that had the "very

Those ten cases had ar average outcome

of

3.1.

That outcore was slightly better than that of the cases

that

were not based on preconceptions,

but

difference

t.ne

between 2.8 and 3.1 does net appear significant. The

data set oC cases which had

tactical

included nine cases that did not involve

surprised" rating

deception operation, ception.

There than

These

very

the

though the enemy had formed

a

precon-

nine cases had an average outcome of

was no apparent difference between those already noted.

Cases where

the data sets t.ne

surprised" in two or three mode c did not have

a

3.44.

other

enemy was

"very

higher

value

a

then tnose of only one mode.

TALLE 43 VALUE CE A HIGH LEGRE'E Of SURPRISE POLE

STRENGTH PLACE

NO.

OE

S+

AVERAGE VALUE GE OUTCOME

CASES

12

3 .1

9

/*

STYLE;

t

i-J

I^E

4

T

.89 .

'c

3 .1 4 .V

INTENTION

158

Table surprised" The

snows that the eneiry is more

often

"very

unexpected strength than ty any

ether

rede.

however,

since

43

by

observation is of no practical interest,

that

knowledge cdtinot

that

there is no apparent advantage in pursuing

of surprise

in

sified

induce

to

put

be

The analysis

use.

to

high degree

a

The deception plan should

any mode.

surprise

in

several

indicates

diver-

be

rather

rrodes

than

focused on one mode only. 5

Zlfict of Security on Surprise

«

This analysis verified that if the victim's

gence

branch

warning had required

warned,

an

both

impending

the victim of

adverse effect on surprise. 3

and

C

intelli-

attack,

such

The tactical

cose

lists of battles to be considered

as

shown below:

TA3LI 44 EFFECT OF WARNING ON TACTICAL SURPRISE LIST E

B C C

TYPE

WARNING GIVE!* NO EARNING WARNING GIVEN NC EARNING

NO

SUH?RISE CASES

^5 22

22 22

the

effect

in

1

>

.54

2. icr

the three cases of

providing warning.

of warning produced

a

the tactical data

159

tc

deception

efficiency of eneny

The Table also shows

disadvantage whether

prise was ultimately achieved or not. more obvious wher

T

8

did not produce surprise were due

intelligence

2.64

46

Table 44 inricates that that

OUTCOME

of

That disadvantage

that

suris

Table 44 is combined.

a

TABLE 45 OVERALL EFFECT OF WARNING CASE TYPE

NUMBER

OUTCOME

WARNING GIVEN

71

2.0

30

2.77

NO WARNING

6.

Effect of Schedule Changes on Surprise

False The

alerts sorretirres produce

Wolf"

"Cry

occurs when

it

materialize. deception

effect is

a

This effect has

to

effect.

Cry ivoif"

force

a

threat that does

a

sources including Whaley's 1969 study

Frofessor Jiri Valenta of t

School made the follow. ng point

in

Use of Surprise and reception".

that

not

associated with strategic

bee-"

the 1962 book edited by Daniel ana Herbig,

2§ii§Ption.

"

desensitizing of

repeatedly responds

in rrany

a

his

tiie

e.r.d

Strategic Military Naval

Postgraduate

1962 article,

"Soviet

He wrote;

"The rrost tion during

effective form of Soviet irilitary decepthe Czechoslovak crisis was pr^baDly the continuing series of military exercises. Although they were probably intended by the Soviet Union tc threaten Czechoslovakia with an invasion, paradoxically they ray have desensitized the Czechoslovak and Western leaders ar. analysts to the very possibility of invasion." [Pef. 132J The

"Cry Wolf

tary

author

of

this thesis totally agrees

effect does cccur in peacetime and

training

exercises near the tense

in

that

wc r

borders

.

the

Mili-

associated

with the Federal Republic of Germany and with the Republic of

Korea fit the "Cry Wolf" pattern. occur

at

the operational

level

lt"0

The "cry Wolf" effect does as

well as

the

strategic

level,

with

the "Cry Wolf

but

schedule changes at the tactical level.

this

associated

The reason

periods of

tinre

operations

as it

might

delayed

be

long

for

often necessary to have long periods

is

favorable weather to mount such an operation.

long

The

between threats provide sufficient time recover from

periods

anxiety of the threat.

initial

the

f'or

probafcly associated with time.

is

Strategic

of

often

effect is less

remembered Repeated

is

false

emotion

The

the feeling of relief when the

"wish*\;l thinking" that

the next alert will

threat

is

passed.

generate

might

for the sane threat

alerts

that

false as well.

be

relays of tactical operations are usually short in

duration.

Tactical delay? might resrit from planning that did

not

sufficient table

-Tor

lag

tion arrived The

time for chance events that upset the

the operation.

for three days,

The tactical plan may

for ex c mple,

by

has

the opera-

three days late.

deception

data base includes irany

There were examples

o *

anticipating the original schedule. teen observed in relation

to

anxiety level caused

by

to

a

ryriac

t

~>

threat.

reduce It

level,

161

but

the enemy's is

necessary

analyse whether the schedule changes reliably produce

desensitizing effect.

of

The "Cry tfolf" effect

the operational

the initial

examples

false alerts caused

enemy

usually the delays were not long erough

to

tire-

delayed

he

if the ammunition for

battles that were postponed one or more times due of factors.

allow

the

Changing

disclosure

that

comrunica tions

the timing of an attach produces is

used

to

as

enerry

The

The

designed

the

be

should he

less

advanced

the

for

new schedule provides less tirre

for

the

analysis of the effect of schedule

charges

was

data

support

the

.

verify

to

intuitive

ions

operation

react

to

necessary

control.

delay or whether the change was an advance.

a

schedule

would

and

corcrrand

the

the

change was

the

implement the

to

of

whether

corrrruni cat

to

risk

due to the posturing of units or

Increased

risk

a

if

historical

the

conclusion above.

The

following Table

addresses

the effect of schedule changes on the outccre of hattle.

TABLE 4fc EFEEC1 OF SCHEDULE CHANGES ON EXPECTED V*L LIST

TiPE

B

ENEMY WARNED

B

NO WARNING

C

ENEMY WARNED

n

NO WARNING

overall

?E

NUMBER

EXPECTED VAIJE

14

2 ,3£i

9

2.67

id

1.43

TOTAL

The

T

3.?

l

42

probability

that

the

enerry

received

warning was 71.4 percent for the cases that involved schedule ':ha^ges.

the

The

average outcome of battle was

cases where no warning was

t ive~\.

warning was present included only

162

14

r^uch

The 32

higher for

cases

where

cases whe-e surprise was

Nine of those cases involved deception which

still achieved.

may have beer able to reduce the effects of the warning. The 42 cases included

attack

was advanced.

2.43.

The

seven where the schedule of the

The average outcome

of

cases of delayed schedules

25

outcome of 1.97.

those cases was

average

an

had

The difference in outcome is sufficient to

support the idea that

a

schedule advance is less risky than

a

schedule delay.

relaying an operation change.

A

usually no more tn c n

is

projected start time of I-day, H-hour, is charged

the people who need to know are informed of the

and

There

are certain events such as the arrival

ammunition which result

in

rumors,

of

plctnned

is

The^e

for the most

tut

on

time relative

to

are two reasons why this tiding is

reason

is

reference will

bo-sed

no

be

generated

a

specific ddte.

If

change in relative time by

the

nate change.

tne date so

oe

the

F-hour.

D-day, The

*n

i'St

done without

changes,

there is no

The second

part

£n opera-

used.

that coordination and training can to

change.

supplies sod

specific dates for an operation are not releasee. tion

date

a

there

con fusion

reason

is

to

that the delaying of an operation

is

protect the security of the projected date. The not

point is,

necessarily the seme

as

"Crying Wolf".

Tne "Cry

situation seems applicable only ?or these cperatio-s a

country

or an army

is

attack which never comes.

in

Wolf" whi

repeatedly placed on alert for

:h

an

The alerts tecorre routine and tne

16.3

respond properly

soldiers

fail

to

happen.

That

type of situation is rore appropriate for the

when

the

strategic level where repeated demonstrations at "be

done in the

forrr

of a

threat,

anxiety

cnce

whether

the

forces

on

between

there

cut

the same

the

does

border ^ay

a

peacetime training exercise.

The peacetime training exercises produce of

attack

is

a

return to

a

perioi

exercise is

over.

reduction

anxiety occurs

in

battlefield during war.

It

is

There

^reat deal

a

reduced

of

questionable military

in

are

periods

battles that can be associated with reduced

threat.

There may not be any periods of reduced anxiety. "Cry Volf" situation should generate the

The that

after repeated false alerts,

the expected

value of

outcome from the point of view of the attacking force

increase. cases

effect

This does not happen at the tactical level

the

should for

the

which were the result of delayed schedules.

TAEII 47 TF5FCT OF LTJZPREE SCEIDUIIS ON OUTCOME NO.

OF PEEERRMENTS

NO

.

OF CASFS

EXPECTED VALUE 2.13

1

23

2

6

i.

3

1

2.0

4

3

1.6?

2

l.h

MORE THAN TOTAI

4

35

1

1.

c j.

e?

97

?•

which

measures

The

countless.

"Fach

can

be

90-2,

depends on the situation and the only

Tactical

deception

9re lirrit

planner.

provides twelve examples

reception,

o^ense

techniques which mainly apply to the

deception sixteen

deception

used for

seem to be the imagination of the

would FM

of Individual Deception Measures

II.f.££t

of ar.i

The manual disc

which mainly apply to the defense.

provides ten deception ideas designed to trigger the imagination cf the deception planner.

manual

the

are:

The three ideas proposed

that each situation is different

(1)

requires different deception indicators, Tion

plan must execute the measures that

tion

story,

and

that

(3)

there is

deception measures that applies

to

all

(?)

no

support

diversionary attack should be avoided. the

This

ruse

conduct they

only ray

ordering

above ideas

t.ne

The demonstration

ruse which by definition uses

require

a

combat

reduction in forces

contact

wi

diversions which allow

T

h

an

the enemy.

The

overall victory

up for weakening the main force.

it

r<=>y

to

once

lost

ruse but

forces.

available

the main operation and tne forces *ay oe

rake

of

Tne exception is that the demonstration

with one exception.

is

decep-

tne

situations.

The author of this thesis agrees with

or

anc

each lecep-

tfadt

rar.*c

in

create

may not maKe

The demonstration force may

suffer excessive casualties.

There

where

were

eleven cases in the

deception included

at

tactical

data

set

least one case of demonstration.

ie:

The average outcome for those tattles was 2.54. the rest of the battles utilizing

result

for

3.44.

The difference is significant.

cates

that utilizing combat forces in

is

The average

deception

The difference indi-

diversionary

a

less effective than using ruses of other form.

son

between

attack compari-

A

the demonstration is made in

the feint and

was

the

next Table.

TABLE 48 riMCNSTRATION VERSUS FEINT PUS*

NO.

FEINT ONLY

01 CASES

OUTCOME

12

3.5

6

3.?

TEMONSTRATICN ONLY EOTE

2.0

Table

deception engaged tetter feint. The

48 suggests that

effect

"For

feint

produces

with

The combat -orces can be less risk if they are used

that matter,

combat

forces are

sare

the

without requiring combat forces to

with the enemy.

advantage

the feint

become usea for

tc

the

required.

not

ray be tasked to combat support or combat

service

support units. The analysis also shews that using both

demonstration in the same deception may The

place

attempt to introduce mode of surprise,

a

be

a

feint end

counterpr court ive.

higher level of ambiguity in

may tip the enemy to the fact

deception is being employe'-.

Ice

a

the

that

Barton Whaley recorded the number and types of deception treasures that were employed in or prior to each tactical

operation.

The data set of interest includes the 47 cases of

surprise

tactical

uencies

of

each

and /or deception.

The

relative

major type of ruse are shown in

the

freq-

next

Table.

TABLE 49 RUSE FREQUENCY OF USE

PUSJ TYPE

NUMB I R

USSIMULATIVE CAMOUFLAGE

18 1? 12

FEINT SIMULATIVE CAMOUFLAGE EEMONSTRATION RATIO DECEPTION PLANT I r RUMORS FAKE LOCUMENTS NEGOTIATIONS

11 7 5 2 1

As many as six different

some

tactical

surprising produce

a

in

types

ov

battles in the data set. that the more elaocrate

higher proportion of surprise.

ruses were Tne

found

analysis

deceptions T he

did

in

was not

number of ruses

was compared to battle outcome in the following tacle.

TAIL? b'd NUMBER OF RUSES VERSUS OUTCOME NUM3FP OF RUSES

NUM3EH OF 14

1

2 3 4 p e

TOTAL

[

CA. ;zs

9 8

OUTCOME 2.f7 3.22

AVI [RAGE

3 .375 3 .27

11 3

2.33

1

1

.0

1

2

• k!

47

2.93

167

.

Table used

in

a

.

indicates that the number of

50

deception should be between one and

nurrber could easily

that

.

.

of

ruses

tnree.

That

relate to the number of modes of surprise

the deception is designed to generate.

number

rrajcr

There may be any

deception measures that

individual

support

o^e

usea

to

ruse

There

display story.

false

are

deception neasures which

indicators

are

or ambiguity for

the

deception

The case histories orovided examples of the following

tyues of measures:

TAELF 51 INCEPTION MEASURES TO LIS PLAY TEE FALSE Edlse radio traffic, timing, sounds, or movement. Fake lighting schemes, dummy personnel and equipment. Controlled agents, political negotiations, press reports Simulations, displays, command visits, false roads. Set up a false pattern that has logic the enemy expects. Present peaceful scene at the FIGT until the last rri~ute False training which focuses on alternate operation.

T4 3LE 52 DECEPTION MEASURES TO CREATE AMBIGUITY 1

2

. .

?. 4. c

p. 7. 8. i^ •

If 11

12

13 14.

Contra ry i ndi cat o rs East movin g e ven t s Traffic vn lum e t o in t reduce time laps in intellig ence. An attack con duct ed to prevent interference with another Own forces de c e i v pd using rumors, radio, ana unit orders .

Deceptive bri dge sei zu res Showing de *en si ve pr eparations wnile attacking. Setting co unt era t tac k traps while delaying, Keeping th e t anks el sewhe^e. Let enemy watch tne Allowing n sa lien t i n your lines for later decoy .se Position c rac k n n its in plain view, Cause en em y t o ch oos e between two real deployment s Pep ley two fo rets an d attack with only one of the m Present, en ery wit h f iotitious al t era ntives .

1

cB

v

:

.

.

The deception measures can be anything at

The

all.

included the following examples designed to conceal the

data real

TAELE 53 DECEPTION MEASURES USET TO CONCEAL THE REAL 1.

2. t

4. »-



6. ?. 8. c *.

*

10. 11. 1?. 13. 14. 15. ie. 1?. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Control! ing ch annel s to create missing data. Decepti e camo vflag e Fdlse er pi dnat ion o f tru e events. Ixecuti n g one opera tion to conceal another. Direct in g atte n 1 1 o n away ""rorr a certain area. False rre an ing to si gnais thdt could not he hi id en. Map exer cises restr icted to a handful of key people, Late dis semina ticn of th e operation s orderRestrict 6 d aCC ess t o kno wledge of real pi on. Badio si lence used as fo rces are concentrated, March at night and c o n c e al in "o rests dv the day. Conceal final appro dCh t hrough noise/light discipline A bnoriral air a ttack timi ng. Ahmno rma 1 land atta c> ti rring Visual d ecepti on Concea 1 forces a nd mat er i e 1 in zone of rrai n ef t'c rt Conceal concep t of opera t ion Strict s e c u r i t y. Conceal di feet ion o f main effort Change u s u a 1 t a c t i c s Keep res erves held much furtner back than normal Conceal compos i tion o* f orces To not c on duct reco nnai s sance by large detachmen ts To not old fa milia rizat ion sessions with n ew fo rces Port ray that m o pp r ehear sal time is r eeie d .

.

.

.

.

.

.

fa

.

.

E.

SUPttAfl.Y

!•

Surprise

although tion.

developed Through Case History Analysis

^iiJci fp.inis

surprise The

effectively achieved at

data

an?

can

deception he

analysis

are

commonly

associate!,

achieved without employing

revealed

that

usin-3

decep-

deception

seems to almost guarantee that surprise will the strategic level.

ie

further,

tne

h

e

conditional

.

probability of tactical surprise given deception was

offense can partially rely on the initiative

The

produce

.89.

surprise.

The defense has

rruch

a

greater

to

for

need,

deception to produce surprise.

Surprise unaided

by

deception

tion usually produces surprise. at

least

a

in decline.

is

Decep-

The probability of achieving

clear victory is highest when both surprise

and

deception are present.

Uncontrolled

channels

cause

can

even

most

the

elaborate deception to fail.

Operations conducted in end

j

n

d

a

predictable manner commonly

ef eat

Any

technological

surprise

loses

rapildly

its

effectiveness once it is used. The use of deception results in

Surprise

enhances force ef f ec

enhancement

in

ti

venees

.

a

casualty reduction. The

af orerentioned

combat power due to surprise and/or deception

diminishes as the actual force ratio nears and then exceeds

a

three to one advantage ^or the attacker. The force effectiveness ratio obtained the

oy

multiplying

force ratio and the casualty ratio experienced, in

battles

may be used to uredict whether an addition

o-ior cc

m

t'

power rultipiier such as deception is needed for success in

a

t

a

future operation.

Territory exchange is the

outcome of battle.

a

valid criterion for reasuring

The attack

1?0

that utilized

deception

produced

advantage

clear

a

in

territorial

gain

over

the

attack that did not utilize deception.

Surprise has two dimensions: Intensity

a rreasure

is

intensity

number

by

increasing

a

modes

surprise

of

single

degree

of

modes

of

rrode

of

is

intensity.

should not

variety and intensity.

ce

Increasing

effect.

beneficial

rrore

than

The style and attention

neglected

in

ceception

Only two modes of surprise are necessary to opti-

planning.

mize the surprise intensity.

Feints should be used

Ceception 1

ry

preference to demonstrations

should never be used together.

and the twc

forrrer

in

best when

is

it

is

preconceptions

the enemy.

Allowing

the

enemy

to

oe warned

operation produces disadvantages, A

failure

to deceive

penalty to the deceiver. the

based on

identification

of

an

impending

regardless of surprise.

the enemy rarely results

that

deception

of

signals

as

deception.

true.

anything

The deception effort T a y re wasted,

small cost nepd not nave any effect en the real

tion.

The

feint

or a

forces

is

e/ception

essential

is

to

una hie tc gain

success.

A

£

penalty would result if

a

required

objective

but

opera-

essential forces are used

if

demonstration.

were

a

The enemy gains aiT^st nothing from

Knowing what is false does not necessarily indicate about what

in

that

in

a

those wa s

penalty would also result if those

force? were attrited during the battle.

1?1

Schedule

changes

is worse than advancing

a

schedule.

enemy

the

being

relaying an operation

thus they should be avoided.

warned,

not

often result in

Multiple

necessarily produce the "Cry Volf"

deferments

effect;

however

do

the

possibility does exist. The nurrber of major ruses used in be

?

The

trey

is

keeping the plan cost effective.

Confidence Evaluation

«

case history data set

The

representativeness and the data set are

rot

least

deception should

The actual number woulr tepe^rj on

between one and tbree.

the situation.

a

required the assumption of is

limited to cases

classified.

The recorded data nay be biase'

at

ways.

Cne bias may be due to inaccuracy in

the

two

historical records used by tfhaley as sources of A

second

duced

bias right erist

in

the way

bad data into the data

base.

data in the data set is not clear. by

information.

that Whaley coded

These biases must be checked os they may have

data.

that

the Central

Intelligence Agency,

tain much excellent

There

are

intro-

The total effect of 03c The data set was accepted.

however,

and

does con-

information. two

thing?

that can be done

to

increase

confidence in the data and the analysis of this thesis. first

approach is to make

analysis

established research group. the

worir

done

a

comparison of the data

with the data and analysis results

results

v

y

the

The comparison will

the Fistoricnl

172

Evaluation

The

and o f

be ra&e

and

the an

with

Fesearch

Organization Method

of

second

approach will be to do

Analysis of Fistorical Combat a

weighting scheme used

nurrerical

Judgment

their Quantified

in support of

(E5B0)

Lata

(QJPA).

The

sensitivity- analysis or

the

represent

this thesis to

in

the expected values of battle outcomes.

Colonel T.N. Dupuy's book, Numbers^ Predictors & War, included

included 22 battles from the

which

analyzed

15

the victor end which side was the

Dupuy classed the battle as battle

the

a

c

Whaley's

scope.

a

In all

were

one case,

tut

defeated.

case

wds

only

1944.

in

the

on

one

methods of historical research used by

in

T-jpuy does

and

a

degree that Whaley did. "v + ",

the

short

"v",

"v + "

ar.c

3.7, and

"V-"

[Vef

Whcley

f

and

.

135]

"e" outcomes

Using

"Quick Win" to 5.0, th° "v-" ai

d

battle outcomes

to

luuuy's closest comparison

listing of "Quick Wins",

"Stalemates."

^he

seem significantly large.

not

Colonel Dupuy die not classify same

of

German

counterattack wnich eventually did end in German defeat. difference

i,e

case

The

The difference was

analysis

c

.vndey classed

German victory,

German defeat.

a

covered

those battles

different was the Battle of the Ardennes

was

that

134]

between lupuy and Whaley as to which

there was agreement was

of

the 1969 study by Whaley.

in

[?ef.

tine period

sarre

Whaley's deception data base?

by

statistics

list of selected battle

a

a

"V

"stalemate"

173

recorded

by

"Almost Quick

Whaley A'ins,"

the tc .-/as

end

rating scheme which equates and to

"Almost Quick win"

2.?;

this

to

Table emerges:

TABLE £4 COMPARISON CI VICTORY CRITERIA NO. CASES

AVE VALUE

WEAL IT 's CRITERIA

CAS7S

QIICK WINS

4

5.0

"v^"

4

4.0

ALMOST CUICK WINS

3

3.0

"v"

3

3.67

STALEMATES

3

2.0

"V-"

7

^.43

DUPUY 'S CRITIPIA

NO

AVE VALUE

.

comparison would remain valid regardless

The

the

c f

weighting scheme used "because Wha ley's "V-" ratings were only found

cases

the

in

that

correspondec

"stalemates."

to

Whdley's "V + " ratings were found, associated with "Quick vins" "

all

in

one case which was an

but.

comparison

w

significantly

an

to

show that Whdley's

equal

War,

datd

biased oy his coding uriteria.

wd

The net

s

A f

The lack

vds

NurnfcerSj.

Predictors

order to describe the andlytical model, QJMA.

in

a

tias in Tupuy's work.

Colonel Dupuy published his book. S.

Win."

bids is shown by the Table as long as there

significant not

made

ds

Alrrost Quick

The

detailed in regdrds to the model but does not include

"booK

is

very

rrany

the

PERO

interaction battles,

statistics

Offensive

Tunuy

details for his examples from history. group developed their model

numbers the

but

from 1

[He"

.

one 13P]

that were

book

in

calculated

really

battle.

from the

Tne

Dupuy 's

174

only

dook:

motherra ti cal

historical

from

included

details can

of oe

5?.*

detdiled the

Sorixe

compared

to

similar details presented by ^'haley

[Kef,

137]

as shown

in

the fallowing Table.

TABLE 55 SOMMF OFFENSIVE TATA COMPARISON CRITERIA

LtJPUY DATA

WfiALEY DATA

600,000 GERMAN TO 250,000 ALLIES

29 DIVISIONS

FORCE RATIO

2.4 TO 1.0

2.45 TC 1.0

CASUAITIFS

200,000 TO 240,000

343,000 TO 330,000

CAS. RATIO

.83 TC 1.0

1.05 TO 1.0

TERRITORY EXCHANGE

PEASF 1: PEASE 2: TOTAL =

30 KM 12 K^ 42 KM

1200 SOU ARE MILES (PER 60 MILE FRONT) EQUATES TO 40 KM

SURPRISE FACTCH

GERMAN SURPRISE (SLIGHT)

GERMAN SURPRISE (NO PRECONCEPTIONS)

OUTCOME

SLIGFT GERMAN VICTORY

"V-" FOR

ARTILIERY

6,473 TUBES

6,000 TUBES

r'ORTAPS

3,532 TUBES

3,000 TU1ES

FORCES

71

DIVISIONS TO

I

^able

^^:

difference

into

two phases;

Whaley

's

1ANS

shews that Whaley and Pvjpvy recorded almost

exactly the sare data for the So Fire Offensive. slight

JFI

in

scope and Dupvy

however,

di a

There was

brea'-r

the

battle

tne Soffc example indicates

that

research and ceding was at least as accurate as that In fact, Eupuy adrrits thdt

done hy Lupuy.

secondary sources [Pef. 133]

he use-:

only tnree

while Whaley cites 16 references

and provides 11 direct quotes to sucport his analysis of

case

a

(Ref.

13S]

.

175

the

lupuy

his HERO associates

decided

as

military historians that tne outccrre of the buttle should

oe

Colonel

and

assessed on the oasis of three outcomes: the opposing missions,

of

accomplishment

(1)

(2)

effectiveness in relation

(3)

casualty effectiveness

to

ground

gained

142].

The OJMA model compares relative comDat effectiveness

using

up

or lost, and

73 separate variables in

to

determines

algorithm

an

influence of environmental

the

[Hef.

which

operational

and

variables upon the force strengths of the two opponents.

If

different from that predicted by

the

the algorithm result

power ratio,

combat

discrepancy.

The

considerations

[Ref.

is

further analysis is dene

discrepancy 141].

is

usually due

to

behavior

The model is important because it

the only known model that reliably

is

explain the

to

combat over the course of history.

real-life

rep esents L

The nedJl WDr v s

veil,

so

that Lupuy wrote, a t?asis "in 1S7S it was the only model that orovides for confidence that it can extrapolate realistically tc the future future, permitting reliable proces within ranges of

possibilities." [Hef. 142] Lupuy's

combat

effect that is not quantifiable in the

tional

The calculations for Dupuy's model account

ratio.

effects

mobility

o f

permitting The

but

it

deal with surprise as perhaps the most important opera-

does

major

model dees not de«l with deception,

second

of

surprise.

The first effect

the surprising feroe.

Mobility

optimum disposition of troous

is

is

"or

three

or.

enhanceo

oefore tne

effect is to increase the vulnerability

1VC

power

the oy

attack. of

the

surprised

surpriser's

vulnerability is

surprising

increased

by

the

ability to place fire unexpectedly and accurate-

third effect is to decrease

The

ly.

The

force.

That vulnerability

force.

pre-planning and

the vulnerability of is

through

decreased

pre-posit ioning of forces.

[Ref.

the

143]

The

values that are used in the QJMA calculations are as follows.

TA3LE 5e TACTICAL SURPRISE FACTORS [Ref. 144j PEGPYE

SURPRISER'S INHERENT MOBILITY CFARACT5PISTICS

CE

SURPRTSE COVPIETE

SUBSTANTIA! MINOR

The

surpriser's vulnerability

SURPRISED 'S VULNEPA3ILITY

5.0

0.4

3.8

3.0

e.e

1.3

0.9

total

1

algorithm

surprise using the ujma

into account the interaction of n"any factors. of

surprise is different for each battle. 52

includes lated.

in

takes

The influence

The QJ^A data

rattles in which the surprise effect was

The results are shown

.2

base

calcu-

the next Table.

TAPIR 57 CJVA rATA

3ASE VALUES FCP SURPRISE.

pepiol

NO.

AVERAGE VALUE CE SUFPFISI

OF CASES

i94e-iQe?

74

1.66

IS 73 WAP

18

2.23

177

There are two observations that can be made in tion

The first

Table 57.

to

indicate

surprise

that

battlefield.

has

that Eupuy's

is

significant

a

calculations

effect

observation is not surprising

That

but the degree of effect is surprising.

rela-

itself,

in

The average case of

battlefield surprise between 1940 and 196? resulted in thirds Increase in combat, power.

That large effect

two

d

provic.es

for the observations made in this thesis and suggest

support

Vhaley's data is,

that

the

on

observation

second

least,

at

roughly

accurate.

that the surprise effect

is

War wns 134 percent cf that of the earlier set of

technology

increased reduce

the

the

or

battiefielc in

was for earlier wars.

is

now

Dupuy

wc

1973

the

lb?3

rs.

The

did

The trend shewn by

effect o* surprise.

data is that surprise

in

The

not

Dupuy's

even more important now than n'aie

it

the following observation:

the last century there has not been a single change weapon s statistically technology with as great on war as the transition measurable irpact to rifled small arms in the and 1850s. 1840s The reasor. and that is, this is the principle weapon of w a r for always has been, ^ar Thus the nature o" warfare hi m self. has .sometimes dramatically, changed only in its details but always relatively slowly) as man adapts himself and his thinking to new weapons and new technology." (Kef. 145j "in

in

Tupuy's modern

do

weapons.

It

applicable

morer~ war

with

has reproduced the results of the

1973

rrodei

is

to

available in

1979

use by or in service to the Department of Tefer.se

cculd

October for

QJ^i

so.

War,

[Kef.

even though no other -^odel

146]

l?d

model provides the ability

QJMA

The

application of this thesis to include nod the principal weapon of war,

decision

human

The

requirement.

provide

criteria

Modern

eneny 's decisions

sirrilar.

That

Whaley's

data.

to

Modern sensors on

diffi-

rrore

mere channels that can be used

the enerv in order to iranipulate

of Whaley's data

results

and

the

the

.

Comparison data

to

is

military

decision

manipulate that

necessarily make deception

sensors allow

information

If man

war.

essential

an

combat advantage remains Valid.

a

send

to

to

the

the ability tc predict

regains

ability

the battlefield do net

cult.

then

em

extend

to

has

and results two

showr that the

produces

a

fair amount

Eupuy's

tc

are

sets

very

confidence

of

in

l

This thesis has kept very clcsp

provided by Vhaley with only one exception. the

is

in

"by

whether

necessary to examine

It

is

of

values to represent the results

this thesis.

used

in

exception

The valve

order to provide

in

the

selective

battle

biases

sere ef the

Tories

o

j"

scheme used in Tables 3b to 52 was a

quick

reference

number.

value scheme could be shifted along the nvmber line and represent the relative values of "V 4-", The

relative

battle

Vhaley.

average expected values presented

the

That

use o^ numbers to represent the value of the

outcomes recorded

choice

the data

to

weighting

of

"v",

the values can

V-" ce

expanding the differences between the outcomes.

1?9

,

That still

and

changed

"T"

.

by

TAELE. 58 OPTIONAL WEIGHTING SCHEMES

NAME

OPTION

V

V

V-

D

A

5

3

2

1

1

3

5

<-

1

-1

OPTION 2

C

5

3

1

-?

OPTION 3

TJ

5

1

-1

_

OPTION 4

F

10

_c

-1

THESIS SCHEME

OPTION

The

linear

different

shifts

weighting

of

Selective

outcomes.

analysis using the different weighting scherres will

whether

the

results

weighting) scheme.

sensitive to the

are

0!

non-

options include both linear and

the

in

e>

indicate

choice

the

of

Table 11 was chosen for the analysis as

with the largest number of factors

was

the ..able

the

expected values were calculated.

A

fcr

it

wnich

comparison was Te:

2

among the five weighting schemes. T^BIE 69 COMPARISON OF WEIGHTING

MOIE

PA IP

SCI"F V IS

NO.

PLACE-STYLE PIACF-STHINGTF TIME-STYLE

19

TIME-STP.ENGTF

13

7 4

TIME-INTENTION e TIME-PLACE 18 7 STEENGTF-STYII INTENSION-STYLE 2 INTENTION-PLACE INTENT ION -STRENGTH c:

3.14 •7

rxK

3.0 2.92 2.83 2.72 2.71 2.e 2.4 2.3

2.71 2.68

7.71 2.6b

2. 5

2.6 2.54

2.54 2.33 2.11 2.14 2./ 1.8 1.67

180

2.14 2.0

1.286 1.105 1.0 2.85 0.67 0.22 0.43 0.0

1.8

0.2

1.57

0.33

2 .0

0.71 0.2 63 0.? -0 38 .

-0.83 -1.39 -1 .43

-2.6 -3.0 -3.33

Table sults

59 can be used

to

show

re-

values.

is demonstrated by the relative ordering of

the

That ordering Terrains essentially unchanged ever

rrode

pairs.

the

five sets of weighting options.

pair

The rrode

"TiTe-

tendency to drop slightly below the

rrode

"strength-Style" as emphasis is placed on the "r"

out-

does have

Place"

a

The difference is not signif leant

come.

Strength" schemes that

analysis

the

not sensitive to changes in the weighted

are

Sensitivity

pair

that,

"Time-Style"

and B

and

cannot

C

are used.

be

.

Code pairs "Ti^e-

places

change

weighting

wnen

The difference is only 0.04

considered significant.

The rest

of

arc the

relative rankings remained unchanged as follows:

TAiLE 60 "OIE PAlP RANKING 3Y WEIGHTING OPTION

RANKING

FRO!"

FIGEEST VALUE TO LOWEST (BY OPTION)

MOEE PAIR

P

3

PLACE-STYLE FLACE-STRENGTE TIME-STYLE TIME-STRENGTF TIME-INTENTION TIME-PLACE STHENGTE-STYLE INTENT I ON -PLACE INTENTICN-STRH'GTF

1

1

1

2

2 3

c

Sensitivity Table does

in

not

3 4 5

3 5 ?

S

? 8 9

analysis

6 8

6 5 7 8

9

9

will

re

applied

order to confirir that the choice of bias the analysis.

to

3

3 4

6

c

f>

e

? 8 c

? 8 G

one

value

more systerr

Table 58 was used tc calculate

the following results for the options:

181

TABLE 61 EFFECT OF WARNING SHOWN BY WEIGHTING OPTION

EXPECTED VALUE BY WEIGHTING OPTION NO.

A

E

1

NO WARNING

25

3.0

2.64

2.59

1

WARNING GIVFN

22

2.84

2.28

2. If

C

NO WARNING

4e

2.125

1.25

1

C

WARNING GIVFN

1.54

s

The three weighting options the

associated with

value

sarre

because

irrportHnt

.0

0.56

shewn in Tdtle 61 all hod

"V+"

ant

"v".

the intent cf the original

tafcle

This

is

was

to

show the effect of warning and surprise en the achievement cf the

"Clear

Options

Victory"

dnd

B

C

outcoire

with

value

its

being

3.0.

retain the Sdme order of decreasing value for

the

four different

the

results

This supports the idea that

situations.

choice

are not sensitive to the

of

weighting

a

weighting

scherre. is

It

that

scherre

possible to

possible,

do

it

without introducing

Different are

but

Table.

Trp

devise

a

This

is

r&y

rr

iu

:

important

that warning given

182

It

oc

is

T

bias that accentuates

totally obvious

tnere are only two first

a

rr

a nner.

options do change the scale

represented.

visible,

to

changes the order of the outcorres.

the effect of defeat in

that

of course.

some

o

?

the

mnbers

trends

rore

issues shown in to

the e^ery has

the a

.

negative

with

associated expected senting

positive

list B cases has a

valve should these

second is that the surprise

The

irrpact.

oe

viewed as

a

means of easily

is

Tne

impact.

repre-

means

rather than as an accurate

trends

that

of

anticipating future outcomes. good data than was expected.

The

^ro^ numerous points of analysis and

the

There was much data

was looked at

rrcre

results were consistent.

Analysis of tne data was dene

in

«

cautious manner that should have reduced the effects of bias. The magnitude the

o+*

consistency

the analysis

the differences in of the differences

establish

results the

and

author's

confidence that the data is representative. The

history two

consistency

between

the results

of

analysis and tne theoretical analysis is

analysis

approaches

to

the

complementary

lei

deception

the

-ase

hi.--h.

The

process

are

VII.

analysis and the case history

theoretical

The

CONCLUSIONS

The first conclusion is that

support three train conclusions.

deception

has played a dominant role in

century.

The

conclusion

second

continue to play

an

analysis

is

the

tattles of

this

that

deception

will

important part in future wars.

The third

conclusion is that optimal deception practices can be identicased

fied

analysis

en the

theoretical analysis

and

.

I*PCETANC? OF PAST USF OF DECEPTION

A.

The

cated

history analysis section of this thesis

case the

positive

effect that deception has

casualties,

territory

increasing force effectiveness, exchanged.

goal.

The goal

Operational

successful deception,

for deception

deception has

but

In

general,

the

reducing

i c-

it

r

ne

Surprise

surprise.

not

the

the operations! advantage.

is

oee^ important throughout 'J

beer summarized earlier and do not ^eed

detail.

cr.

increasing

end

period covered by the case history analysis.

have

indi-

The primary element that produced

operational advantages was the elerent of is a byproduct of a

had

producing victory,

following evaluation criteria:

in

empirical

the

the advantages

tary deception that were shown in the strategic deception advantages

184

this

of

tc

h.e

oe

advantages repeated

operational mili-

thesis are similar

shown

by

the

Barton

V ha ley.

to

operational advantages of deception

The

through analysis of each evaluation criterion. teria are measures of effectiveness.

producing ability

victory,

cevelcped

were

The four cri-

Three of the criteria,

reducing casualties,

increasing the

and

gain or hold ground are the same as the

to

measures

of effectiveness used by Colonel Eupuy and EIRO associates

the quantifying of battle outcomes

surprise

variable factors used

combat power ratio in the OJMA base included 34 cases

data

in

model

Table 57 was

a

verifies

number

is comparable

Dupuy to [Ref.

1

modify

48 J

to

tne

Tne CJm*A

.

between 1943 and 1967 for

which

The average result shewn

surprise effect was calculated.

the

by

fourtn

The

147].

increasing force effectiveness,

criterion, the

[?.ef.

in

two-thirds increase in combat yc^er the importance of past use

a*

That

.

deception

by

offense.

the

It

not possible to conclude that deception done

is

defense

as

is

important as deception done for

There are indications that there

are

conclusion

not

it

may

be

by

offense.

the

even more important,

enough historical examples

to

the

support

but

any

.

FUTURE IMPORTANCE 01 OPERATIONAL II'CSPTION

3.

war was not covered

Modern

in

tne

case history analysis.

This

thesis projects the importance

wars

using tne postulate that human nature ice^ not

af

deception

ir

future change.

War is fought by men who control and direct machines not only by

machines

.

165

already teen pointed out that the QJ^A analysis of

It has

effect in the 1973 war was 134 percent

surprise

the

the same effect for the Tupuy set

than

and 1967.

wars between

of

1940

The relationship betwen surprise and deception at

the operational level has been established.

deception should

is that

larger

be

conclusion

The

even more important in

rr.od.ern

war

the past.

than it has been in

OFTIMAL riCIPTTON PFACTICFS

C.

Chapter

listed

II

with

associated

and confirmation;

the target; 1

and

(3) (5)

adaptability;

be

(2)

(1)

plausibility

predispositions of

initiative.

iOoMindti

planning and precise execution

on

successful

a

deception

Deception requires

happen by accident.

not

(4)

first conclusion is that

The

could

operations:

and coordination;

Sfc.recy^ CrgdnizaXicrij. sHi



does

deception

successful

organization,

secrecy,

which

categories

+'ive

detailed

.

The case history analysis confirmed that secrecy must

Allowing the enemy

he rramtained. a

levels

two

necessary is

There one

become warned

disadvantage whether surprise is achievea or

are

it

to

to

o

p

secrecy that

necessary

rare

should be.

tie

not.

maintained.

There It

is

protect the security of the operations plan and to

is no general is

trust

produces

protect the security of rv

le at

the

deception.

tne operational level that

important than the other,

The operations plan

is

lee

but

perhaDS

the critical one.

Says there

Organization executed

is necessary if the deception is

Organization reauires

as it was planned.

personnel

sufficient knowledge about

with

portray

the

several

units

false.

there

execution guidance.

When deception is

to

assigned

io

provide

requirement to

a

trained

tasking

the

tasks are

be

to

detailed

The best forr of execution guidance

i

c

probably the deception implementation schedule because it can enough tc answer the who,

be detailed

how

what, when, where, and

deception task is to be accompllsne

the

rrentation schedule can also

be used

to

The

lrrrle-

coordinate the

decep-

tion plan with the operation plan.

There support

is

unit

and coordination.

II.

trained,

in

[Ref

.

and

impersonation

fcy

Troops

Special

Army unit pur-

The unit conducted

14SJ

the European Theatre

1944 tc June 194£ using raoic deception, tion,

secrecy,

and equipped specifically for the

operations

deception

strong

The example is provided

That unit was the only U.S.

poses of tactical deception. 21

needs

history of the 23rd Headquarters,

during World War

activated,

deception

the conclusion that

for

organization, the

example which provides

one excellent

iecoys,

of other units

conclusion for the need for organization,

from

June

scnic recep-

[Ref.

150].

coordination,

The and

secrecy can be evaiuatea against the lessons learned from the

operations cf the 23rd Headquarters. The

Tactical Operations

Proving Ground,

Analysis

Office,

published Interir Note Number

18?

-11

Aberdeen which rede

the following

summary as an evaluation of that unit:

"There were three principle lessens which the 23rd Headquarters learned regarding their employment of tactical deception. First, there was a need for close coordination "between the 23rd Headquarters and all real involved in a deception operation. Second, troops c deception operation must be thoroughly planned to the Third, it is* necessary to insure authenticity last detail. The false picture that presented in a deception operation. to enemy intelligence must appear completely authentic and Lack- of close coordination ^s plausible in every aspect. responsible for the failure of the 23rd Headquarters earlier missions." [Hef. 151] i%

conclusion

The

though

were

there

stated

the report

of

instances where

the

"Even

that,

Headquarters

23rd

failed to accomplish their mission, due to poor intelligence. or

incomplete security measures,

such

forces not

failure leading to

a

152].

[Pef.

That is

defeat

military

a a

fairly interesting conclusion,

organi-

because it addresses what happens if the decep-

but

tion fails.

If

the deception fails,

not necessarily

it does

tell the enerry anything that helps him is

of

friendly

just because it supports the need for secrecv and

zation,

what

one occasion

there is not

The enemy rev

ow

real, but he still does not enev what to do cbout

not

it.

There

one further point that can

is

the

deception plan

23rd

Fecdquarters

the

U.S.

the

France,

15th

'roir I

about

which provides an example of what can happen if

coordination

assist

made

oe

21

anK

is

not compared

to

operations

the

provided three forces in Ill

3

deception

Corps' attccK on the port

through 2V August 1944. Patt.alion

in

the crEa of

ley

plan.

of

to

Ire-:,

Force "X" simulated the

9th

Infantry

deception

of

n vision.

2Sth Infantry

Pegiment,

the S-2 of the 9th

that

in

the enemy installed from

that

the "X" operation.

after

Force

2
to

"x" did

Regiment

reported

anti-tank

more

52"

good job

a

guns

"x" deceived

Unfortunately,

the

enemy into "believing that the tanks were going to attack from

where

exactly

Company

they did.

709th Tank

C,

Eatlaien,

attacked directly in the face of the reinforced German tank defenses. 2

153]

Plausibility and Confirmation

«

plan and the deception plan

operation

The

must

enough so that the essential forces of the

different tion

[Ref.

protected,

are

similar

they must re

but

sensors

he searching for

will

requirements

tc

The enemy

indications of the real plan.

They are directed by the

sensors do not search blindly.

collection

be

opera-

enough

support enemy collection of the deception signals.

The

anti-

which are basea on whet

the

enemy

thinks the real plan will be. The

enemy

wilL

De

able

options that are not prcbahle.

consider

eliminate

ari

but would

olausifcle

to

used in

the

seriously

rot

armored brigade

swampy terrain with no existing roads.

seer

be

of

a

massive

The enemy would also hesitate to accept

deception story involving

be possible,

many

The enemy would

untrained troops would

that

airmobile operation. a

to

attack

over

Such operations

Tight

rarely be attempted.

They would

the enemy.

They would not not

seem

plausible to the friendly commander end staff, as veil.

139

very

consideration in deciding whether

important

An

the

will accept the plausiblity of the deceptior story

eneiry

is

determining whether the deception plan might be acceptable as A variant

the real plan. the

plan might make an excellent

operations

deception. might

choice

easily convinced that the logic of

for

the discarded option

commander

's-

the "skein of

is

presented

course of action briefing coe« share

proportion of common features.

large

a

for the deception plan.

truth"

not need to

Those features

portrayed.

opera-

involve

tion

[Tay

real

forces conducting real operations which just happen

features

could

excessive fect.

he

danger,

The

be

deception

the

'or

Security

story.

relaxed if doing but

even normal

enemy can ne expected

indicators of such activity. tion

at

The common features establish

features common to the deception and the

The

taken

be

sufficiently different

is

from the operations plan as each option that

support

a

operatic

the

Cdre would have to

the deception choice.

to insure that

the

options for

The enemy does not have perfect intelligence and

be

requires

of one o^ the discarded

for

does

so

the rot

security will not to

irtercept many

to

common

produce be

per-

n-

the

Providing an alternate explana-

the activity should help protect

the

security of the

operations plan. The

critical aspects of the ouerations plan rust

provided increased security so that con not

presented

to

the enemy.

t

ra

H

ne

ictory signals are

The critical aspects

of

the

^

deception [ranner

plan need

be presented

to

allows the signals tc

that

The number of

sources that con-firm

of the sources are both important

credible sensors in

to

the credibility

fact and

and thej

r

effects interact.

Knowledge of what the enemy will accept as

plausible

what degree of conf irmati-on is necessary before he

and

believe

fact

a

is

firm requirement for

a

Knowledge

a

a

supporting.

rrutually

oe a

e

will

successful decep-

the enemy organization

key

to

prediction of how the enemy will react to the information

he

tion.

a

it

can

be

enemy will tend

the

details that do not 3

.

changes.

The

must

deception

normally

it

nt er

change

as

1

pret

r.he

situation:

deception

(

1

There )

begins before

may oe impossible

cire

it

a t

the

real

support

the

of

the

tc

the

three options available in

s 'cii

ir.

(

least produces

)

continue

T

h

sere ambiguity,

adapt the deception tc support the new

191

pert,

contradictory

abandon the deception,

and hope that

reality

operation is changed after the

would prooasly De

truth"

deception signals.

(?)

c i

n

The signals that were

criminal deception plan. of

be a Die to

If the real

has started,

deception

or

ignore or

confirming

by

"it.

deception

operation begins.

a

to

As

AdaptaMLi tjr The

"skein

real,

commander.

false conception builds and is supported

signals,

oe

combined with deceptive information to produce

plausible but false picture for the enemy

the

the

is

Much of the information he receives will

receives. but

of

reality

'

the pew operation. be the most

ability

deception

analysis

to

obvious that the thira option would It

would also be the

adapt

a

difficult.

rrost

deception might

require

signals nave more than one possible

The desired

tion.

is

beneficial.

The the

It

that

explana-

explanation would evolve from the enemy's

the composite set

An

adaptable

conclusion of this thesis is that it is

necessary

of

signals.

of

deception story might become very complex. A

to

at

tion.

least plan to execute an adaptable deceotion is

It

necessary because of the systems theory applica-

bility to deception. changes.

that

ment can change.

It

is

not

just the friendly

The enemy situation and the overall environ-

The simple deception plan that has

receive confirmation.

That Fay

be acceptable

to

ambiguity producing deception but not to maintain ng

deception.

type

situation

only one

may deviate from the system reality tec

explanation

i

opera-

The

misleading

type

soon

tc

maintain

an

rislead-

a

deception

is

considered the optimal choice.

adaptable deception requires the ability

Ar to

The

change and also requires knowledge about when

ability

to

react to change is

execution flexibility. needed is

a

a

to

to

rea:t ree»*t.

function of planning

The ability to know when

a

or.d

change is

function of coordination arc intelligence.

Flexibility

in

deception

planning

requires

"li^

Picture" knowledge o^ what is really happening on the Battlefield.

That experience and expertise is not

available under

the

present

officer

usually

is

at division level where

system

coordinating staff officer

a

the

G3 plans section.

was

authorized

pertise,

Even if

and trained

to

a

the necessary

formed to the "3ig Picture" level. be provided by

guidance

a

which

working

Thus,

level an

of

ex-

element

in-

the expertise

trained deception officer or staff, cotres

frcrr

in

deception planning section

would be difficult to Keep such

it

deception

the

;:ou.ld

but

the

knowledge end experience rust

be

found elsewhere.

Execution flexibility requires positive control the

Positive control is not

execution forces.

Communications

easily.

corrrrander

is

operation

deception command

An

might

deception

might

operations

officer

as

having

considered as

It

is

similar

river-crossing

a

conceivable that an ad-hec

necessary

be

is

implement

to

is

staff responsibility.

a

responsible for

plan is well coordinated.

coordination adapt

^dantarle

An

compie:

2

.

Coordination

deception

be

A

ad-hoc command headquarters is established

river-crossing operation.

headquarters

intended.

the Jod done right.

get

to

control problems as these for

and

operation. a

needed

insure that

to

were

measures are executed as they

deception

established

are required to insure that changes

Controls are necessary

can be made as needed.

over

be

It

insuring is

continuous if the deception

reality changes.

The division that

mat

necessarv is

required

The necessary information

193

the

to

about

.

friendly

forces

the environment is

and

division headquarters ard

must

it

available

the

at

readily available to tne

be

Without that information, they could not

deception planners.

know what to change or what

forces might be endangered by the

change The ability to know when

change is needed

a

function of intelligence about the enemy.

gence

must provide feedback on what

why.

The

feedback from the enemy

doing

indicate which deception measures are working and

are

not.

know

as

manner

planned

or

sc

that

interpreted the

so

the deception

that

produce the desired effect

require

enemy force,

it

signals

execution can

the execution can

continue

modified

be

z^

.

to

react.

for example,

A

enemy

different tailoring of

r

t

e

might ruin the chances for decep-

success in one area while generating new

tion

the

in

Those changes can ir-valid^te the decep-

part of the system. or

which

can also indicate changes in the

Intelligence

tion

and

Feedback is necessary if the deception planner is if the enemy has

desired

a

plarner

the deception

con

to

also

Friendly intelli-

the enemy is to

is

opportunities

in another area.

£l££pncep.tions

-•

The

theoretical

analysis

aid

tne

case

history

analysis

strongly agree on tne need for the deception tc

base^

on

the preconceptions of the

forms

a

target.

preconception about what will happen

194

An is

enemy

he

which

predisposed

to act

in a

certain manner.

predispositions

A

deception which pleys on

the target will

of

successful more

be

one which requires the target to

than

the

often

change his mind or

go

against his predispositions. are essentially three situations prior to

There

(1)

enemy's estimation of the situation may

The

battle.

been correct,

been wrong,

(2)

or (3)

the

have:

been ambiguous.

The

may not know for sure if his conception of reality

enemy

correct,

but

he

if

has formec.

a

firm conception

is

will

it

influence his battle planning and his intelligence collection requirements.

preconceptions

The

will also oias

processes and reports intelligence and will

enerry

en*

the

bias

the

commander's decisions.

view

of the deception planner

confirm redl

situation is the worst

first

The

his hypothesis.

operation

the

because the enerry

execution of which will

a

more Salient

true hypo the

with

c

i c

.

t:

the -lues

The deception must pre-

This may require initiating the 'he

a

the

deception

deception mvst

the enemy into considering that he has made in his analysis.

provide

fdlse hypothesis while discrediting

strong and obviov. s evidence

zf

expects

The enemy correctly diagnosed

which confirm the enemy hypothesis. sent

^rom the point

she

serious mistake

The deception must grab the ereTy's atten-

tion and provide supporting evidence to keej his attention.

The

would

neceipt

probably

of

defeat

contrary evidence the deception.

195

at

This

-re

lire

demands

that

the

s

:

security

strict

rraintained,

the real operation would

for

which

would

against

goes

probably would have it

to

that security will never be perfect.

tut

tion Fight or right not work to change

reception

have

rind,

predispositions

target's

a

Decep-

target's

the

better chance 10 produce arbiguity than

a

to produce a hypothesis change.

There

is

great deal of threat

a

involved

when

expects the friendly operation to proceed in the

enerry

banner

be

which it is actually planned.

in

the

same

would seer more

It

prudent to change that operation than it would be

take the

to

chance that deception would protect it. The

second possible outcome of the enerry's

that he had for/red the wrong conception.

of the situation was

That can i

situation for deception.

the ideal

is

designed to ^eed the enemy with

be

nf orrat ion

support

to

his

rr

i

of the deception operation

will

accepted

exactly

be attended to or

the

The

.

and the

true indicators supporting

rray

be

misinterpreted

to

ni^ht cc^rrci

operation

true

The contrary evidence that will

hypothesis. net

as

deception

The

spercept i en

features be

estirate

t :^e

f^i^e

received ray

oe

fit

the

false

hypot hesis. The

situation

ir

which the enemy remains

of ar biguous conception has ra ny possibilities

The

enerry has

plausible This

not

f

hypothesi

provides

a

erred c

a

preconception

as valid

great

as

19

;

a

state

for deception.

s^.d

ray

long as it

is

flexibility

deal of

in

in

^tent

any

confirmed. deception

planning

is essentially the

and

same as the case

which

in

intelligence cannot verify anything about the enemy's preconceptions.

The

cannot

enerry

efficiently

as

be

because there is less inf crmat ion available. is a better chance to keep the

targeted seem

would

It

that

there

than

there is tc convince him tc accept the deception story.

That

is

not

a

bad situation.

ambiguous

ene-ny

The enemy who is not

sure

the friendly disposition or intentions will normally

forces is

that are kept

clarified.

reserve

in

to

of

require

react once the

situation

enemy

ambiguous

The deception may keep

the

past the time needed to effectively commit these forces.

preconceptions

The

of the enemy predispose

Those decisions and actions c: j the

initial preconceptions.

key factor in the success of the deception.

formed

a

preconception, deception can

precorception,

intelligence

to

it

find out what

That is

chanr°s.

the

is

a

If

be

used

responsibility it

tne

enemy

'.



help him

to

Once the enemy has formed

form one that is easier to target. a

to

decisions and take actions that are consistent with his

make

not

him

is and

difficult task tut

of

friend

Keep track

cf

it

is

one that

used if there

is

no

is

..

nry not

impossible.

Initiative

5-

reception to use

part ^orcp.

re

There is ro opportunity

it.

of

cannot

the

The

force that is totally force

that

is

to

use deception

controlled

totally controlled is

197

opportunity

hy

o n

tne

another one

that

allows

enemy

its

and

act

to

just

than

reacts

tc

the

situation. The initiative is the ability to act.

little

to

between

with the relative force sizes or the difference

do

offense and the

the

held

norrr.ally

defense.

the superior force because

by

options

rrany

ncrrrally

defense

the

needs the inherent

it

mobility.

offense

The

superior

the

force

that

is

The inferior force is usually en

The defense provides

defense. of

as

is

The superior force

superior

and it is the

the offense.

on

initiative

The

force usually has the do.Tinant position. has

Initiative has

advantages

fewer opticas due

rore

has

the its lac'.

tc

options

that

=re

available but does not necessarily control the initiative. An Team

exarrple

Spirit

Pivisior.

of

defense having the initiative

conducted

exercise

S2

division

The

corrrrar

Alexander

I*.

Weyand,

directed

to

be

on

by

phase lines.

established

der

,

by

the

2btfc

who

was

"
had very few opticas.

Ms

is

Infantry

-"

General

division

the defense and the exercise scenario

The division was

a

very

little chance that the e^eny could oe surprised

rodes

cf

however, his

place, was

time,

a

given period cf time.

or strength.

A

wa

s

was

reouired

delay

fiven distance in

the

Tnere was

passive

not in line with toeyand's style and

in

the

defense, it

was not

intention. The deception nlan was simply thaT

Tivision

was

the c*th

willing to trade spece for Tire

193

in

Infantry en

effort

to reduce casualties

being

elsewhere

won

both sides.

en

there was little

so

the enemy in the modes of style aid

surprise

The

^cal was to set up

the

lead

intention.

"luring" defense which

a

enemy forces at

time when the 25th Division

a

The style was that the defense would

tenacious

was

fire.

become ferccicus

the delay had reached the area

once

trap

would

thought to he most vulnerable to direct and indirect

and

costly

for

need

The deception was cesig r.Pd

combat when.it could te avoided. to

Essentially, the war was

retrograde river-crossing under enemy pressure.

,n

tne

of

inten-

.ie

reinforced

battalion

tdSK forces which were tc errerge from hiding at the

critical

was to spring

tion

The

hour.

a

desired

trap using several

operational advantage was

surprise attach against the flanks or rear battalions.

The

enemy

tne

fires against the vulnerable

enemy

crossing the river would

of

be

The operation was

a

units

denied.

complete success.

The e^emy lead

The majority of

decimated.

forces

were

forces

were able to nrcss the river without enemy

The stay-behind forces were able

river

ccrrplete

long

enough

to

were adequate to support the withdrawal

forces

e^

they suffered

only

o

r

the defense.

for

a

of

tne

pressure.

the

fror

divisio."

Covering

few casualties.

199

Tivisicr

keen the enemy cway

for the rest

its preparations

the 25tr

Df

trapped

The enemy attack was stalled and the

easy victory.

a

leal

were overextended and overconfident after the day c

units

the

fron

be

to

to

fi^es

stay-behind [?ef.

154J

.

25th Ei vision plan was risky.

The forces

stay-behind

The

easily have been cut off from the rest of

could

division and destroyed or captured.

the

risk was worth

The

The key to the success was that the initiative could

it.

taken

be

by the defense.

L

IMEGFATION

01 THE OPERATIONS

PLAN

THZ INCEPTION FLAN

ANT.

The Tear Spirit 82 deception operation ^y the 25th Infantry

Pivision

The

type and

used

to

two nlans Fust

deception is to The

be

support

of the operations plan

integration needed.

can

be

and,

conclusion

the

that

the deception plan

be mutually

supporting

optimized.

the situation was

generate

forces.

produce

to

explanation I

the

f

such thct deception had to succeed

was no chance tnat the deception could

There

alternate

ambiguity as there for the actions

was the

of

de-

plausible

no

stay-behind

enemy located those forces once

bad

they

entered their "hiding" positions, the operation would n«

ve

to

changed.

Security

for

the

deception plan

security measures were strict. and

the

if

25th livision's deception plan w^s of the misleading

totally.

be

is

planning

commander

and

commander

used

one-on-one

so

essential.

was

initial coordination

First,

for the deception was limited to the a

few selected

staff officers

late-night sessions which that

security

could

be

division c i

were

vi

si on

essentially

rrai n ta i n.ed

commander gave specific guidance to tne rest of the

2-62,

The

The

planning

staff

that the bcdy of the real plan would

so

with the deception.

[Ref.

155]

deception officer worked as

The

This insured

section.

a

member

operations

coordinating provided

plan

was

the focus

operation's

the

rr

ap

The deception

overlay

process.

This

never put

plan was

order

in

teams to check the security of all

insure

the

of

maintain

to

The deception officer directed the corn terin telli-

security.

gence

attention

of

which the deception officer interfaced

by

with the rest of the staff. on

The map overlay for

planning

staff throughout the

the rreans

S3 plans

the

c+'

that the deception rreasures were dene

in coordination with the operations plan.

the

compatible

be

only the information

that

sections

staff

that was

necessary would

All planning a~eas

to

be

displayed

on

guarded.

Planning papers and overlays were secure: when not

in use.

[Fef.

similar maps.

annex

security

deception

security for

annex was specific,

the routine aspects

annex

itself

was

addressed only the cover plan the

division.

It

fcr

of

the

part of the "or

but

after

It.

a

be

order. it

was nope''

The as

it

&ey personnel

markings that

deception might be satisfied with that

201

The

addressed

deception

bumper

the

deception

operation.

the urits and

also addressed

provided instructions for sawe. looking

emphasized

were published os part of the operations

operations

of

re

An operations security and

was completed.

plan

to

156]

reasures continued to

Security

had

and

the enemv

part

of

These actions were in accordance

deception.

the

corps' deception plan.

was written ty the deception officer, by d

personnel

cleared

for

prepared and reproduced

appropriate

the

security,

separately from the operations order on

isserrina ted

the

The actual deception plan

15?]

[P.ef.

with

and

strict,

a

need-to-know basis [Fef. 158]. There were few soldiers who needed deception

the

other

than unit

the

stay-behind

they could reveal little

information

identifications and the ^aot that the

was not defending in its norrral manner.

sion

combat

units were withdrawing by phase lines

decisively confirmed

engaged.

This

was done for

to

stay-behind

observed

positions

by

Once

the enemy.

were eliminate^.

i:he

Organization

the

being

reasons".

It

enemy

the

the

by

the

disappear

for the deception

camouflaged

their

Signals from

va

cy

s

th

r

se

was

established usin- the where the

possisle.

commanders on

intention of the stay -be hind units strict discipline of the office

2?<2

without

IF.ql

[He

the delay was controlled

The

ground. tained

without

security at that point

command and control structure of

in

move.

to

essential and it was maintained,

style

fact,

The enemy had no opportuni-

forces were able to

positions they were not allowed

normal

divi-

keep track of the actual disposition of combat forces.

The bein^

In

two

deception story and it denied

the

receict of critical information. ty

know anything about

supporting the use of

plan

If captured,

forces.

to

was -s

which

"he the

mainO

Z

those

The corrbdt support forces involved

units secure.

in

the deception were organized under the operational control of

division

the

Officers in charge

staff.

forces,

those

of

however, did control the execution. The division intelligence officer,

Intelligence

forces. enerry

collection was done to Keep track

of

prisoners

ground surveillance,

and

were

Deceptive

rest cf the operation.

,

communi-

This was done

ordered.

!Ref.

jdrrrrinj

and manipulative

with the deception officer wno

coordination

providing

sections

signals intelligence were specific-

irritative corrrruni cations deception

deception

of

counterintelligence,

war,

of

throughout the operation.

tasked

cations

The

actions and intentions.

interrogation

ally

warfare

control over the intelligence and electronic

tional

the

02, ma in t dined opera-

close

in

controller

the

160J

The deception officer performed several functions Tor the G2

a

nd

did require additional equipment for the

The deception officer exercised

functions

of

psychological

operational control ever

electronic Warfare,

functions were combined

operations

operations

warfare in

operatic n.

(FSYOFS).

the

security,

and

four

The

order to insure that the deception

those force mul tipli ers

would

have

a

synergistic effect. The coordinated effort was established

in

support

the

provided

ty

planning process using phases which corresponded

operations schedules.

order sr^ detailed using specific

tc

the

implementation

.

Specific measures for jamming,

communications deception.

operations security were not really different from

and

It

rral.

was the timing of the signals and the content of the sent to the enemy which were designed

signals

nor-

support the

to

The primary value in having central direction of

deception.

the four functional areas was that contradictory sis-naif were

eliminated

in

the planning process.

[Ref.

161]

PSYOPS support to deception needs to be

explained

first goal of PSYOPS is to destroy the enemy's will Use of PSYOPS to support deception ness

the

of

can

The

.

to

fight.

degrade the effective-

overall PSYOPS program.

PSYOPS was

used

to

support the 2£th Division's deception only after the plan was

approved

The vulnerability of

the corps commander.

by

Eivision during the river-crossing operations Was

?5th

enough

justify

to

calculated

the

risk

to

the

high PSYOPS

the

operat ion

PSYOPS support to the deception involved drops

and

the use

theme

was

established

story.

The

designed

to

Eivision

two loudspeaker

of

leaflets

as

and

a

numerous leaflet

duplication

deception

the

of

the loudspeaker

broadcasts

provide clear and obvious evidence that

was

willing

to

trade space for time.

time

supported

?5th PSYOPS

provided

operations of the 25th Eivision up to the

that the trap was sprung.

deception

were

the

The

theme supportec the corps PSYOPS operation and also

explanation of the

PSYOPS

The

tean"b.

PSYOPS

It

as

2 a4

could

much

as

oe

argued

PSYOPS

that

the

supported

deception.

because

worked well

It

operation were planned together. The leaflets did not have

planned

scenario

["Ref.

fast

a

deception

the

and

162]

response time.

p~e-

A

used for tne first four days

was

the

tne

of

operation.

The leaflets were prepared in advance in several

varieties.

The

di sserrinat ion of the

thousands of

dene using the units conducting the delay.

was

operation,

additional

intelligence

content of

remained appropriate for the situation.

loudspeaker

The

officer before

on

a

were directed

teams

day-to-day basis.

first light

[Pef

a

activities and the normal FSYOPS

logs.

The

c

1 e

midnight

forward

briefing

ry

The

:ece:

a

review of

the

t.i

using

activity

4j

oord ira

t

ior

as

a

necessary

to

brief

adjacent units. [Pef.

requirements for the deception have been

continuous

addressed

tion plar.

deception

tne

by

Broadcasts were tasked

schedule and checked by

[Ref.

:

163]

.

broadcasts were based on current intelligence.

master

1

The voice res sages and vehicle uoise

the deception officer.

a

curr^"

leaflets

tne

The teams deployed

and returned for

Tie

I?uring

leaflets were designee: using the deception

that

so

leaflets

staff

the deception

function.

It

higher,

to

is

else

lower,

ana

This was acne for the 25th Ei vision's incep1651

Summarizing the deception, it can be seen tion plan was plausible.

It

was

a

;:iose

real option available to the division.

205

t-nat

tne decep-

variant of the only

The enemy was able

tc

confirm the deception plan because roughly 95 percent of

the

The deception was based on

the

deception

was real.

story

preconceptions

the enemy and

of

verified by intelligence.

preconceptions

these

The enerry remained predisposed

accept

tnat the division would continue tc traie

time.

The

indications

of that

communicat ions and was confirred

enemy

forward units.

by

defense.

E.

[Pef.

lost it tc

The

less

progressed.

"luring"

the

166]

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS reception

standing part

his

in

Those units reccire increasingly

the initiative but

had

to

for

the actions of

cautious and more overconfident as the operation

enemy

space

fact were observed

radio

The

\*ere

o ^

a

is

no

r

easy to plan.

complex process.

signals

must and

be

a

coherent

an

under-

enemy is an uncooperative

understood in order

project

requires

The enemy organization and

of that urocess.

systerr

Trie

It

the entire

control

to

deception

deception

story.

Furan

behavior cannot be predicted, but patterns of behavior can The prediction of those enemy

predicted.

requires an understanding

of

the

nature

oe

behavior patterns of

deception

the

process and the decision-making process. The tions of

estimate of the situation establishes the preconcepa

force.

of a

matrix game,

the

estimate

of

The estimate is essentially

thus,

game theory is

the situation.

a

a

formulation

quantification

The payoff matrix

common link between decision theory and game theory.

206

is

of r

he

— payoff matrix can provide

The

measure of the worth

of

the difference in payoff between basing

an

intelligence

as

estimate

enemy

on

intentions.

capabilities authors

The

a

the

of

basing

and

it

on

emy

Operation*

Naval

took,

en

Analysis, put it this way:

"Knowledge of the opponent's plan can ce valuable there is no saddle-point in game 'This the matrix. intelligence allows a player to maximize against a single rather tnan .against his whole enery course of action If of happens Spectrum capabilities. it that tne intelligence is not sufficiently complete to identii\v a single course of action, but does eliminate certain of tne enemy strategies, these letter courses of action may oe Tne treated as dominated and discdried from the matrix. to use intelligence is enery of equivalent listing intentions instead of enemy capabilities. The value of intelligence is related to tne difference between tne ninimex and the maximin the smaller this difference, the less the intellige-.ee is worth." [P.ef. 167J if

The

payoff the to

value

tne change

made

tc

nor

that

increase his payoff with regard tc accomplishment

Deception advantage.

reduction of casualties, should

Surprise

ing the enery is net

advantage

deception

is

mission.

be is

designed

or

mutu

to

her efi

he

It

procure an

Attaining

a

operational

mt

insure that

surpris-

opera-

specific

goal which provides clarity helps

t

c

...

<

of

territory exchanged.

important to deception,

the goal. a

to

or

:o~

the deception

properly coordinated and integrated with the operations :

*.e

The superior force cormander can use rejec-

does not use it.

the mission,

-

The inferior force commander ccn use iecepticn tne enemy's oroper course of action so

counter

tional

in

is

matrix which is apparent to the deceiver but

target.

tion to

deception

of

the is

plan

Optimizing deception requires the establishment of securcoordination,

ity,

plausible and conf irma tie

The optimal deception

.

predispositions

target's

the

The deception rust

anc organization.

based on

is

adaptable

be

when

the

requires

the

modes of surprise and the intensity of surprise

are

situation

The

changes.

use

and

is

of

deception

initiative. The

ideas which provide

planning

reception

knowledge

measures

mod?3 it

It

o r

.

to

imagination to thinir

deception

tionally

are

that

a

deception story should

produce surprise in two rode; rather than

The

what

requires

It

measures

rule may be modified

be

one

in

certain Dperations where

in

right seer necessary to attempt tc gain

lee st

of

requires intelligence support to determine tne

thumb would be that

or more modes at

the

planning.

are optimal.

that,

rule

designed

determine

to

possible.

.

requires

work to successfully deceive tne enemy.

might

a

starting point for deception

a

surprise

three

in

order to insure trat surprise is achieved in

in

The

two rrodes.

critical

the

a

depend en how opera-

ec is ion would

deception

was

whether

on

anri

the

increased costs in Terms of deception assets *as acceptable. The

difference between coerationai deception

division and support

con c

brigade

recognized. com v dt

should

level operations and

lower

level

reception rea c ures to become

an

and.

tactical deception

operations support

cut erratic oart

,-_>

support

to

of

tne

must

to re

front line

tattle

tactics

The primary Treasures are signature reduction and false target

genera

ti or

.

Signature

reduction

OPSFC procedures already being impl emented should

tion

expanded to include

he

camouflage

must go beyond the

end

Signature reduc-

.

mil ti-spectral

signal

suppression and the avoidance of predictable patterns.

False

target generation should he supported by realistic and rugged

pieces

decoy equipment that can be quickly

of

front

soldiers to confuse

line

empldcea

target

enerry

cy

acquisition.

There are two prirary benefits that are expected from the use of

devices.

such

targets

Flank shots can

that maneuvers to engage

reception i

rvo lvemen

t

.

as an option?

has

a

te

rore

oroducen.

possible

and

place in modern war because not

It

is

it

must

fodern cost

set

be

against

uo

false target.

a

o

+>

the human

sufficient just to include deception supported.

r-ulti-spectral decoys,

target simulators, and intrusion devices need and

false

and the friendly 'nrces will be able to erfa e ,e

lucrative enerry targets. an enerry

waste munitions on

The enerry will

technology

ca^

be

to

rake

such

Continued efforts

e"fective.

signature reduction techniques,

developed

tc

devices

improve

camouflage, and obscurants is

necessary.

reception

rust

be made

The size of the dejeptior

level. rrost

forces

of

available

forcp

the deception re c sures can

am

r.eed

not

should

at re

be

soldiers assigned deception tasks on an ad -hoc oasis.

C

fc'b?

division large as done

ty

There

certain

however,

are,

specialized equipment trat

tasks and

will require training and maintenance. for

Periodic requirements

platoon sized deception force could be handled

a

as

a

unit tasking.

Deception assigned

planning

require that

fray

on a permanent

duty

that

forces

basis so that

become deception and counter-deception experts. is

G3 planning function.

a

Tay as

team

c

they

can

The function

Increased errphasis en

deception

require that the deception officer perform that function The officer should

single duty.

a

be

assisted

capable of maintaining deception

soldier

one

ry


files

least and

Cuantifiafcle measures of effectiveness are necessary.

possible

establish

to

evaluation.

tive

quantitative rating for

a

An example of

that is

Such

a

system mitrrt

[Hef.

1C8]

manner,

They

ray rrovide

analysis

cf

available

tc

If

deception.

provide

deception effectiveness,

a

applicable to the deception

be

base needed

data

Computer on-line

qualita-

of experimental

results are recorded in

process.

«

It

the .Handling quali-

ties Irating scale used for test pilot ratings

aircraft.

a

deception data base.

ccrrput eri zed

is

be

complete

for

algoithms

battlefield

scientific

c

might

become

indications

optimization measures,

a

n

~:

of

counter-

deception measures. A

quantifiable data base is ais^ necessary

tion of the deception effect

data

used in

frorr

this thesis provided

210

:"or

ctr.er effects. a

lot of cat a

the isola-

The or

-vhaiey

surprise

t

.

and deception, but it is only sufficient for an indication cf

Part of this thesis,

trends.

for

example,

tried

effectiveness effects from the deception

force

isolate

to

effect,

tut

the Wnaley data specified only the relative forces.

F~rce

is not merely forces multiplied

effectiveness

casualties.

That definition was used in tnis thesis.

by

There

are other parareters which combine tc define force effective-

more completely,

ness 'A'haley

lata.

effectiveness

Eupuy's in

a

out

they were not available

CJr'A

model does

much oetter manner.

account It

factors

affecting

those factors might QJP.A

outcomes and the

roT

the

force

for

is possible

additional research applied tc the esses in the tion nata base might allow the Eupuy model to

n .

be

r,

.'h

=

ley

that

decep-

used.

interaction

r

.ne

of

Da

tie

be

more specifically identified usln.* the

algorithm

11

t

HJCOMMENMTICNS

VIII.

There are three recommendations that will

recommendation

first

theory

"alternative

of

decision-making

executed

at

structure.

the

The

as

to

The

/-ha

how deception can

reoorrrencat ion

is

planned

re

existing

the

a

^nc

force

additional

that

is

ley's

existing

its

second recommendation

The

division level using third

Army adopt

within

objectives"

process.

proposal

concept

the U.S.

is that

made.

be

analysis of operational deception should be done.

A.

AITFFNATIVE OBJECTIVES MODEL T?u,

Sun

advised

in

the

FOT?

OPERATIONS

great military expert of

The Art of

his tcok,

ancient "the

that,

^e.r,

without ascertainable s::n:e.

o^e's troops is tc

Then

most penetrating soies cannot pry in ror

the

wise lay plans agcinst you."

\?ef.

The author of this thesis of "the shape of the

the

loccition,

enemy

believes that Sun Tzu's concept

enery" is the Seme ds the rodern icei

function,

size,

the

intentions ds well

battlefield"

and n

c

a*)*

it

movement.

is

ilea

?f

is

to

sorted

by

The pattern

th.-=>t

provides composite information

capabilities.

requires

Tne

The enemy force

^orces.

develops is the "shape' on

the

;a n

1C9J

needing to he able to "see the battlefield." locate

irate in

*il

disposing

he

China,

the

existing enemy situation, analyze

cl2

ability it

Eeing dble to

to

perceive

according tc

es

T

nfcl:'

see the ><

I

stereotypes,

project the future situation teased on

and

the

present one.

fundamental

The

applicable

remain

military

war

modern

to

proposed

ideas

and,

military

many

in

these

his aphorisms have become cs familiar as

circles,

Tzu

Sun

by

of

Clausevitz. The

logical ideals of Clausevitz are exempli

principle

of

"the objective."

is

3arton

tfhaley

observed

battles a

si

n

single objective cr goal

Bef. '170]

The

Army has designed

rrocess in such

a

way as to insure that

r

author

of

this thesis contends

single course of action provides shope

Is

their direction,

identified

also

forces

ve ry

complex The

have

and

executing

that

provide

the

combat

The location

enemy

a

an::

chance

tc

a

a

force.

The shape

support

activity to

shape even

"see i*"

of

the it

is

.

technical advances in b'attlefielc

mad<=

required.

their speed.

The enemy can observe this

battlefield.

single,

the

definite shape

by the actions of

combat service support units.

friendly

a

decision-

its

function cf the location and composition

a

combat forces, is

to

have

1914

oe

best course of action is chosen for the objective

The

key

Staff System in which all

that "most

been planned and launched with but

The

his

by

geared towards attaining the one common objective.

effort

making

ied

The objective is the

the Dlanning process of the General

in mind."

f

r.e r c p

otioo

of

the

reconnaissance

battlefield

ClO

possible.

may The

e

rroMlity

modern weapons is such that the enemy who

of

single friendly course of

ceives the obviousness of

a

will be able to interdict

it.

This the

alter

has proposed

thesis

enemy.

would use illusion to transform one shape

different

one.

additional

shape or shapes to keep the enemy from

recent ion seems to

wrong decisions.

the

effective

It

deceptions

re

1

method by which the shape of the single course

cf

oe

.

not seem prudent to assume

Joes

do

is what

question

preconception, situation,

wcrknMe

or

s

if

The optimal deceptions have

ho v. Id

be

done

i "

the

of

simply no plausible,

deception course of action to

be

very good asset

thdt

good

i f

it

a

those

e^ery.

the

The ic

a

214

be

~

a

serious, and v

inv

deception plan.

cor Let power multiplier.

cannot

r

-nerry

is iVd liable.

conducted without

reception is termed as

'^eer

the enemy dies not

intelligence cannot ascertain

if there is

operations may have

a

deception

History has snewn thdt

based on the preconceptions

are

that

not always succeed end often they only prcdr.ee

small advantage.

not

has

and

will work for every operation.

Is

perceiving

4ii?X5§ll26 QhjectjLves ana Deception

!•

that

an

the obvious

action can be con oealed

a

a

orccuc3

deception would

have been achieved when the enemy

thdt

into

"his thesis has also shown the historical

correct one.

ddvrtntages

ambiguity

to

misleading

A

deception

the

action

that deception can re used

snape that is seen by the

An

per-

available f?r

It

every

The author of this thesis suggests thdt deception

operation. can

part of every operation if there is

be

a

change in

the

decision-making process to adopt the "alternative objectives" v haley.

concept originated by Liddell Hart did developed by

The thdt

choser

course of action.

essential to planning

A

however,

Continuously

is

is

d

it

is

evaluating alternatives

kept as

which right

reviewed

periodically rirds

of

alternat i ve plan

The battle

so

probahility change

more one of

re en

hr.vz

should

trie*',

tout

the

refresn

points

good

ce

the

c^

the

.

situation

rr

ay change enough curing the rour c

the alternative

that

success.

of

must

a

*'.

The author

slightly

during the operation to

planners

the

r c

The alternative plan should

working *ile.

a

nothing

-is

the options presented at the Course of Action he

Alternative

mine.

in

The alternative plan,

forrral.

repairs

realized that there is

function of command and control.

normal

the

tc

objective

suggesting that the orcjess be rade

only

simply

is

objective.

that

paths to the objective ere kept

That

-making

well defined

than ore way to achieve

nore

si on

continuously evdluate dlterndtives

staff

the

change in deci

suggested

made,

be

It

plan

i^^e-s

vnen

r

be

to

of

highest

the

see rs reasonable that

that change should

e

adopt

a

an

alternative that has teen carefully evaluated. Having

a

viable alternative plan

re

any in at

least

outline form would simplify decision-making under stress.

21

It

i

.

the detrimental effects

alleviate

would

Further,

perceptual Diases.

it

notion

the enemy

oy

alternative objectives

of

end

might reduce the chances of

having crisis decisions manipulated The

cognitive

of

new.

not

is

Barton Vhaley had studied Captain B.H. Liddell Hart's concept

"alternative

of

objectives" and noted

Joseph

Pierre

that

(1700-1780) had expressed the dictum ds fellows:

Jourcet

"Every plan of campaign ought to have several branches to have beer, so well thought out that one or other of the said branches cannot fail of success." f?ef. 171] and

idea

^he

"alternative objectives" is

o"

sased

preparing several courses of action for each plan. could

sold

be

on

one

course of action is implemented. up by a

to oppose

the

switch to It

a

contends can

be no

concept

insure

thesis

of

that

different

The eie^y that sets

thwarted

be

different course of action.

is

in

opposition

the objective."

the two need rot

The be

in

to

th.it

'alternative objectives

author of this

opposition,

there is no such question.

win

use

trie

alternative

must

thesis there

but

The

is.

qualified

ne

paths

to

concept

objectives

n

the same uLt irate objective.

are alternative courses

of action

21b

to

This section cf the

expressed by Fort dnd Vhaley to introduce the possibility dual

cf

the principle of

question ds to whdt the ultimate objective nf

itself

necessary to question wnether the concept

is

ntena nee

enemy

The

a

correct course of action could

"alternative objectives" rr-r

while

course of action

on

that lead

.ne

tc

the

paths

dual o d

1

sf

ec

1 1

ve

j

Alternative objectives" should apply to intermediate steps in the path to the ultimate objective.

changed

along

waiting in force along the path. to

around

go

obstacle.

an

enemy

because one finds the

way

the

The path can

I^any

tirres

obstacle than it would be

rray

it

be wiser

should not rratter as long as the end

It

be

tc

the

rerrove

tc

be

resul

1

:,

the ultimate objective, was satisfied.

One

aspect of the

[rod

is

el

that the staff would

more attention to alternative courses

believes result

the commanders are already doing

that

that

is

the corriranders

situation but the staffs cannot.

and

control" can implement

qualification

objectives"

(1)

be:

the r^ad junction,

to

forces.

mission.

(4)

The The

junction

idea

the

of

"alternative

and

lower

order

(2)

tr.at

destroy ail enemy forces in

i

r

dominates the area.

order to draw the

deceit

the enemy into voluntarily movine

higher

orcer objective is to

lower order objectives in

the

quickest

rray

time,

be

with

er e?

M

c

accomplish

the

secure

the

to

the

smallest

expenditure of ammunition, or with the fewest casualties.

17

re

The alternative

control the terrain

successfully attack elsewhere or

sta*f oeeos

The

particular road junction.

rt

objectives mieht

away,

"ccrrrand

eramole of the ultimate objective might

An

the securing of

road

plan rapidly.

there ray be higher

that

is

objectives.

(3)

Battlefield.

i n

odvance to react «s quickly.

in

A

a

The

this.

respond quickly to changes

the

to prepare

The author

action.

o f

cay

It

'

obvious

is

.

lower order objectives may impact

that

alternative objectives chosen

the commander

by

Other lover order objectives may be more A

may have

commander

lower order objective

a

An opposite rule would be to reinforce strength.

succeeding

is

priority

to

exploitation flanks

follow

allocates fighting power to reinforce

which

the commander would

then

is

Reinforcing

left.

the

path which

a

demands

that

The commander would

should never be left exposed. path

systematic.

One such rule is that flanks

he follow certain rules.

that

the

or.

weakness. If

continue

strength

disregards

a

the left

give

tc

achieve

to

threats

the

tc

.

"alternative

The

process

of

change

assumes

that

as

changes

anticipates them.

objectives" model is situation

the

changes

will be necessary

Sun Tzu put

in

a

.

any

continuous The

^ccti

plan

an

d

&s'

it

"Now an army may be likened water, to "or just as the heights and hastens flowing water avoids to the lowlands, so an ar^y avoids strength a^6 strikes weakness. And shapes its flow in accordance with the as water i t s accordance victory in ground, so an army manages with the situation of the enemy." [Ref. I 7 ?

The

duality that

the

deviation

use

of

deception is enhanced

planning mocel.

by

the use of

the

The most significant advantage

operation becomes

deception

a

bejorres an unexpected

eve

r

t.

in

itself.

Each choice of

is

v^.cn the

indirect

approach defies enerry analysis as each pnase of the

operation

rnay

have alternate objectives fror which the

objective cannot

re

determined.

213

**inal

The Operational Advantage of Alternative Piths

2.

A

of

sirple example will be use! tc clarify hew the idea

"alternative

otjectives"

operational advantage.

can

used

be

achieve

to

an

The situation is shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIVES SITUATION

FRIENDLY FORCES (ATTACKING) FORCE

enen:y fc^:is

(detent

A

OEJ

FORCE

1

CPJ 2

C

3

O'SJ

FORCE

B

friendly

The

division

committed bri£ade task forces,

shown in and

A

B,

figure with

force

tas.K

two

has

1

C

in

The ultimate objective o^ tne division is to seize

reserve.

physical objective as possible, at

m)

objective

but 3

<*•

is

The enemy is defending as

.

situation

is

objective

4

alternative

retain the dominant terrain

deterrrined to

and has positioned

division

friendly

The

its reserve

course

ground assault by

a

objective

3

which

objective

4

once

operation cannot

to

is

a" followed

be

airmobile

would allow "? it

had

219

a

to

arrived

implemented as

'"orce

for

r ~

and

1

"

of

a s

Tne

the enemy

The

2.

to

C

att^cK

successfully 3.

the

by

portion

at

Imp

there.

action

of

through intermediate objectives vAav.

far forward

airmobile is

at

3.

location of the enerry reserve is the key

The

operation.

succeed although force "a" will

will

plan

heavy casualties.

The

objective will

If

3

subjected

oe

can

used to advantage. at

3

blocking

a

about

importance

the

The enemy

least until he

rrake

observes

deception plan for the situation

alternative

snort

time

to

1

is

based on

the

dnd 2 is

a

u t.

diversion to drew

reserve away fror the ultimate ocjective which

at

tr.e

is

3.

airmobile operation will take place once the reserve has

rcved.

The

objective

rrission

c'

o

force

hold

tc

is

three combat forces participate in

communications Force

the airmobile

of

until relieved.

3

The

such

that

At

The deception story is

course of action.

attack on objectives

enerry

The

a

the

the right decision. The

the

will have only

enerry corrmander

the

of

commander

direction that "a" takes once it leaves objective 2. point,

to

the division plan will

and 4,

preconception

his reserve at

keep

2

enerry be

the division

the enerry reserve roves to

between objectives

position fail.

force stays at objective 3,

If that

the

to

deception

to

portray the

deception

undergoes the airmobile rehearsals

complex operation.

on objective

.?

in such

a

Aerinl

« s

f

'ie

c

story.

necessary

reconnaissance

way as it satis

needs of the planned operation

manipulative

the

is i

::

T

'or

centered ell

i

je r ce !

;

well.

The theoretical analysis of this thesis woulo suggest that

the

preconceptions

of the

enerry

commander

-all

be

reinforced

sufficiently

objective

is

reserve force will be kept out

the

cf

objective

at

is

4

The value of the deception

by the friendly division.

taken

reserves

enemy

the

will have to be withdrawn once

and

battle

That

3.

keep

to

that the enemy is not able to use his force effectively.

The value of "alternative objectives" is shewn if the

enemy

disregards the deception story and moves

force

tc

be

That reserve force

block the obvious attack.

again placed at

a

coordination,

is

disadvantage since the alternative plan can implemented.

immediately

reserve

his

allocation

and

necessary

The

airmobile

of

training,

assets

was

accomplished dS part of the portrayal of the deception story.

partial

generate executes

the alternative plan

in-mediate execution of

The

viable

a

^cre

surprise.

enemy

produces

which

plan

importantly,

1

s

faced with two choices.

force to attempt to regain objective 3, tc attach from the rear ?.

that

the other hand,

On

his

f^crs

threatened

Attacking

to

cr

objective

he uses it

nay

The enemy his reserve

subjected

be

flank by the *'orces frcr objective the enemy commander must

that remain

be rut

If

recognise

between "B" and objective

are

3

off if he does not regain objective 3

it

operational

en

advantage which insures at least partial success. commander

dees

will have disadvantages.

The

3.

enemy

force rust face direct fire to attach" the dominating terrain. flow of battle from

The

objective

4

is

that point and the taking of

beyond the scope of

221

tnis

thesis.

It

is

that

obvious

The new situation

new situation exists.

a

is

^avorable to the friendly commander.

irore

advantage of "alternative objectives"

An

planner

deception

practice

ambiguous situation. changes can

as

opportunity

to

The enerry is always presented with

an

the

The reason is obvious.

the situation changes

be predicted.

it

the

always provided

is

craft.

his

that

This is

a

cannot

be

is

which

plan

A

compromised

significant advantage

the present planning process because it increases

over

enemy's

the

chance of making the wrong decisions even without the use an actual deception

of

operation.

author

The

nor

suggested

has

that

the

"alternative

objectives" concept is rot ir opposition to the principle

of

I

of the objective.

rraintenanre

It

is possible

that 'the two '

concerts will of

opposed in

be

a

given

situation and the concept

"alternative objectives" rust not be used.

possible viable

is

disc

that only one viable course of action exists.

Two

alternatives might net be

compatible.

It

"Alternative

objectives" can only be used in the right situations. -



£ odel of the r ecept ion Flow ;

Figure as

it

right exist in

objectives' of

presents the conceptual flow of

2

a

concept is

action as Plan

action as Plan

E

A

operation for which the i

deception

alternative

mpleren ted usirg the primary

course

(operation) and the secondary course

(deception).

222

of

'

DECEPTION

FIGURE 2 TEE ALTERNATIVE "OBJECTIVES" XCElL

UNTEP.

iLO'A

ENEM! IS PRESENTEE WITH AN AM3IGUCUS S ITUATION

INTELLIGENCE VERIFIES THAT ENEMY PERCEIVES THE MCST APPROPRIATE

EPIEMLY OBJECTIVE

intelligence verifies that enemy is in a state of ambiguous perception cf the friendly ituation

C^

COUPS: OF ACTION

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t

central idea of "alternative oojectlves" is

The

concept just

ndving two viable courses of action

of

discernible

enerry

One

another

courses of action The

difference.

difference.

while

alternate

The

one.

target

instead

provide

gaining Key

might

strength,

intermediate

ultimate

objectives

objective.

need not all

i

trie

r.

modes.

lead directly

The path taken might simply

oe

least resistance which retains the initiative

of

key

intention, or they

style,

different in combinations of several

be

the

of

forces. The courses of action might be different time,

a

terrain

option right be for the destruction

modes of place,

of

have

mist

rright

option might be for

the

The the

to

the oath

wnile

the

ene^y force is manipulated into positions of disadvantage.

Tistracting

anticipate should provide an

cannot

he

the enemy's attention with actions

T

ha

Vhaiey

advantage.

quoted Liddell Eart as having said: "To insure reaching an objective one should have alternate objectives. For if the en e^y is certain as to your point chance of guarding of aim he has the best possible If, on the other hand, himself and blunting your weapon. that t hreat ens_ alt emate you take a line objectives, you distract his mind anc his forces." [P.ef l?3j .

Intelligence

duality know

-tlso

essential in

the alternative plans can

forth to avoid the enemy's strengths. find enemy weaknesses and

to

discover

has

fnrmeo.

ar-y

support

the

of

Intelligence must allow the commander

the enemy so that

back ^^6 must

planning.

remains

or all

o*

shifted

Intelligence

this may entail the

the preconceptions

22

be

tc

that

the

need er

err y

Knowledge manner

certain

alternative

the enemy predisposition

of

essential

is

use

to

deception while the other is

a

also

necessary to signal when changes to the plan are needed. changes

Fay

simple timing rrodif ications designed

te

on the enemy's mental

the

deception plan and the real plan as required

that

the enemy is always wrong.

There War"

such that intelligence

is

insure

"Fog

of

unable to reliable predict

is

The temporary advantage tnat

the enemy situation.

play

to

tc

times in any operation wnen the

are

The

interchange

The changes might

biases.

a

of

The feedback channels are

the operation.

for

in

Such knowledge allows the commander

plans.

choose one course of action as chosen

deceptive

the

to

act

to

the

enemy

is

also

I

right have at such

tire ce

objectives"

be

offset if the enery

theoretical

mace

be

m

a

fold.

evolves

The is

re del

the

is

shown

Eaoh path would

itself

in

basis

Figure

deception

central a

nlter-iate objectives at

central

totally random

a

manner. re

ob-

be equally

"fogged" environment.

reception objectives'

a

advantage of random behavior could

tained without degrading tactics.

viable in

during

The shifts in the plan

model.

"fogged" situation could

The

1

with the ambiguous situation provided by the "alterna-

faced tive

a

2.

The deception is three-

is That

deception

"alternative

the

for

operation

the

oecav.se

the key tires during

it

based

the battle.

deception is most important in that it

22b

is

is

bases

that on

The en

achieving

ar

operational advantage rather

generating

than

surprise. The operational deception conducted at division ievei

second

the

is

deceptions.

the three

of

focuses

It

on

confusing

the

campaign.

Theoretically, the operational deception supported

enemy

as

the central deception has

by

misleading single

the

course

enemy

objective

much greater

a

than

of action.

final

the

to

does

a

The ambiguity

produced is

°inal objective.

the

at

by

a

the

least

the

The goal

o^

advantage

operational deception is reducer' to achieving

the

cf

deception supporting

result of the operational deception.

expected

the

probability

deception should insure that ambiguity

central

of

The scope of the deception

re-

is

I

duced via ble

and

the

mo

e

a

tactical deception conducted

maneuver units during each phase of

the

The tactical deception measures would such c

as

false target generators,

bined

operation.

rely on modern

irult

devices

ispectral decoys,

and

with maneuver to portray one plan while the ether

effect.

advantage collect

the

These devices would be com-

ommunica tion s-node simulators.

in

becore

.

The third deception is by

solutions

elegant

simple and

The tactical deceptions would gain an opera 'or

enery

the maneuver forces due to

bullets.

Tactical

their

deception

r

was io::al

tendency would

to

also

generate ambiguity to support the central deception without requirement for additional planning.

226

a

The tactical deception

.

The path

planning is provided by the alternative plan. executed

the operation is the path to

in

deception. arrbiguity

Signals

generated along both paths provide

the

optimizes deception because it goes

deception

conclusions that

risk

The

threefold deception possible when using alterna-

plans

optimal

in

practices

this thesis.

of

might

enemy

the

net reduce

security

correctly

the

.

it

predict

hew

Alternative planning

does

intelligence,

it

does

that

the

but

possibility

the

becomes "fogged".

The model

provides for the cooperative use of operational and

deception at the division level. itself is

tion

basec

on

."

[Bef

tactical

insures that the operaThe model seers

"all warfare

is

7eet

to

based

on

174j

.

Maintaining could

It

deception.

the estimate made by Sun Tzu that

deception

the

in

the

against

intelligence is v-ong or that

the

Alternative plans reduce

the demands for quality

mors

beyond

reviewed

were

that

operation will proceec

friendly

provice

be

.

The tive

executed

not

an

alternative plan at

satisfy the presert reaui regents for

division

le

deception,

continuous

search

treme r dous

operational advantages while presenting ambiguity

signa Is to the enemy

for paths of

least

resistance

promises

.

There ^re significant costs involved with raintaining an alternative plan. al

resources

to

The critical

issue is finding addition-

accomodate the increased need

22?

for

planning

.

and coordination.

the present planning process

of

if icat ion

automation

through

rather

realized

and

additional

than

that

s

slight

a

manpower.

computer/word pro-jessor serving the

user

multiple

this thesis recommend

objectives" model be adopted as

"alternative

the rrod

The author of

would allow an increase in efficiency which would

A

planners

offset

the

increased requirements. P.

EICFPTION PLANNING AND EXICUTION BY deception

Tactical

oe done

can

to

U.S. AEP.Y DIVISION

support

tained simply by supporting tactical deceptions line units and this can be done with only in

resources.

The use

camouflage

passive

is

of

p

or the

costs

d

effective measure which carries

effective if

it

built

dollars,

thousand

to

for

all

The

example,

decoy

is

cost

author

Tne

procurement of tactical

combat units he

A

same decoy could

killed many times.

be

this thesis recomrends that

devices

for

saves only one tank.

tough enough

"ront

complement

to

almost no overhead in terms of planning and support.

which

ob-

modest investment

a

active camouflage

cost

a

Army

U.S.

Significant benefits can De

level operations.

brigade

A

developed,

re '

-

deception

approved,

and

funded

Operational di7ision

level

objectives tional

would

deception

(ran

he

done

to

operations whether ^r not

model is adopted.

deception under probably not

te

support

is

That opera-

the "aliencti're objectives"

required for

?26

all

Army

"alternative

the

The difference

U.S.

concept

operations.

The

manipulative

occasional built

the

deception necessary

ambiguity could be handled on

in

The routine use of deception as

basis.

supplement

to

case

a

case

by

combat multiplier;

a

however, would overload the part-time resources thct presentare used to plan and execute deception

ly

of this thesis recommends that operational

author

planned on

be

situd

t

operations.

a

ion demands

The

The

deception

routine basis and executed as often

as

.

requirements

for increasing the use of

operational

deception follow tbe arguments developed in this thesis. needs for secrecy,

substantial

organization,

Competition for resources

resource demand.

filled using the existing force structure.

how

to

produce this

do

studied

compromise

or

could

-" r

and

wiil

oe

terms of how

it

cannot

ccn

it

evolve into

can

a

be

be

dore.

done so that

viable deception

eventual

an

organization

concept.

resource problem.

tion

Any proposal

recommends that the resource proolem should

author

additional

re

of

and operations

The

of

Tne author

many reasons why

in

a

to

drawbacks

that will have significant

thesis

The

and coordination produce

division is such that the requirements will have

the

the

-proposes

solution

one

to

deception

the

starting ooirt for

It

is

recommenaeo. as

studies as

it

does provide ideas as to new decep-

be done at

the division level without

chcngjng the force structure.

«

The solution dnes

some changes in roles and responsibilities.

2c±

increasing involve

E§ce.ption Planning Resources

!•

d

Corrmand Level

.

commander

The

and control He

try

by

in

corrrand

retaining the initiative.

rrust

keep the enemy's possible options in mind

and

to

Keep at least one rrove ahead of the enerry

decision-

Fe will

maker. the

include the enerry

to

the central character

The corrrander must extend his

planning.

deception

Terrains

retain the initiative if he is able to reduce

enemy's options and manipulate the enemy's of disadvantage.

positions

forces

into

The commander provides focus

deception plan and the operations plcn

the

"both

rrust

to

insure

to

that the central aspects of the plans are complimentary.

Coordinating Staff Level

b.

i

The coordinating staff level contains

knowledge,

talent,

a^d experience that allows

direct

the

action

staff and they

advisors for the commander. involved

in

deception

of the

division

to

These senior personnel manage

conduct efficient operations. and

a

rrfch

are

principle

the

directly

They rarely becore as

planning as they

do

in

operations

planning. The proposal is that

priate

the commander select

personnel from the coordinating staff level,

them

with seme additional expertise,

ano

with

providing the deception guidance

nc

the

desires

jectives.

of the commander

This

group

into

charge

appro-

augment

the

group

cessary to translate

cohesive

deception

ob-

tight meet with the commander after

22 2

evening to

rress

long

address deception requirements

to

reception may not

range battle.

every battle and this group might only

author

The the

well-experienced personnel.

around

the

charge

of

a

available

deception

expert of whatever rank,

even

a

formed

be

assistants

his

in

The G3 ana the G2

be

included whenever they

were

special staff officers for deception might

and

The

added.

it

Executive officers from the

minimum.

major subordinate units might

group

organize

The group might

the functional staff sections.

to

occasionally.

and would

division Chief of Staff and

would be required as

applicable

be

this thesis would call this

of

"Extended Battle Planning Group'

with

rreet

the medium

'or

staff expert might

oe

be

deception

a

member of the local resistance, cr

a

converted civilian with special attributes.

Magicians

might be particularly adept at the application of illusions. c.

Action Staff Level The

of orders.

operation action

officers

in

the

division

staff

actually conduct most of the planning and coordina-

sections tion

action

as

staff

it

They also supervise the execution pretains to their

functional

areas.

m

should not normally be involved

of

the

The

deception

planning and execution. d.

reception Planning Level A

deception planning cell should

the G2 deception officer as

staff

representative should

be

the officer in charge be

provided from G3

231

formed (OIC).

with A

operations,

G3 plans,

and G2 plans,

G4 plans,

The QIC's for PSYOFS and OPSEC

the signal office.

and

(CIWI) S3 should also

the MI battalion

deception

The

members

planning cell is

a

of the cell must plan

subset of

security

the

specific

The

deception

requirements from the guidance received

Planning Group and

Battle

trust

integrate

into cohesive deception plans.

quirements

frorr

the

the

re-

They must insure

that conflicts with the operations plan are resolved

compromising

deception

the

plan

rest

the

to

the

for

reasons.

Extended

and

he included.

hut the separation is necessary

staff

dction

the fire support office,

without of

the

headquarters.

How

The

2-

Battle

possible

Planning

duality

scenarios.

It

planning.

The

predict

enemy

Group attempts to

probabilities,

assign

actions,

Planning

initiates

commander

The

Extended

of Pece_ption

also

and

predict

attempts

to

outcomes predict

reactions, determine enemy preconceptions, and focus

gence requirements.

work in

would

ba^ e

to

It

be

charge of the All Source Analysis Center (ASAS

the division tactical operations center

The

alternatives

this

analysts

supporting

(PTOC).

commander presents guidance for duality planning based on results of the extended

battle

esti-

The staff estimates of the situation are prepared and

mate.

briefed

)

enemy

intelli-

would be expected that much of

done in conjunction with the

of

.

252

The

course

normally would be>

action briefing is conducted

of

however,

as

the commander would then

it

select

two courses of action instead of just one.

The Extended Battle Planning Group would then conduct a

revision of the two courses of action to establish

using points, could

phased approach of

a

milestones,

include

a

tirre

courses

of

command

approval.

action

intersection

phase lines.

or

decision

points,

An alternate

line or snapshot approach.

would then be

duality

method

Zhe revised

coordinated

receive

a^d

The Extended Battle Planning ^rcup would

opera-

then prepare the deception theme and guidance for the

tional deception to support the alternative plan. The

next phase in the flow of deception planning

done in conjunction with

etailed planning.

i

is

The division

G3

planning section initiates the detailed planning by providing guidance to the sta~f action officers. tfie

supervision, the coordination, and the prepa ra r ion of the

operations

order.

It

is

also responsiole for disseminating

the operations order by phases. to

The section conducts

u^rk

The deception OIC woulc have

closely with the plans OIC to

estaolish

the

non-

essential aspects of the operations plan which can be used in the

deception

aspects

a

oasis of

nf the operation would

protection.

be

The

truth.

identified,

critical

insure their

to

The deception OIC would then pnepa-e the details

of the deception and

to provide

story

u

c

ing the guidance that

wa

the openotions information that was provided.

2.56

c

received

deceotion

The

planning

OIC

would then

form

and would provide guidance.

cell

The

functions aspects of the deception.

wculd

OIC

coordination

serve as the focal point in the preparation and of

deception

the

The deception

CIC

would prepare the detailed deception plan after the coordinaThe deception plan would

was complete.

tion

the Extended Battle Planning Group a

decision briefing

rratri*

and

would

OIC

tion

to

and would be presented

receive command approval.

then translate the plan into

Battle Planning

Extended

continuous review? of the environment cos",

execution

an

Group by

conduct

applying The princi-

actions, cost effectiveness of actions,

o*'

wculd base their evaluations on enemy action,

priate

the time,

would

The Group

chances of succes;, and freedom of action effects.

enery situation,

in

The execution of the plan would begin.

the location.

ples cf war,

oy

The decep-

the activity,

specifying the action agency,

The

reviewed

be

changes

in

changes

the

i i

enemy preconceptions, anc approThe Group would be

measures of effectiveness.

the operational

situation

in

a

position

to

friendly

forces and would be able to anply their operational

expertise

appreciate

to

recommend changes

Group would

te

collection

requirements

deception

the deception

able to specify (additions to the

progress

intelligence,

in

end

Croup actions would

plan.

reports

from

QPSEC,

on

on

a

continuous D^sis.

234

The

the

counter-

interrogation of enemy prisoners of oh

the

intelligence

and would rronitcr feedback

through

of

war.

Deception ExiSllIiflU

3-

aHl Q^§Idtions

H£SflLlir£££

Execution resources are an essential part of

in

very precise manner if they are to convey

a

signals he

The deception measures rust

organization.

tion

to

requirement

responsibility example

executed

the

correct

The author of this thesis recommends

execution

the

re

Positive control over deception rust

the enerry.

established.

decep-

a

of

will

be

considered

subordinate unit.

a

division's

the

be

command

a

The unit used

military

that

an

as

i^t ell i^e^ce

battalion (CIW-I). The

requirement

first

deception forces.

The

M

is

'or

o *

cojrrander

i

battalion commander would have tne

required experience in operations and in intelligence.

the

commander has an established relationship

m*I

members of the Fxtended fdttle Planning Sroup. access

direct

.As

cf one of the division's major subordinate

commander

to

division commander

the

the

a

units,

with

the

Fe also

has

which

would

oe

essential for such an operation.

The the

The

!*

battalion

engineer

division signal the G?

,

Thp

c^mrand

signal

The

not

o

"fir*er.

+

the

second

T r"

a

very complex unit,

he does not

sake of argument,

engineer.

is

commander runs

I

ccmrander battalion

have an is

but

additional

also

comnander

the is

The division intelligence

ti

fcr job.

vision.

also

tne

officer

battalion con-manner.

requirement for the execution forces

and control organization.

23 b

The use of

an

is

a

existing

structure

force

an obvious improvement over

is

Deception

organization.

ad-hoc

an

measures may be required over

entire division area of operations.

the

This requires communica-

tions which for security reasons should be Kept encrypted for normal division operations.

nets that are not used

The

division

battalion

1*1

has assets located

support team that is the size of

manned

There

brigade

head-

battalion Tech-

the

organic

the

to

has

platoon.

There are battalion assets lecated

aviation assets

support area and,

provided

in

the form of

the in

ire division

finally, there are OFSFC teams and counter-

which nay >e

teams

battalion

commander

would

found

communications

anywhere.

All

in

are

these

of

The MI

owns more internal communications en in

infantry

or

armored

place and should

the increased requirements

handle

The

CUICKFIX

elements are connected using organic communications.

be

in

and

battalion.

MI

battalion

intelligence

brigade

a

company.

The ASAS at the ETOC is

area.

personnel

by

the

the

and Analysis Center are centrally located

Control

division

the

reinforced

The battalion heaquarters ana

quarters. nical

a

liaison teams at each of

battalion

are

throughout

Each maneuver brigade is provided

area.

en

fcr

be

brigade.

sufficient

deception command

than

The to an."!

control. The

unit to

the si7e of

divert

requirement is

third

small

a

"or

deception

battalion snouii have enough

forces

^or

limited oeriods

236

o*"

forces.

A

flexibility tire.

The

advantage

using the MI battalion is that it

of

variety

wide

vehicles which

of

assets.

the TEAILELAZER,

in

might

used to lay

be

battalion

The

TACJAM, false

a

has

sized trucks,

track

pattern.

and more than sixty snail trucks.

tearrs

which are normally deployed independently and

owr.s

of these vehicles are associated

short duration deception tasks without their intelligence missions.

on

over

a

The

with

The small rright

so

significant

a

battalion

hundred generators which provide

aisc

acoustic

and

deception

emissions that are of increasing value in

thermal

The

than fcrty

rrore

majority

impact

tracked

13

vast

be given

a

And TEAMPACK sections

"battalion has more than twenty large trucks, rrediurr

includes

operations. The fourth requirement for deception execution fcrces is an ability

use

provide the right signals

to

intelligence

of

scripts

detailed

soldiers should reduce nave

would

that

That would

ola.nners.

te

a

near impossible during war.

nical

MI

to

ce

the enemy. the

to

need

for

by

me

prepcred

It

would ay

be

^kc':i

easier if

battalion could use the operational and

advantage.

trie

a nd

The division's expertise

ir

tech-

warrant all

the functional areas of intelligence is directly available the MI battalion

choreograph

commander who controls sufficient assets

individual signals into

20/

::

the execution forces.

expertise of its more than forty officers

officers

The

tire consuming task that would

specific signals were determined The

to

a

o" to

to

coordinated operation.

The

MI

battalion's

rTain

signals of the enemy and

signals

function is to collect it

in

is

a

good position

and

analyze

to

know the

friendly forces that are equally important

frorr

tc

the enemy. A

that

is

requirement for

fi-fth

attached deception elements.

A

fo -ce

assigned

or

battalion-sized unit could do

than if it was attached

better

that

deception execution

have the capability to support

rust

it

a

to

division

the

head-

quarters company.

M

An

battalion

has the

additional

advantage

of

an organic general support maintenance capability "or

having

communications

and electronic equipment.

There will be

increased need for the fielding of new deception equipment

an to

meet

the advances in eneiry intelligence collect j

ity.

Much of this equipment will be electronic in nature and

will

probably'

The equiprent will need to

position. and

operate automatically once

transported.

is

store:',

placed

In

maintained,

The authorized manning for such an element

may have to be minimal. a

te

it

capabil-

or.

Support would have to

be

provided

by

host unit.

The use of a

use

a

battalion sized unit in the executicr of

deception operation should he much more efficient than of

an

The deception mission could

control.

ranner control

ad-hoc organ: zation or the use

as

eny

other mission.

The

be

of

decentralized

handled

existing

the

in

the same

command

structure could provide the positive control

and

needed

.

adaptability.

for

The

The designation of one headquarters

advantages.

the coordination problems.

tion could become

a

rrission

things as

a

should ease

The flow of the deception opera-

srrooth and

envious extension of commar

to

the division's MI

battalion.

advantages have been discussed.

those

channels and

through

intelligence,

signals

interrogation.

A

exists to provide immediate feedback on

of

such

CI

i

rer t

link

links to

counterr\

to

Li

C

T?

"

friendly signals that

compromise the deception.

Another

advantage

communications

imitative

tasks for the

N'I

battalion.

is

measures

that many

deception and jamming

sucn

as

already

a -e

The very Fission or intelligence

always link the battalion

will

Some

e-

direct link to both &2 and G3 through the support

intelligence,

might

c

c

Others include

tears provided to those sections and also the direct

feedback

.security

are many obvious advantages to giving the

There

ception

has

use of only one unit

to

deception because

of

the

requirement to know the enemy before you can deceive him. The importance of the intelligence nnissior,

should

and

is

be

sufficient to justify the

idea

however, that

battalions should not be assignee the deception mission.

author has used the most

tions a

M

battalion example simply

familiar with that organization.

te< a ise

Deception

is

ar\

The he is

opera-

function and an increased tie to intelligence might

serious mistake.

be given

to

The author recommend

c

that seric-'S

determining the best w*y tc organize.

nor r

*'T

be

study

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

C.

Deception seers

to

wide open area in which there ere

be a

experts and fewer solutions.

few

present

5orre of

the issues and provide some ideas

tactical deception.

There is

before

even

sary

analysis

will

it

of the problem.

requirements

requirements Studies

understand

possible

The development

tc

is

detailed

"begin

of

neces-

capa Dili ties,

just some of

are

the

initial

decepanalysis

.

must be done cq methods to train commanders

decision

other

"be

regarding

support applicable to future tactical

communications tion

lot more work that

a

to

erployment concepts and intelligence and

tactics,

programs,

This thesis has tried

makers,

operating elements,

the deception process.

effectively plan for,

make,

and

The}

end

and staffs

to

must ne trainee

tc

execute deception decisicr-s

and integrated actions.

Analysis

must bE dene To identify and provide the

addi-

tional

intelligence

The key

issue will have to be on the intelligence required

requirements in support

of

deception. tc

identify enemy oredispositions ani preconceptions. Ara lysis is needed to identify training requirements

qualifications act

i

for

personnel who perform

ecept ion-rela tec

viti es.

Research, development, test ment

d

and

of

ar\n

evaluation, and

systems applicable to deception

requirements

that require analysis.

?i.(/

are

ail

procurepossible

Analysis

required to identify all options

is

for use in tactical deception. be

sufficient

options

advantage

to

is

Finally,

Because each option

accomplish the deception

he carefully hlended

rrust

obtained

work

is

test

possible deception data base

ddtd

base is

best

possible data base

a

to

tasi:

insure

y

not

alone,

the

that

rr

a

cptirnl

available resources.

frorr

additional

available

good start, is

needed to insure that is

available.

but it could

be

required before

work can be done.

£41

>'haiey's

improved. rrucfc

of

the

The

the other

APPFNIIX A.

CASE

LIST A:

A.

LISTS OF BATTLES IN TFE DATA SFT

CASES OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE ANL/OR DECEPTION

PLACE

TATE

OPPONENTS

TANGA (GER. EAST AFRICA)

BRITAIN/GSR.

GALLIPOLI (TURKEY)

JRIT-FR/GiR-TURK

2/05/15

GORLICE (GALICIA)

GERMANY /BUSS

A4

4/06/16

BRUSILOV OFFENSIVE (PUS.)

RUSSIA/AUSTRIA

Ad

24/10/1?

CAPORETTO (ITALY)

AUSTRIA-GER/ITALY

A6

31/10/17

3RD BATTLE CF GAZA (PAL.)

BRITAIN /GER -TURK

A7

21/03/18

ST.

CUENTIN (FRANCF)

GEF,

A8

31/09/18

ST.

MIHIFL (FRANCE)

U.S ./GERMANY

A9

19/09/18

MEGIIDO (PALESTINE)

3RIT/GER-T JRK

A9A

26/09/18

MEl'SF-ARGCNN

U .S .-ER/GERMAf* Y

A10

16/08/20

VARSAW (POLAND

POLANT/RIJSSIA

All

26/08/22

DUMLUPINAR (TURKEY)

TURKEY/GREECE

A12

12/03/37

GUADALAJARA

REP. SPAIN/ITALY

A13

15/12/37

TERUEL (SPAIN)

REP. SP/'NAT.

Si 5

A 14

25/07/38

E1PO (SPAIN)

PEP. SP-'NAT.

SF

A15

20/08/39

KFALKEIN-GCL (MANCHURIA)

RUSSIA/JAPAN

A16

1/0C/3S

POLAND

GERMANY 'POLAND

A17

9/04/40

DENMAFK

GIF MA NY

A18

9/04/40

NORWAY

GER/NCRWA Y-ER-FR

A19

10/05/40

NETHERLANDS

GER .'NETH-FP-B?

A20

10/05/40

BELGIUM

GF^ /EELG-ER-xP

Al

2/11/14

A2

25/04/15

A?

E

(FRANCE)

(SPAIN)

IA

/IE IT-TPAN CF

,

2 42

-T

ENM«

p

\.

GER/FR-BR

A 21

10/05/40

FRANCE

A22

06-09/40

INV. OF BRIT

(PLANNING)

GERMANY /BRITAIN

A23

09/40-42

INV. OF BRIT

(HOAX PEASE)

GERMAN! /"BR IT A IN

A24

23/09/41

DAKAR

A 25

9/12/41

A26

31/03/41

A2?

6/04/41

A28

Sin

BRITAIN/VICE. FR 3ARF.AM

DESERT)

(W.

BRITAIN/ ITALY

MERSA EL BREGA (CYRENAICA) GERMANY/BRITAI!

YUGOSLAVIA

GER/YUGOS LAVIJ

22/06/41

RUSSIA

GERMANY/PUSS

A29

25/08/41

KIEV

GERMANY /RUSS IA

A30

7/12/41

PEARL HAPIOR (U.S.)

JAPAN-'U.S.

A31

8/12/41

MAIAYA

JAPAN/BPITAIN

A32

26/05/42

GAZALA (V. DESERT)

GERMANY 'BRITAIN

A33

3-4/06/42

MIDWAY (PACIFIC)

JAPAN /U.S.

A34

28/06/42

SOUTHERN RUSSIA

GERMANY /RUSS IA

A35

23/10/42

ALAMEIN

EF.IT/GEP-TTAI

A36

8/11/42

A3?

06-10/43

EUON PENINSULA

A38

10/07/43

SICILY (ITAL V

)

A39

1/11/43

BOUGAINVILLE

(S.

A40

20/11/43

TARAWA fGTLBFPT IS.)

U.S. /JAPAN

A41

22/01/44

ANZIC (ITALY)

U .S .-BR /GERMAN"'

A42

1/P2/44

A43

22/04/44

FOLLANDIN (NEV GUINEA)

U.S. /JAPAN

«44

11/05/44

4TF BATTLE CT CASS IMC

ALLIES /GERMANY

A45

5/06/44

A46

22/06/44

(RUSSIA)

(V.

DESERT)

NCRTF AFRICA

I*

Y

U .S .-BR /GER-VICi (

N.

GUINEA) U.S. /JAPAN BR-U

PACIFIC)

JWJALEIN (MAPSFAL

IS.)

.S

.

'GER-IT

U.S. /JAVA

I

U.S. /JAPAN

"'

NCRMANDY (FRANCE)

"

BELCRUSSIA (RUSSIA'

FUSS lA/GFPMAN'Y

243

T .

J

.-BR

'G

IRM

A

A

A

.

A 47

25/07/44

NORMANTY BREAKTHROUGH

U.S .-3R /GERMANY

A48

15/08/44

SOUTHERN FRANCE

U.S.-ER/GERMA.\ V

A49

20/10/44

LEYTF IS.

U.S. /JA PA

A50

24/10/44

LIYTE GULF

A51

16/12/44

ARIENNES

A52

9/01/45

A53

(PHILIPPINES)

JAPAN /U

(JELGIUv)

.S

N

.

GERMANY /U.S

LUZON (PHILIPPINES)

U.S./JAFA

01-05/45

TFE FAVAPIAN RIEOUET

GERMANY/U .S.-iF

A54

14/02/45

IRRAWAITY (3URMA)

BRITAIN/JAPAN

A55

6/08/45

HIROSHIMA

U.S ./JAPAN

A56

22/12/48

ISRAEL

ISRAEL /EGYPT

A 57

25/06/50

KOREA

N.XCR/S .SCR -U.S.

A 58

1950-1953

KOREA (USSR INTERVENTION)

RUSSIA/U.S.

A59

15/09/51

INCFCN

U.S./N. <0RlA

A

60

25/10/51

YALII

CHINA

A

61

15/10/53

KCJC FEINT

U.S ..'N.KCP-CHr-

A62

20/11/53

EII-NdlBNFHU

63

29/10/56

SINAI CAMPAIGN'

A 64

31/10/56

SUEZ CANAL

65

17/04/61

PAY OF FTGS

A 66

5/06/67

67

20/08/68

A

A

A

P.

CASE

LIST B: TATE

PI

4/08/14

32

27/08/14

P3

7/02/15

T^T

SH

(VIETNAM) (EGYPT)

-'U

.3

N

.

FRANCE/ VI IT MINH ISRAEI /EGYPT

FR-BR 'EGYPT (CUEA)

U.S ./CUIA

ISRAEL/EGYPT

LAY WAR

CZECH INVASION

PUSS T

/CZECH

CASFS OF TACTICAL SURPKISr AND OR DECEPTION

OPPONENTS

PLACE

LIEGE (EEIGIU V

GI

)

RMANY/PSLGI T

OSTENI rEMONSTRATION

BRITAIN /GERMANY

MASUHIA (EAST PRUSSIA)

GERMANY

r^f±

A

RITSS

I

)

.

E4

10/03/16

NEUVE CHAPELLE

35

22/04/15

2ND BATTLE OF IP RES (BELG) GERMANY /3R-FB

16

6/08/1S

SUVLA PAY (GALLIPOLI

BRITAIN /TURK-GIB

36A

7/10/15

SERBIA

GEF-AUS -3UL/SER'3

FVAC. OF SUVLA AND ANZAC

ERITAIN/TURK-GER

EVAC. OF CAFE BELLES

ER-FR/TURK-GIR

B7

20/12/15

18

9/01/1C

(FRANCE)

-

ERITAItf /GERMANY

B8A

21/02/16

VERDUN (FRANCE)

GERMANY .'FRANC 2

B9

18/03/16

LAKE NAPOCF (RUSSIA^

RUSSIA/GERMANY

B10

31/05/16

RATTLE OF JUTLAND

GERMANY /BRITAIN

Ell

9/04/17

SCAPPF

B12

7/06/17

BATTLE OF MEiiSINES

B13

20/11/17

CAMBPAl

B14

27/05/18

CKEMIN-DES-DAMES

GER /FR-BR-U. S

B15

4/07/18

FAMIL (FRANCE)

ER-U.S

B16

18/07/18

2ND RATTLE CF TEE MARNE

FR-BR-U

117

8/08/18

AMIENS

BR-FR/GIRMANY

B18

9/0 7/21

BATTLE OF ESKISEEEIR (TUR) GREECE /TURKEY

EISA

6/02/37

JAFAi*A

3183

6/07/37

3RUNETE (SPAIN)

LOYALISTS /RE3ILS

B19

02-05/41

ITALIAN FAST AFRICA

BRITAIN /ITALY GER /3R-GREFCE

VIMY RIEG5 (FR)

S,

(BELG)

(FRANCE)

CRETE

E21

16/11/41

SIDI RFZEGE

B22

21/01/42

MEFSA EL

±23

6/^5/42

324

20/06/42

TOBPTJK

B25

17/08/42

MAKIN ATCIL



.

EESERT)

T

*

.

.S

.

/GER

'8? ITA IN

GERMANY /PUSS

EESERT) (C

/GERMANY

BRITAIN /GFR-ITAI.Y

GERMANY

3P EGA

KEPCF (RUSSIA) (

.

tllELS/tOYAIlSTS

(SPAIN)

20/0 5/41

BRITAIN /GERMANY

BRITAIN/GERMANY

(FRANCE)

320

ERITAIN/GIRMANK

.

PACIEIC)

24-S

IA

GER MANY/ BR ITA IN

U.S./JAPA

326

19/08/42

IIFPPE (FRANCE)

BRITAIN GERMANY

527

31/08/42

ALAM HAIFA (W. DESERT)

BRITAIN/GERMANY

328

14/02/43

KASSEEINE (TUNISIA;

GERMANY /U.S. -BR

529

6/03/43

MEDENINE (TUNISIA)

ER I TAIN/GERMANY

530

6/0 5/43

MASSICAULT (TUNISIA)

BRITAIN /GERMANY

331

28/11/42

BATTLE OF SANGRO

BRITAIN/GERMANY

532

2/12/42

B33

29/02/44

134

8/04/44

335

(ITALY)

MONTE CAMINO (ITALY) ANZIO COUNTERATTACK

U.S .-ER/GERMAf' (

ITALY )GERMA NY/U

.S

.

Y

-B?

CRIMEA (RUSSIA)

RUSSIA/GER-RTJM

10/06/44

KARELIA

RUSSIA /FINLANI

536

15/06/44

SAIPAN

U.S

337

24/26/44

TINIAN

U.S ./JAPAN

538

25/08/44

GCTFIC LINE (ITALY)

BRITAIN ''GERMANY

339

8/02/45

PEI CHS WALT

BR-CANAIA /GERMANY

540

IS/02/45

IVO JIMA

U.S

341

9/04/45

PC VALLEY

54?

15/10/48

PAIESTINE

ISRAEL/EGYPT

543

28/10/48

GALILEE

ISRAEL/EGYPT

C.

CASE

LIST

C:

(RUSSIA)

(ITALY

.

.

/JAPAN

'JAPAN

ALLIES/GERMANY

)

TACTICAL CASES NOT INVOLVING SURPRISE OP DECEPTION

5ATF

OPPONENTS

PIACE

CI

12/08/14

SERBIA

CIA

17/08/14

TANNEN5ERG

C13

9/0 5/15

AUSTRIA /S (E.

PRUSSIA)

2ND BATTLE OF APTOIS (FR)

PUSS IA/GER* ANY

FRANCE/GERMANY

ISONZO ITALY/AUSTRIA

C?

23/06/15

1ST & 2ND BATTLE OF

C3

25/09/15

BATTLF OF LOOS (FRANCE)

nA

25/09/15

2NI

EATTLF OF CEAMPAGNF

24 6

RJ *IA

i¥ ITA IN ''GERMA NY

FRANCE/GERMANY

8

4TH 3ATTLE 01 ISONZO ITALY /AUSTRIA

C5

ie/10/iE

3RP.

C7

15/05/16

TIROL (ITALY)

AUSTRIA/ ITALY

C8

1/07/ie

3ATTLE OF SOMME (FRANCE)

0R-ER/GFRMANY

C9

e/08/ie

6TH BATTLE OF ISONZO

ITALY /AUSTRIA

RUM/AUS-GIRM-BULG

6.

CSA

27/08/16

RUMANIA

C93

12/09/16

3ATTLF OF MONASTIR

C10

14/09/ie

7TF-9TF EATTLF OS ISONZO

Cll

26/03/17

1ST

3ATTLE OF GAZA

C12

16/04/17

2M

EATTLE OF AISNE

C13

17/04/1?

2ND 9ATTLE OF GAZA

3R 'TJPK-GERMANY

C14

73/04/17

2ND EATTLF OF SCARPI

BRITAIN 'GERMANY

C15

12/05/17

10TH 3ATTLJ OF ISONZO

ITALY /AUSTRIA

cie

31/<^7/17

EAT TIT OJ PASS CHEN-DA ILI

BRITAIN

C17

18/08/1?

11TH 3ATTLE OF ISONZO

ITALY/AUSTRIA

NOYCN-MONTLIDIEF

.TERM A NT! /FRANCF.

C17A

9/06/18

(

SERBIA) FR-3P-SFR3/GEPM-3U ITALY /AUSTP *A 3R

(ER)

(FR)

/TURK-GERMANY

FRANCE /GERMANY

/GERI* A NY

cia

15/06/18

3ATTLF OF PIAVF (ITALY)

AUSTFIA ITALY -EF

CIS

15/07/1

CKAMFAGNE-MARNE (FRANCE)

GERMANY

C20

24/10/18

EATTIF OF VITTOPIO VINFTO

IT ALY-EP-FP. /AIjST

C21

23/08/21

3ATTLE OF SAKARYA

GREECF/TURK" £Y

C21A

8/11/36

SFIC-I

OF MALRIL

(TURKEY)

(SPAIN)

PEf

r

1

S

''ALLIES

/TO

i

AT TS'T

C22

30/11/40

RUSSO-FINNISH WAR

RUSSIA /'cINLA NI

C73

11/08/40

BRITISH SOMALILANE

FTAI

BATTLE OF BRITAIN

GERMANY

7rFRNANY/ERITAD

C23A 13/08/4S C24

12/^^-/41

SIFGF OF TOEPUK

C25

15/06/41

3

c?e

5/07/43

ATT IF OF SOLLUM

KUPS"

v

'EF ITA

iRITAl'N

-•

-J

T

N

VITA

II-

GERMANY

GEPMANY RUSSIA

(PUSSIAj

24 7

^

Y

(RUMANIA)

.

C26A

1/28/43

PLOESTI

C27

9/09/43

SALERNO (ITALY)

U .S .-BR/GIRMA NY

C28

20/01/44

1ST RATTLE CF CASSINO

U.S ,-ER-FR/GEFMANY

C29

3/02/44

ANZIO,

GERMANY /U

C30

15/02/44

2NE BATTLE CF CASSINO

ALL IIS /GERMANY

C31

16/02/44

ANZIO, 1ST COUNTEROf FENSE

GERMANY'U. S .-3B

C32

7/03/44

IMPFAL (BURMA)

JAPAN/BRITAIN

C33

15/03/44

3RE 3ATTLE CF CASSINO

ALLIES /GERMAN

C34

21/07/44

GUAM

U.S. /JAPAN

VOSSENACK-SCEMIET (GER)

U.S. /GERMANY

26/12/44

SIRCFIO VALLEY (ITALY)

ITALY -GER/ALLIIS

C35A

5/e3/4 5

LAKE 3ALATCN (HUNGARY)

GERMANY /RUSS

C36

1/04/45

OKINAWA

U.S. /JAPAN

C37

22/24/51

C34A C35

2/11/44

C37A 20/05/51

1ST PREP.

U.S ./GERMANY

ATTACK

*

.S

.-3R

IA

1ST COMM. SPRING OFF.

CHINA -N .KOR/U.

KANSAS LINE (KOREA)

U .N ./CH INA-N. KOR

I

C3S

18/08/51

BLOOEY RIEGE

U.N»/NORTS KOREA.

C39

13/09/51

HEARTBREAK RIDGE

U .N

C40

3/10/51

JAMESTCV/N LINE

U.N./CEINA

C41

11/12/51

LITTLE ANE BIG NORI

CHINA'S. KOREA

C4.1A

14/10/52

TRIANGLE PILL

U.S./N.

C42

2d/05/53

NEVAEA OUTPOSTS

CRINA/TUREEY

C43

1/26/53

FINAI COMMUNIST Off.

248

(KOREA)

.

/N

.KOR-CEINA

KOREA

CFINA/U.N.

,,

.

.

LIST OF REFERENCES feds.}. and Herbig, Katherine lanlel, Tonald C. I. Per^crrcn Press, Stratggic Military deception, New YcrK: 1982, p."xi.

I.

Ibid

p.

3

,

p.

4.

5.

Ibid.,

p.

5.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid

.

p.

6.

9.

Ibid.

p.

7.

I?.

Ibid., p.

16.

II.

Ibid.

9.

12.

Ibid., p. 21.

13

Ibid

2

.

-

.

3.

Ibid.

4

Ibid.

.

.

,

.

p.

p.

16.

p.

IB.

p.

21

14.

Icid.

15.

Ibid.,

16.

Ibid.

17.

Ibid.

18.

Fart, B.H. Liddeli. Sherndn, New Yorfc: pp. 315 - 316.

19.

Edrton

Aii-aley,

,

Stratage^i

Carrbrid^e i^ass: Studies, 1969, p. 86.

;',ar,

20.

Ibid

,

p.

.4-480.

21.

Ibid.,

p.

A-49S.

.

MIT

24b

Dodd read.

lSi.?Js.

reception and Surprise in Center for Internatio/

,

22.

Whaley, War,

p.

.

Sarton, 218.

Stratagem

reception and Surprise

23.

Ibid.,

24.

Ibid., p. 232.

25.

Ibid

26.

Ibid., p. 234.

27.

Ibid.,

pp. 93 - 103.

28.

Ibid.

p.

29.

Field Manual Eepartnent of the Ariry, 92r
30.

Ibid.

31.

Ibid., p.

C-12.

32.

Ibid.,

C-8.

.

,

,

,

in

195.

p.

233.

p.

99.

Tactical

C-6.

p.

p.

Ibid., p. C-9. d.

C-ll.

p.

C-l

34.

Ibid.,

35.

Ibid

.

36.

Ibid

.

37.

Arrr.y Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 0506S/80313: De cep_t ion pp. 7-ie to i-ci~.

U.S.

,

;8.

9.

42

,

School,

SuoE 1979,

Arizcr.^.

Tcniel and Ferbig, Strategic Military Deception,

239.

p.

J. A., training exercise recollection of the operations of the 125th Military Intelligence Bettclion ?CEWI), 25th Infantry Eivision, during TFAM SPIFIT 87), Republic of Korea, April 1983.

Van Vleet,

inhaley,

Strata£_err_:

reception and Surp~i c

P

in

'/.'a

r

,

p.

146. 41

Daniel and Fertig, Strategic Military Deception,

42

Ibid., p. 101.

43

lepartrrent of* the Army, Field Manual 30-5j telligence, Washington D.C.", 1971, p". 6-3.

2 57

p.

Combat

ri.

In-

.

.

44

Ibid., p. 6-1

45

Ibid

46,

Department of the Zrmy, Field Manual 34-10.: Military ICorr^at Electronic Jsttalion Warfare *2
.

,

pp

.

4-14 to 4-19.

,

47,

Christopher Wickers, D., Engineering Psychology and Fuman Performance, Charles E. Merril Publishing Corrpany, Columbus, Ohio, 1984, p. 260.

reception," Journal Michael, "intelligence and 5(1), March 1982, p. 134.

Fandel,

48

°£ Strategic. Studies, 49,

Schlesirger, Robert J., Principles of Electronic §_rfare, Peninsula Publishing, Lcs Altos, California 1961, T

:'

,

pp.

26 - 27.

50,

Ibid.

51.

Fandel,

52

stetter, Roberta, "Cuba and Pearl Earbor: Hindsight 43(4), July 1365, no. and Foresight," Foreign Af£dirs,

.

,

15.

p.

"intelligence and Deception," pp. 137

- 133.

V.ohl

691 - 707. 53, 54,

55.

Daniel and Per big. Strategic Military Eecepti Scott,

or,,

p.

5.

ana Scott, Harriet F. William P.. Tne Armed the USSR, 3rd edition, Westview Pre??, Eouicer Colorado, 1984~ pp. 107 - 116. ,

?2l!2es

of

Ibid

pp

V.

.,

120 - 122.

Engineering

iekens.

pp.

78

-

Ibid.,

p.

T

.,

pp

.

,

p.

99.

60

Ibid.,

p.

94

ei

Ibid

62

Ibid.

63.

Pari el dnd Herbig,

bid

Ibid

Psychology and

Hurt!

an Performance,

79. 99. .

97 - 96.

.

,

pp.

2ct

-

227.

Strategic Military reception,

p.

4?

. .

64.

Lefervre, (Trans.

V.

A.,

Algebra

o_f

Conflict,

Moscow,

1£68

)

65.

Tarakanov, E.V., Mathematics and Ar-red Combat, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1S74, FTE-IL (RS )T-0577-79 (Trans.).

66.

I. Mi., Shavrov, and Galkin, Ye., Methodology of Military^ Scientif ic Knowledge, Voyenizcat, Moscow, 1977

(Trans.

)

67.

Committee, Naval Science lepartment, Operations U.S. InstiNdVdl Academy, NdVal Qpgrdtions Analysis, NnVdl tute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, p. 3.

68.

Ibid.

,

pp.

69.

Ibid.

,

p.

24.

70.

Ibid.

71.

Itid.

,

p.

25.

72.

Ibid.

73.

"Notes on GaTe Theory," PestWashburn, Alan, Naval graduate Scnool, Monterey, California, Class handout used in OS3003, 4th Quarter, FY 1984, p. 1.

74.

Operdtions Corrmittee USNA,

23-24.

NaVdl

p. 41.

75.

Ibid.,

p.

25.

76.

Ibid

p.

26.

77.

Ibid.

78.

Ibid., p. 27.

79.

Ibid

.

80.

Ibid

.

.

,

,

c.

28.

,

p.

29.

81.

Ibid.,

p.

30.

82.

Ibid.

p.

41.

83.

Ibid.

84.

Ibid.

85.

Ibid

,

.,

pp. 42 - 44.

252

Cperatipns

Analysis,

,, ,

86.

U.S. Navy (Retired), OS3003 Pushes, Wayne, Captain, lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 August 1S84.

8?.

Ionov, On ^ejhods of Inf luencing an Opponent's recision, roscow, 1971, (Translation).

86.

Tarakancv, ^atherriatics and Arrred Cornbat,

89.

Solnyshkov, Yu S., 1973, (Trans, by Prof. Jarres G. Taylor, Operations Pesearch lepartrrent, N'aval Postgraduate School, provided as class notes in 1984).

90.

Sickens,

p.

315.

.

pp.

11

to

Jngineerin^ Psychology and Furran 13. -

220.

220

-

221.

78,

79,

218

91.

Ibid.

92.

Ibid.

,

p.

93.

Ibid.

,

pp.

94.

Ibid.

,

np.

95.

Ibid., p. 80.

96.

Ibid

97.

Ibid.

98.

Ibid.

cc

Ibid., pp.

92,

100

Ibid

.,

pp.

98 - 100.

101

Ibid

.

Dp.

76 and 77.

102

Ibid

.

pp.

127

pp.

p.

.

Perf orrra.nce,

95.

and 95.

86.

pp. 24 aid 25. ,

pp.

85-87. 93,

-

108, and 109.

137.

'Comrrand Colonel, Technology: Voennaya J.i Sistemctcknika An Algorithmic Approach to Tt\ ?.i ^ ion -r - rIngt" Journal of the Fcyal United Services Institute [or Pffensi Studies, Volume 125, p. 59, 3~Septerrber 1980.

Perrsley,

,

104

Ibid.,

105

Wickens, Engineering mance, p. 494.

p.

106. Scctt and 122.

59.

Psychology,

end

Kurran

Scott, The Arrred forces of The USSR,

2b!

Perforpu

.

120-

,,

..

107. Pechtin, Iberhardt. Dr., "The Technology of 18, Naval War College Review, 1983.

C

errand," p.

108. Daniel and Eerfcig, Strategic Military Deception, p. 10S.

Ibid.,

p.

110. Whaley, 168. Ill

.

Ibid.

,

187. S_trdtager[i

p.

179.

and Surprise in War,

Exception

p.

169.

J. A.; King, r.E.J and Welch, Harris, E. 3.; Count grrreasur.es editors; Peninsula lieotrpnic California, (reprint Publishing, Los Gatos of a 197b, 1971 book declassified in 1973) p. 21-6.

112. 3oyd, E.W.J

.

,

Strgta^erni Deception

113. Whaley, 358.

Surprise in War,

cin,d

o.

A-

114.

Ibid., p. 191.

115.

P. V. Tne Vizard War, Coward rcCann aai Geo^hJones, e^in Incorporated, Nev York, 1978. pp. 85 - 138. f

i

116.

Fisher, David, The War Pa£ician, Coward porated, New York, 1983, "pp. 99 112, and ,

117.

i"cCann

Incor-

121.

Pitts, Piohard J. The Strategy of Fleet rorragnetic Conflict, U.S. Air Fo r t:e Acadery Text, 1974, p. 6. ,

Kin^r, Harris, measures, p. 2-1.

118. ?oyd

119.

-

,

and

Welch,

S_tratagerj Deception and

Wbaley, 23.

120.

Ibid.,

p.

A-102.

121.

Ibid., p.

A- 243.

122.

Ibid

p.

A-281

123.

Ibid.,

p.

A-395.

124.

Ibid.

p.

A-453

125.

Ibid.

p.

199.

126.

Ibid.

,

p.

200.

127.

Ibid.,

p.

A-393

.

,

.

2 54

electronic

Counter-

Surprise in War, p. A-

,,

128.

Ibid., p. A-452.

129.

Ibid.

130.

IMd.

131.

Ibid.

,

pp. 3-24 to 3-37.

,

p.

210.

132. Ibid., p. 215. 133. Valenta, Jiri, tion," Survi val

,

"Soviet Use cf Surprise tnd recepMarch-April 1982, pp. 54 an:'. 55. f

Colonel (Eetired), NurrterSj Predictors & T.N., 134. Tupuy, Inc., New York, War, Ecbbs-Merril Corp a ny, 1979, pp. 14~and 15. 135.

Ibid., p.

162.

136.

Ibid.,

156.

p.

13?. Whaley, Strataggmi ?§.cep_tion and Surprise in War, £-103 and 3-3~t o 3-9. 138.

lupuy,

NurrberSj.

139. Whaley,

Predictors

Stratagerr:

S.

158

War,

pp.

.

Deception dnd Surprise

in

«[ar,

pp.

A-103 to~A-109. 140. Pupuy,

Nurrbers ±

Predictors

&

War,

p.

47.

141.

Ibid., p.

50.

142.

Ibid.,

p.

148.

143.

Ibid.

p.

63.

144.

Ibid

,

p.

231.

145.

Ibid.,

p.

142.

146.

Ibid.

,

o.

143.

147.

Ibid.,

p.

42.

148.

Ibid.

p.

£7.

149.

Interim hcte Nuirber. 7-1 1_? The receptive Special Tr.oo.pc Buxz Practices of the 23rd Bee dg.ua rters^ ing World V G r II, Tactical Operations Analysis Office, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, January 1978, p. iv.

.

Kronrran,

v ark,

2bb

,,

.

,

- 2.

150

Ibid

151

Ibid., p.

152

Ibid.

153

Ibid.

154,

Van Vleet, J. A., Training exercise recollection of the plans and operations of the 25th Infantry fivislon during Tearr Spirit 82, Republic of Korea, Merch 1982.

155.

Ibid.

156.

Ibid.

157.

Ibid.

158.

Ibid.

15S.

Ibid

160.

Ibid.

iei

Ibid.

162.

I

163.

Ibid.

164.

Ibid.

165.

Itid.

166.

Ibid.

167.

"pera perations Corrittee 42.

168

IX Appendix PT-ECR-70, Handling Qualities Pa ting to Scale, Handout provided Dy CAFT. EolviJs for OS4601 t^p k*-, the Cuarter, FY at 1985, Naval Po stgraara t e School, fonterey, California.

169

Art of #a r Griffith, Sun Tm: The Samval 5., University Press, New York, 1963, c. 100.

170

bit

.

pp.

1

50.

pp.

25-26.

.

dhaley,

Stratagem.:

\JSKP.

:

.

N

ayai CperaticQS Analysis,

Eecgption

and Surorise in

132.

171. Griffith,

Su.n

T.zui

The Art of War,

2r:6

p.

101.

,

d.

Oxford

A'ar,

p.

172. Whaley, 129. 173.

Ibid.

,

Sjt

p.

rajagem

:

reception

and Surprise in War,

130.

174. Griffith, Sun Tzuj The Art of War, p. 66.

cZ7

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4.

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